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The way by which nationality and citizenship are codified in law or used by 
political entrepreneurs to mobilize populations is different from how individuals 
make sense of themselves. Although sharing a particular attribute or physical 
connection offers some sort of relational identity, it is the product of belonging both 
to a category and network of individuals in addition to the feeling of belonging which 
produces a bounded groupness. The Russian Soviet anekdot—a politically subversive 
joke—provides an intimate view into the perspective of the Russian people living 
under the Soviet regime. The anekdot serves as a discourse of “cultural 
consciousness,” connecting otherwise atomized people to a homeland, collective 
culture and memory. Beyond its transgressive properties, politically subversive texts 
like the anekdot articulate the details of an intimate set of knowledges that insiders 
“are taught not to know” (Taussig 1999). In this dissertation I look at how the 
characters and narratives construct (1) the boundaries of “we”—who belongs and 
who does not by exploring how different groups are “marked” in the anekdoty, (2) 
how the collectivity negotiates their understanding of leaders, institutions and State 
propaganda as a means of rejecting or reifying aspects of Soviet power, and (3) what 
sort of collective memory and identity is conveyed through the expressions of the 
public secret, nostalgia and/or regret. The anekdot reveals power dynamics at 
multiple levels: within the family, between ethnic groups and geographical regions, 
and between people and state. Together these multiple identities and relationships 
express a form of “cultural consciousness” among Russians uniting this group in a 
shared identity and network amid the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  
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Chapter 1 Humor, Politics, and Identities: the Anekdot 
Brezhnev dies. At the gates of hell, Stalin greets him. 
“How are you doing, comrade Stalin?”  
“I’m in hell, comrade Brezhnev” 
“And how is it?” 
“Well, you know, there are two hells: a Capitalist hell and a Socialist hell.” 
“And which one are you in?” 
“I am in the Socialist one.” 
“And why is that? Out of patriotism?” 
“What do you mean ‘patriotism’? It’s just that it is better here: In capitalist 
hell, they whip you alive, then they boil you in oil and then they shoot you. In 
here they do the same, it’s just that they often forgot to bring the oil or the 
whips, the boiler room is under construction, and the gunman is always 
drunk…” 
 
Article 58 of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Penal Code 
defined political humor as "anti-Soviet propaganda,” which was a punishable capital 
offense. During Stalin's reign, over 200,000 documented political prisoners were sent 
to the Gulag for telling such political jokes or “anekdoty” in Russian (Medvedev 
1979). Despite being illegal, Russians found ways to tell anekdoty, whispering them 
in alley ways or laughing about them late at night around the kitchen table, sharing 
their worries and frustrations of daily life with trusted family members or friends. 
Although shared with hesitation, to only those who they could absolutely trust, these 
narratives spread far and wide across the Soviet Union (Davies 2007; Graham 2009; 
Brooks 2001; Bradenberger 2002). The implementation of state policies served to 
homogenize the daily lives of all Soviet people, so these narratives became salient 
and meaningful across an incredibly diverse group of citizens. Before the October 
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Revolution in 1917, over 80 percent of the Russian population lived in the 
countryside. As a consequence of Soviet industrialization programs, by 1990 the 
proportion of people living in urban centers had flipped (Utekhin et al 2011). Soviet 
citizens lived in identical cement block communal apartments in cities, among 
equally run-down factories and barren markets. They were versed in the same State 
propaganda and daily hardships.  Anekdoty evolved into a secret language for those 
who were fluent in the same conditions of daily life, but who could not speak out or 
resist publicly or visibly. This folklore enabled Russians to engage in irony and 
cynicism through “half-word” references to the absurdity of daily life, serving as a 
means of coping and resistance during uncertain times (Boym 2008).  
 These narratives served as an important social safety valve, enabling citizens 
to release frustrations and commiserate in the doomed vision of the Soviet empire to 
which the Russian people were bound. Anekdoty enabled Russians to socially 
recognize and vocalize that which they were instructed not to know. George Orwell 
(1945) argued that under totalitarian rule every joke is a “tiny revolution,” and in the 
context of Soviet Russia, the exchange of anekdoty undeniably challenged the 
legitimacy of Soviet power to control and define the lives of the Russian people. Akin 
to Scott’s hidden transcripts that serve to undermine power and associated official 
presentations of support for this power, anekdoty served as a means of resistance by 
challenging the legitimacy of Soviet authority and drawing attention to the contrived 
and disingenuous performances of compliance of the Russian people before this 
power (Yurchak 1980). This story of anti-State resistance is important to explore, but 
we must also be careful not to cast the narratives in the anekdot as entirely resistant in 
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nature. Such a characterization fails to account for the complex relationship between 
Russians and the Soviet State, other ethnic, racial or religious groups, their families, 
or between Russians and their own self-image, collective memory and ideations of 
the future. These multifaceted and dynamic relationships and attitudes are all 
enmeshed in these oral narratives that are not uniformly acts of resistance. The story 
is of conflict, but also of support, collaboration and negotiations within the intricate 
web of meanings and power relations. 
In this dissertation, I analyze how anekdoty to speak to a number of issues 
ranging from collective identity, collective mobilization, state reification, and 
political resistance. I explore how the discourses of anekdoty reflect a collective 
identity that is both reifying of and resistant to Soviet power in that they express both 
a top-down nationalism akin to Anderson’s (1980) “imagined community” and a 
bottom-up model based upon Herzfeld’s (1997) “cultural intimacy” and Taussig’s 
(1999) “public secret.” I argue that anekdoty foreshadow and lay groundwork for 
“narratives” (Polletta 1998) and mobilizing “frames” (Snow & Benford 1988) of a 
cultural movement, through their “hidden transcript” (Scott 1990) nature by giving 
expression to the otherwise subjugated an voiceless. Anekdoty are incredibly 
“political” in both the traditional sense in terms of engagement with political 
institutions of power as well as the non-traditional feminist understanding of the 
political nature of all social categories. My analysis identifies the subjects of ridicule 
that are explicit or implicit in these narratives in order to understand the collective 
identity that these stories express. These subjects include the Party, the Soviet State, 
social problems as well as racial, ethnic, national, and gendered “others.” Bringing 
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these multifaceted discourses of power together, I found that anekdoty expressed the 
“unmarked voice” of the Russian man, by offering a masculine, Russian national 
identity which contrasted with official discourse that defined the Soviet people at a 
supranational level and was gender-inclusive and promoted gender, racial, and ethnic 
equality. Together, I argue that Russian Soviet anekdoty expressed a cultural 
consciousness of an otherwise voiceless and atomized people. These discourses 
expressed forbidden opinions and helped orient a collectivity through historical and 
cultural contextualization. 
I argue that it is important to understand how collective identities are a 
product of both top-down state-disseminated discourses and bottom-up popularly 
authored discourses; in some cases, these discourses reify state power and legitimacy 
while in others they undermine or challenge it. Anekdoty challenge the Soviet State’s 
political ideology, economic and social policies, yet in other ways the narratives 
solidify racial, ethnic, national and gendered distinctions. These gendered, racial or 
ethnic markers are not created by anekdoty themselves, but rather reflect the 
engagement with Soviet law, Party ideology, popular culture films, television serials 
and books. Table 1.1 offers examples of how top-down state disseminated discourse 
both reifies and challenges its only claims to power and definition, as well as how 
bottom-up anekdoty discourses also reify and challenge the power of the Soviet state. 
The examples included in this table are just a few among many of the many different 
ways by which these various discourses negotiate with existing power structures in 
order to strengthen or redefine notions of identity, power and truth. 
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Table 1.1 Discourse Orientation to Soviet State and Origin of Discourse 
 Rejection Reification 
Top – Down 
(State discourse) 
 Passport policies 
 Stereotyped characters in 
films 
 National Holidays 
 Monuments 
 Formal structures and 
institutions 
Bottom – Up 
(anekdoty discourse) 
 Ethnic, racial and gendered 
stereotypes 
 Disjuncture between 
propaganda & lived realities 
 Social problems 
 Reference to War Heroes 
 Reference to Holidays 
 Centering of Soviet 
leadership/authority 
Although this dissertation focuses primarily upon the bottom-up discourses 
created and disseminated by anekdoty, the analysis is historically situated in the 
Russian Soviet environment in which such anekdoty engage with top-down State-
disseminated discourses. As illustrated in Table 1.1, both top-down and bottom-up 
discourses make political and analytical cuts that in some ways reify Soviet power 
and the Communist Party’s vision of the future and in other ways undermine or 
challenge it, even if that is not its explicit intention. Further, some anekdoty are 
oriented towards the state and politics-proper, while others vocalize daily struggle and 
hardship, using humor as a means of coping rather than a claims-making narrative 
that is oriented towards the state. The power of comedy in bringing about political 
and social change or in promoting the stability of social institutions are both 
overlooked in scholarship and I hope that this work will bring more attention to these 
powerful discourses.  
This analytic approach and theory of cultural consciousness developed from 
the translation, coding, and analysis of 1290 anekdoty that were randomly sampled 
from 12 compilations, published between 1951 and 2010. The total number of 
 
 6 
 
anekdoty among these volumes is somewhere between five and six thousand. In order 
to construct the sample, every fifth joke was included from the compilations and I 
coded each one in the qualitative software program Nvivo 9. My broad theoretical 
approach was based upon Foucault’s discourse analysis (1978) and Van Dijk’s 
critical discourse analysis. These theories and coding schemes are discussed in detail 
in chapter two. 
In this introduction I will give a brief overview of scholarship on humor, 
collective identities, social movements and everyday resistance, and illustrate how my 
argument about anekdoty lies at the intersection of these articulations of social action. 
After chapter two, in which I lay out my methodology in terms of theory and 
application, I then expand upon these literatures in greater detail in chapters three, 
four, five, and six with both quantitative and qualitative analysis of these jokes
1
 in 
order to flesh out each element of the argument. I also provide a brief history of the 
anekdot as a genre and an overview of other scholarship on anekdoty. I do this in 
order to demonstrate how important it is to interrogate anekdoty altogether in order to 
explore the intersectional discourse that both creates an identity of solidarity for 
commiserating Russian men, while subjugating other groups through a process of 
exclusion and scapegoating.  
                                                 
1
 Although there is a difference between the more generic “joke” and the anekdot, throughout my 
analysis, I will use the two terms interchangeably in order to discuss the role of this short-form 
political humor in the Soviet era. Similarly, the Russian anekdot has a history that extends for 
centuries before the Soviet rule, but the form that I will discuss in this dissertation will be the 
political, short-form anekdot that was prevalent between 1950 and 2000. The anekdoty included in 
this analysis were derived from 12 compilations that were published between 1952 and 2010. 
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I explore how Russian men in particular are centered by this discourse that 
serves to, (1) resist the Soviet State, Communist Party and associated ideology, as 
well as serve as (2) a coping mechanism and means of surviving daily hardships, 
which ultimately (3) constructed a collective identity for Soviet Russians in contrast 
to other ethnic, religious, national, and gendered outgroups. I illustrate how anekdoty 
are a rich source of data of the subjugated political identity of Russians (most notably 
men) that differs in a number of ways from the dominant, state-defined, political 
identity.  
My research found that such subjugated political identities are not simply 
100% “resistant” to the state, but serve other functions, such as creating a cultural 
consciousness that unites people in a shared space for self-recognition and self-
definition. Akin to Patricia Hill Collins’ work that emphasizes the importance of safe 
spaces for the oppressed to speak out (a space that necessarily must exclude some 
other groups), anekdoty adopt and reify the social boundaries established by Party 
discourse, constructing particular groups as “other” in order to bolster a Russian 
collective identity. These narratives express the political identities of the soviet 
people, highlighting fissures and power structures between racialized and gendered 
social groups. In addition, anekdoty served as means of dealing with devastating 
realities, political, and social powerlessness. As a coping mechanism, these narratives 
might also have contributed to the maintenance of a status-quo, in that they provided 
an outlet for resistance that effected minimal political change. I explore each of these 
elements in this introduction as well as in the dissertation at large. 
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Humor, Collective Identity and Political Resistance 
If you have lived in another country, traveled abroad, or had friends from 
another culture, you have probably noticed that humor is not something that translates 
very easily. You may hear the joke, you may understand the logic that should make it 
funny, but the joke does not always produce laughter for you the same way it does for 
other “insiders.” This is because it does not reach your core in the same way: it does 
not speak to your lived experiences, or your identity. Humor is directly tied to one’s 
social location, one’s collective identity in relation to other collective identities. As 
such, studying jokes in relation to the people who told them, provides a window into 
how these people see themselves, into who they see as insiders and outsiders, into 
their national identity, and their collective anxieties. Studying the jokes of a people 
who risk imprisonment in order to tell them, exposes a subversive collective identity, 
it provides a unique glimpse into the shared experience of state repression. 
Of all the forms of communication, humor is arguably one of the most reliant 
upon cooperative participation between performer and audience. The audience, in 
order to enjoy humor must "get" the joke. The content of the jokes, characters, 
settings, and objects of critique are drawn from the environment in which they were 
created, told, or reproduced. This means that both the performer and the audience 
must be familiar with the people, events, and contexts presented in the joke and find 
the particular narrative as particularly surprising and meaningful for the joke to be 
successful.  
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A popular type of political humor operates by highlighting incongruities 
between what “should be” and what “actually is.” Sigmund Freud argued that society 
(the superego) suppresses those thoughts/recognitions of reality that might be 
dangerous to the stability and/or power of social institutions such as the State, but 
when an individual’s consciousness (the ego) allows these thoughts to surface, the 
incongruity between the way something “ought” to be and the way it “is” produces 
humor. This emphasis upon incongruity is especially important in understanding why 
political humor can be so powerful and popular in societies in which public 
expressions of opinions and ideas are tightly controlled and/or censored by the 
government (Yurchak 1997; Drakulic 1993; Ayling 2008). In these societies, political 
humor serves a means of coping with a painful reality by enabling both the teller and 
the receiver to participate in shared recognition of the incongruence between the 
official discourse and personally experienced reality. 
The oral nature of such humor or folklore more generally is also an important 
characteristic of the genre in that it affords a decentralized deconstruction. Oral 
folklore is ambiguous and anti-essentialist in that it has no fixed or definitive 
version—the repetition of a joke or song or folktale is a choice on part of the 
individual teller and each enactment is unique. As James Scott explains in 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance, “there is no orthodoxy or center to folk 
culture since there is no primary text to serve as a measure of heresy (1990: 160-1). 
The very act of telling these narratives serves to reconstitute what is the “primary 
text” of experience or the lived reality of those who participate. While folklore 
empowers through its popular authorship, it also affords anonymity or dissociation 
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from the particular criticism in that the teller is more often not the author and even if 
in cases where s/he was, s/he often will not admit to it. Therefore those participating 
in such humor or folk cultures are afforded a bit of protection—if not legally, at least 
psychologically. 
In this dissertation I conceptualize “resistance” as discursive moves that (1) 
dismantle or chip away at existing power structures or (2) empower subjugated 
groups through self-recognition and self-definition. Specifically, I treat those 
anekdoty that subvert Party propaganda, State laws, official history, or the legitimacy 
and authority of particular leaders as forms of resistance. In these situations, anekdoty 
challenge authority by rejecting the official version and offer an alternative 
description of reality. Anekdoty further act as resistance in terms of the voice that is 
afforded by these narratives. Forbidden opinions may be expressed through these 
private narratives. As Russians huddle around the dinner table to recount new 
anekdoty, they are able to voice dissent, self-define their personhood and collective 
identities, as well as commiserate about their daily hardships. As such, resistance is 
conceptualized as a combination of subversion, communal recognition, and 
redefinition regardless of the explicit intentions of the performer or audience or the 
level of visibility of these actions. Unlike organized social movements that seek 
political recognition from the State, everyday resistance often takes more subtle forms 
that are more concerned with survival than State recognition. 
One of the most popular forms of political humor in Soviet Russia was the 
type that highlights incongruities or dysfunction. Given that political humor is an 
 
 11 
 
expression of a collective, shared reality, the anekdot serves as an exemplar of a 
process of the formation of collective memory, identities and dissent, and therefore 
might reveal intimate details of an otherwise-difficult-to-measure collective 
mentality. During the Soviet era, anekdoty were never told in public, because doing 
so could result in arrest and imprisonment. Children who overheard these jokes 
around the late-night kitchen table were instructed not to repeat them in school lest 
their parents suffer negative consequences. There are many self-reflexive anekdoty 
that deal with the very consequences of telling them: 
"Comrade Brezhnev, is it true that you collect political jokes?" 
 "Yes, it is true."  
"And how many have you collected so far?"  
"Three and a half labor camps." 
Between the years of 1929 and 1953 (the height of Joseph Stalin’s power), over 18 
million Soviet people spent time in the network of forced labor camps called “the 
Gulag.” The prison camps varied in types of labor, some involving the construction of 
railroads, canals or factories. Similar to other work sites, the camps had economic 
goals set by the State; therefore the camps needed prisoners as workers. In 1929, 
many of the inmates of regular prisons were transferred to the camps and by 1930, 
several hundred thousand peasants and workers arrived annually, arrested for 
resisting collectivization, telling anekdoty, taking potatoes from the collective farm 
fields, for mishandling factory machinery or being late for work three times—an act 
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that was considered to be “sabotage.” While many landed in the camps for infractions 
such as those listed above, even more were guilty of nothing at all (Getty, Rittersporn, 
Zemskov 1993). In 1937, every secret police officer was given an arrest quota, in 
order to ensure a larger supply of labor and in order to make the quotas, the secret 
police fabricated cases.  
The Gulag camps were supposed to be economically sustainable and 
profitable, therefore prisoners were given just enough food and clothing to keep them 
alive and working. Unfortunately, in practice there were never enough supplies and 
many prisoners died from overwork and malnutrition. Most years, the death rate was 
just over five percent, but in particularly bad years the death rate was much higher: 15 
percent in 1933 (a year of widespread famine), 25 percent in 1942 (the year of the 
greatest shortages in World War II, and in 1937 and 1938 tens of thousands of 
citizens were simply executed (Getty, Rittersporn, Zemskov 1993; Yakovlev 2002; 
Applebaum 2003). What was in store for those sent to the Gulag was unknown, yet 
rumors about the severe working conditions and high death rates spread far enough to 
instill a fear of arrest in the Soviet people. 
 In exchanging these narratives, Soviet citizens were aware of their 
transgressions, but nevertheless continued to share them as a means of commiserating 
and coping with hardships of daily life. People would not have risked telling anekdoty 
if they were not certain that the person hearing the joke would not share in the 
sentiment or understand the context. The fact that anekdoty were as popular as they 
were given the severe risk of being caught telling them, is a particularly important 
indication that these discourses serve as an important barometer of collective 
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experience and collective identity formation. These short narratives were especially 
important in constructing and perpetuating a Russo-Soviet collective memory in that 
they helped define the histories, values, and goals that comprised that national 
identity. 
Political humor serves as a strong barometer of a collectivity, its associated 
collective identity, collective memory, and its perception of collective lived realities 
(Davies 2002, 2007; Critchley 2002). In addition to serving as a barometer of popular 
sentiments towards the state and official discourses, these jokes serve to circumscribe 
the collectivity of the “unmarked” Russian by scapegoating and stereotyping various 
outgroups (e.g. Jews, Ukrainians, Georgians) and subgroups (e.g. women). The 
construction of an ingroup and outgroup enables discourses—and the people who 
perpetuate them—to cast blame and responsibility upon some groups/individuals and 
success and innocence upon others. This type of humor—and its framing of collective 
memory/identity—is particularly powerful for those nations who must reconcile a 
difficult past with their otherwise positive collective self-concept. Only in managing 
these inconsistencies or blemishes, might they be able to focus upon collectively 
established goals (Heisler 2008). The state’s power is codified in law via its ability to 
establish and maintain systems of meaning and classification and its ability to control 
the distribution of various resources (Bourdieu 1994). Therefore the ability to 
effectively challenge the state necessarily involves culture and the renegotiation of 
such meaning systems (Armstrong & Bernstein 2008: 84-5). 
In his seminal work Imagined Communities (1983), Benedict Anderson argues 
that modern technological advancements such as print-capitalism have enabled large 
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dispersed populations to associate with or self-define according to a collective 
identity articulated by an “imagined community.” He identifies the census, the map, 
and the museum as exemplars of the process by which such networks of people are 
transformed into bounded and interchangeable nation units. These three technological 
innovations are singled out due to their ability to make the abstract idea of identity 
into something concrete and tangible. For instance, the census enables the state to 
count the members of a population and describe them in terms of demographic 
characteristics. The map outlines the territory that constitutes the homeland of an 
“imagined” community—establishing boundaries of inclusion and exclusion—and 
finally, the museum delineates a shared history, giving meaning to cultural artifacts 
and symbols that connect these people. Such a “totalizing classificatory grid,” is 
flexible in terms of its ability to categorize real or imagined phenomenon as “us” or 
“other” (Anderson 2006: 184). Along with Gellner (1983) and Brubaker (2004), 
Anderson argues that a nation cannot be reduced to an actual historical community or 
ethnic group, but that it originates as a constructed myth of the people, their history, 
and their homeland, creating a singular ideology which envisions their collective 
mission. This top-down theory provides a lens through which we might better 
understand the influence of the State upon the construction of an ethnic Russian 
identity, but it leaves a gap in the analysis about how this identity was actually 
experienced by those living under Soviet rule. 
Discourses that exclude (underpinned by xenophobic ideologies) or include 
(by reifying Anderson’s idea of an “imagined community”) are constructed and 
perpetuated only with a great deal of self-reflexivity and associated embarrassment or 
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regret.  Michael Taussig’s concept of the “public secret” (1999) and Michael 
Herzfeld’s concept of “cultural intimacy” speak directly to the tension produced by 
these discourses that are characteristic of the anekdot. Building upon Elias Canetti’s 
(1962: 290) argument that, “secrecy lies at the very core of power,” Taussig argues, 
“that which is generally known but cannot be articulated” serves as a binding force 
among those who are prohibited from publically expressing personal opinions (p. 5). 
Such known—but—unspeakable understandings serve to connect those who are 
divided or atomized by such censorship. Taussig (1999) argues that learning this 
public secret, learning “what not to know” (49), serves as a means of initiation into a 
publically silent but silently knowing collectivity. It also serves to circumscribe a 
population of insiders who are able to negotiate these different sets of institutional 
knowledge. I experienced this first-hand, albeit after the Soviet regime had already 
been long over, when I lived in St. Petersburg for my fieldwork in 2011. 
My parents and then-seven-year-old brother emigrated from St Petersburg in 
1978, so my dissertation fieldwork in Mother Russia turned into a pilgrimage of sorts. 
I stayed with extended family to conduct my research and met family and friends who 
often inquired about my project with great interest. They were excited, interested, and 
always had a few anekdoty to share. But once our conversations developed beyond 
opening friendly remarks, often skepticism emerged: “You won’t be able to 
understand anekdoty unless you lived here; unless you were part of it.” And in some 
ways, my skeptics were right. I grew up hearing anekdoty exchanged around the 
dinner table by my parents and other Russian friends or family who had come to visit. 
The crowd of adults would laugh uproariously after each one was told. And to me, 
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they were rarely funny. I didn’t “get it.” I didn’t live through “it”; I didn’t understand 
the context or the irony. And that was part of the motivation behind this study—I 
wanted to understand what made these jokes so funny. The laughter was a sign of 
connection and a sign of understanding. It was also a sign of omniscient insider 
status.  
Michael Herzfeld’s (1997) concept of “cultural intimacy,” a level of shared 
understanding and closeness among a group of people, describes an important aspect 
of the narratives expressed in anekdoty. Herzfeld argues that beyond an impersonal, 
legally based system of classification, what holds a collective group together 
psychologically is,  
“the recognition of those aspects of cultural identity that are considered a 
source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with 
their assurance of common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of power 
that at one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence 
and the next moment reinforce the effectiveness of intimidation” (3).  
This definition of “cultural intimacy,” theorizes nationalism as both top-down 
and bottom up, by recognizing the power of the people in shaping the manifestations 
of collective identities. Opinions and sentiments expressed at this level of cultural 
intimacy may reinforce the power of those at the top when it projects a collective 
confidence, but expressions of embarrassment and rueful self-recognition often cast a 
shadow on the immaculate outward presentation maintained by the State. 
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Humor and satire have a long contentious history with political regimes and 
those in power (Ayling 2008). Unlike other forms of literary style, humor and 
satirical works are of a type more explicitly anti-establishment and threatening to a 
political ideology, therefore authors and publications of satire are often carefully 
monitored and sometimes outlawed (Liz and Stephan 1996). Despite totalitarian 
censorship or other controls of free speech, jokelore has remained part of the 
independent “culture of contestation” (Lombardi-Satriani 1974), which regularly 
comments upon official morals and ideologies. As such, there is great utility for 
social movement and everyday resistance scholars in studying this phenomenon, 
specifically with the aim of understanding a clear connection between the targets, 
jokes and the underlying context (e.g. interethnic relations, economic and cultural and 
historical circumstances). Although anekdoty have been studied by folklorists, as anti-
State discourse or as expressions of racialized or gendered sentiments, they have not 
been studied altogether in terms of how they reflect a collective identity that is both 
reifying of and resistant to the state and how they establish and maintain relationships 
between different social groups. By studying this genre as a whole, we are able to 
understand the complexity of sentiments, identities, and relationships that existed 
under Soviet leadership and the creative ways that the Soviet people coped with this 
uncertain reality.  
In today’s globalizing world, with increasing migration and connection 
between diverse people who speak different languages, practice different religions, 
and espouse different moral and political ideologies, national identity often takes on 
more extreme forms of nationalism, sometimes resulting in xenophobia and 
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interethnic intolerance (Goldberg 2001, Brubaker 2002). Such nationalizing and 
xenophobic trends are reflected in humor, particularly in the way other ethnic and 
religious groups are framed. The very inclusion of some groups over others in the 
discourse of nationality speaks to the visibility of some people over others in a 
particular historical culture (Davies 2002). 
Nationalism attains its power by appearing to be natural and timeless 
(Anderson 1983; Puri 2004). In his exploration of ‘banal nationalism,’ Michael 
Billing highlights how nationalism attains its power by incorporating itself into 
everyday life and practices. In becoming part of the everyday taken-for granted 
environment, nationalism serves to construct how we understand the world, who is 
part of one’s collectivity and who is not. This view emphasizes nationalism as 
decentralized power, which is established and maintained through production, rather 
than merely coercion and restrictions.  Akin to Foucault’s notion of discourse and 
biopower, nationalism establishes and incorporates itself into various parts of 
people’s lives in such a way that it goes mostly unquestioned and accepted.  Studying 
which elements of the “official” Soviet or Russian nationalism were uncritically 
adopted by anekdoty versus those elements that were challenged gives us insight into 
the emergent nationalism that both poaches and dismantles the system from which it 
emerges. 
Anekdoty were authored by the disenfranchised and disempowered. The 
exchange of these jokes was widespread, but only in private settings, whispered in 
Goffman’s (1959) “backstage.” These jokes thrived because all other creative 
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outlets—such as the theatre, literature or music—were centrally controlled by the 
state. One could argue that as a result of such censorship and limited venues for 
personal expression, these creative and critical energies were directed toward humor 
(Bradenberger 2001). Anekdoty from the Soviet Union highlighted the contradictions 
of the system, and foreshadowed an imminent collapse of the social order. Although 
it is unlikely that anekdoty were responsible for structural changes as macro as the 
dissolution of the Soviet regime, the narratives do provide intimate insight into the 
society in which they are invented and circulated (Davies 2002, 2007).  
Laughter is often provoked in response to an unresolved tension—which is a 
reason that political humor is so popular in post-totalitarian regimes which still 
struggle with issues from its past and its transition forward. After Stalin’s death in 
1953, the Soviet people who had long-before lost faith in the promises of the Party, 
were in a position in which they could muster some opposition or at minimum, 
vocalization of doubt. Based upon his analysis of political humor from a number of 
Eastern European and post-Soviet nations, Douglas Ayling (2008) argues that jokes 
challenging and criticizing ideologies, states, and regimes are much more common in 
post-totalitarian regimes than in totalitarian or authoritarian ones. He argues that this 
is because totalitarian regimes have a relatively dominant ideological component 
“that articulates a reachable utopia” (Liz and Stephan’s typology 1996: 44), whereas 
post-totalitarian regimes are characterized predominantly by a loss of faith in or 
commitment to the ideological utopia. This loss of faith is coupled by a general crisis 
of legitimacy, a combination that created fertile ground for the production and 
circulation of such politically critical jokes. Despite the formal appearance of 
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continuity in terms of policy, after Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet Union arguably 
transitioned from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian regime, especially by the 1980s 
which, coincided with the height of popularity of the anekdot (1996: 16). Since jokes 
tend to focus upon those issues of friction or rupture within the social structure-- 
potentially giving way to an emergent counter-discourse--it would follow that 
ideologically-oppositional political jokes would be particularly popular in post-
totalitarian regimes in which official ideological claims and reality fail to map upon 
each other (Liz and Stephan 1996).  
Taussig (1999) argues that learning the public secret, learning “what not to 
know” (49) serves as a means of initiation into a publically-silent but silently-
knowing collectivity. The anekdot afforded ordinary citizens the opportunity to name 
and identify that which is supposed to be unknown, the negative power that Taussig 
calls “defacement.” The anekdot reveals this process: using sarcasm and irony to call 
attention to the act of false and public presentation of Soviet organization and power. 
The anekdot is a venue of expression of the “public secret,” and therefore acts as a 
site of its collective defacement. The anonymous authorship of these texts casts these 
truths as collective in nature—the wider their circulation, the more profound the 
secret, and the more transgressive its associated defacement might be. It follows that 
the act of recounting anekdoty was considered to be anti-Soviet, subversive behavior 
under Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal code, punishable by prison or death. This 
defacement or “outing” of the secret propels a public transgression that challenges the 
legitimacy of all the social institutions it calls into question. It serves as an 
undermining of public complicity and obedience. 
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The public secret also serves as such insider knowledge which can result in 
embarrassment or regret, elements that are part of Michael Herzfeld’s concept of 
cultural intimacy. As such, by studying the anekdot we can better understand how the 
imagined community was experienced collectively and understand the tenuous 
relationship between pride and embarrassment in the collective identity of the 
Russian people.  
 
History of the Anekdot 
Anekdoty have a long history in Russia dating back to the mid eighteenth 
century, though its initial structure and subject-matter was so different from Soviet 
variety that there are many who categorize the two as separate genres (Graham 2009). 
The original genre of anekdoty was diverse, including narratives of: (1) a trivial but 
factual event in the life of a historical figure, (2) a short account of an unusual 
fictional event or situation that is then developed into a lengthy literary work, and (3) 
short stories that were considered to be a subcategory of the folktale. The Soviet 
anekdot combines the features of these different varieties, producing a short, orally-
transmitted humorous variety that was able to gain popularity and widespread 
circulation by the end of the nineteenth century (Alaev 1995; Graham 2009). 
Vishnevsky (1993) identified the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 Russia and 
subsequent urbanization and industrialization in the late 19
th
 century as a birthplace of 
the short form anekdot. The total population of Russia tripled between 1863 and 
1913, and the number of urban dwellers with peasant backgrounds quadrupled 
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(Vishnevsky 1993: 83). Although many of these peasants continued to hold land and 
homes in their countryside villages, they regularly travelled to the cities to work or 
sell goods which contributed to this intermingling between the city and the country in 
a regularized fashion. This demographic shift also involved a sharp increase in 
literacy which enabled oral folk cultures to be transcribed, and for the circulation of 
such anekdoty to gather great speed and volume in the urban industrial culture 
(Vishnevsky 1993). The new short form variety of anekdoty lent itself to exchange in 
passing: in stairwells, in bathrooms, or to be exchanged in high volume, successively 
over vodka late at night (Yurchak 1997). This pastime was shared by compatriots, 
solidifying a shared identity through reference to a common history, identity and 
fluency in official Soviet rhetoric. Yurchak (1997) argues that the “hegemony of 
representation” made the Soviet citizen feel as though her/his experience was shared 
by all other citizens. The “hegemony of representation” referred to the State’s control 
over media outlets, propaganda, factories, schools, textbooks, city construction and 
other modes of “representation.” As such, there was a singular landscape and 
construction of reality, with which all Soviet citizens were very familiar and with 
which the anekdoty engaged. 
The steep rise in literacy following emancipation of the serfs contributed to 
the process of cultural communication, as well. The decades between the 
emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the October Revolution in 1917 saw the rapid 
development of “a popular culture based on common literacy” (Jeffrey Brooks, 1985: 
xiii). The literate peasants, tended “to divide all books into two categories, the godly 
and the humorous. The Scriptures were the model for the first sort of text, and the 
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frivolous fairy tale the exemplar of the second. The fairy tale was ungodly, untrue, 
useless, amusing, and uninstructive” (1985: 32). Until the eighteenth century, the 
Church was in control of most publications in Russia and since the Church viewed 
humor as directly related to sin smekh i grekh (“laughter and sin” in Russian), only 
the godly texts were published. It was not until Russian publications were secularized, 
that satirical and other comic texts began to enter the market. This new literary style 
expanded upon those oral folk traditions that made their way to the cities from the 
countryside and upon short, humorous genres (like the short form joke) imported 
from Europe (Graham 2009).   
Satire was celebrated by the Bolsheviks as a potential “weapon” to be 
mobilized in the service of the Revolution during the 1920s, but was later abandoned 
in the 1930s by those revolutionaries who replaced this politicized communication 
with socialist-realist aesthetics (Graham 2009). It was not until after Stalin’s death in 
1953 that there was a resurgence of such satire: both a toned down form in official 
publications like Krokodil—a satirical magazine that lampooned approved targets 
such as capitalist countries and racial, ethnic and political groups were perceived as 
threatening to Soviet power—and the unbridled form of critique in uncensored 
anekdoty. Although the Party was still in power, Khrushchev's repudiation of 
Stalinism in February 1956 and the subsequent reduction in arrests and sentencing 
enabled the culture of anekdot exchange to flourish. The height of such anekdot 
exchange was from the late 1950s to the early 1990s (Brandenberg 2002; Davies 
2002, 2009; Krylova 2009; Graham 2009). It was during this comparatively liberal 
time: from the 1950s until 2000, that such satire was able to thrive. The coupling of 
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the state-defined nationalism à la Anderson’s “imagined community” with the 
satirical critiques of daily life and recognition of illegitimate Soviet propaganda or 
Party ideology served to bind Russians together as a collectivity. The Russians were 
no longer divided by class or geography as they had been in previous times and their 
positioning as the “core” of the Soviet Union’s multi-national collectivity 
paradoxically served to reify their national identity. Laughter bound them as a single 
community in a shared environment. 
Anekdoty have generally been studied in Russia by folklorists for whom the 
performance of joke-telling and the micro-level interaction dynamics are central 
(Lurie 1992, Abdullaeva 2000; Bauman 1992). In response to the surge in 
publications of anekdot anthologies in 1990, after the dissolution of the USSR, 
research also began to focus upon the role that anekdoty played for the Soviet people 
(Beckmann 1980; Colombo 1996; Yurchak 1998; Ayling 2008). Despite the 
increased attention to this genre, there remain few systematic analyses of anekdoty as 
a single corpus situated in a socio-cultural context. I will explore those few works in 
the section below.  
 
Anekdot Studies 
Previous studies of anekdoty brought attention to their subversive, anti-State 
quality; while others have painted the folklore as a tool of exclusion by groups with 
more power. In fact, anekdoty are actually reflections of both power and of resistance. 
They are used by different groups to produce different results and they express the 
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mixed and ambivalent sentiments of this people.  It is precisely the recognition of 
these different impulses within the anekdoty that make them such a rich source from 
which to understand popular collective identity formation.  
After immigrating to the US from Russia, Alexei Yurchak (1980) was one of 
the first Soviet insiders to write about anekdoty for a Western audience. Based upon 
his firsthand, ethnographic-like experience, Yurchak explains how Russians were 
socialized to live double lives under Soviet rule by ways of cynicism and doublethink. 
He explains, “In late socialism, state-controlled public events became structured as 
two simultaneous events: an official event, at which shouting of the official slogans 
and voting in favor of an official resolution were unavoidable and unanimous, and a 
parallel event, at which many people were engaged in parallel practices and adhered 
to parallel meanings without needing either to support or to ridicule the official ones” 
(1980: 163). This alternative mode of resistance that does not entail overt expressions 
of rejection was appropriate for Soviet Russians who supported some elements of the 
Soviet system while were ambivalent about others.  Yurchak positioned the anekdot 
within this culture of parallel practices and meanings.  
What was distinctive about the Russian anekdot, as opposed to other humor 
traditions, is how many of these jokes ridicule the joke-tellers themselves by way of 
highlighting their public complicity in the doomed Soviet project. Although many 
anekdoty highlighted the absurdities of the system and lies promulgated by 
propaganda, the “butt” of the joke was not just the Soviet leadership, but also the 
Russians who remained acquiescent under Party rule. This speaks to Herzfeld’s 
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assertion that cultural intimacy must include an element of embarrassment or shame 
and is an element of anekdoty that has yet to be explored systematically. 
Akin to James Scott’s (1990) concept of everyday resistance, Yurchak argues 
that the Russian people learned to navigate and cope with the system through a 
combination of detached quiet cynicism along with public compliance.  For example, 
“as soon as the meeting would start, everyone’s head turned down, and everyone 
started to read. Someone could doze off.  But when it was necessary to make some 
decision, a certain sensor would click in the head-‘Who is voting in favor?’ and you 
raised your hand automatically” (172). Although physically present in the meetings, 
these party members were operating in simultaneous public and private spaces, 
publically paying attention and following the rules while in private finding an escape 
and means of coping.  Reciting anekdoty was also done in a backstage space: in 
stairwells during smoking breaks or around the dinner table late at night—the one 
time of day when a family or group of friends could find some privacy. Anna 
Krylova’s piece (2005) “Saying 'Lenin' and Meaning 'Party': Subversion and Laughter 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Society” similarly argues that each anekdot reveals 
simultaneously the cynical and ideal in its subversive narrative. Krylova (2005) 
argues that anekdoty orient towards a hopeful future in which the disjuncture between 
the reality presented by Party propaganda and the lived reality of Soviet citizens no 
longer exists. The system of comparison (whether explicit or implicit in the narrative) 
is always Western capitalism which serves to contrast the Soviets’ dysfunctional 
impoverished communist system with a functional and prosperous capitalist one.  In a 
similar vein, Alena Ledeneva (1998) likens anekdoty to blat and samizdat, the black 
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market for goods and underground newspapers respectively, in regards to its 
backstage nature. The anekdot is identified as an integral part of this parallel culture 
of resistance that is contrasted with the official world of obedience and loyalty to the 
Soviet party. 
Another strain of scholarship on the anekdot focuses upon ethnic stereotypes 
that are common in the narratives. Emil Draitser’s (1998) Taking Penguins to the 
Movies: Ethnic Humor in Russia, provides a brilliant contextualization for each ethnic 
group that appear in the anekdot repertoire. Draitser focuses on the historical 
relationships between Russians and the other nationalities and ethnic groups that 
appear in anekdoty in order to explain the origin of such stereotypes and the histories 
of how ethnic group relations emerged over time.  Considering the substantial number 
of anekdoty explicitly about Jews, and the long history of Jewish humor as a means of 
collective preservation (Lauchland 2009), there are many who believe that some of 
these anekdoty are authored by Jews themselves (presenting Jews as intelligent and 
successful as a consequence of their creativity) and another anti-Semitic variety that 
was most likely authored by Russians out of a similar resentment that was felt 
towards the Georgian (presenting the Jew as cheap, greedy and pilfering the Soviet 
system only to move to Israel or the United States). Many of these types of anekdoty 
were told among people of the same ethnic group (Draitser 1998; Davies 2002). For 
instance, when two or more Jews met for dinner, they would sit around recounting the 
new Jewish anekdoty that they had heard from others. Since there was little novelty 
by way of official media, and the only means of hearing new anekdoty was by way of 
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mouth, these gatherings were an exciting pastime for the Soviet people 
(Brandenberger 2002; Brooks 2000).  
Although anekdoty about women are very popular (as evidenced in the 
compilations and in informal conversations) the research interrogating the gendered 
implications of these narratives has been very limited. Since anekdoty were 
traditionally told among men, oftentimes while drinking vodka around a kitchen 
table, misogynist humor was not uncommon (Brandenberger 2002; Draitser 1998, 
1999). When three men of the same nationality congregate together (e.g. Georgians, 
Ukrainians or Russians), they would undoubtedly tell ethnic jokes disparaging other 
outgroups or praising their own ingroups; regardless of national affiliation, 
misogynist humor was common among all these groups. Draitser’s (1999) Making 
War Not Love: Gender and Sexuality in Russian Humor is one of the few sites that 
explore this gendered variety of anekdoty. Women—wives, mistresses, prostitutes, 
mother-in-laws—are a popular subject of anekdoty, almost exclusively portrayed as 
the over-sexed, money-hungry, overbearing gender. Infidelity or high rates of suicide 
and alcoholism among men are blamed on women for being such annoyances. While 
Draitser (1999) explores these issues of gender inequality in his analysis, he does not 
contextualize these issues in the broader nationalist framework, which leaves the 
analysis of different genres somewhat disconnected. In anekdoty research it is 
common to treat different subjects (e.g. racial, gendered or popular culture anekdoty) 
as highly distinctive genres without exploring the relationship between the different 
objects of ridicule. In this dissertation, I argue that the power structures that are 
reified through this folklore do not exist in isolation, but rather rely heavily on 
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intersectional logic of power. In other words, by only looking at one subject of 
anekdoty, we fail to see how the multiple discourses that construct what it means to 
be Georgian, Jewish, Chukchi, American, and female intersect in powerful ways with 
those narratives about State power, Party ideology and daily hardships experienced 
under Soviet rule. Fingers of blame and responsibility are pointed in different 
directions by anekdoty narratives, and in doing so, we see how particular groups are 
particularly discriminated in law and practice, but also in popular narratives that cast 
them as contributing to or even benefiting from the Russian man’s misfortune. Only 
by looking at all of these power moves on a single chess board can we truly 
understand how these narratives serve to “center” and construct what it means to a 
Soviet Russian man. 
Seth Graham’s recent work (2009) is one of the first projects to undertake the 
contextualization of the anekdot in a Russo-Soviet cultural and media environment. 
Graham explains the significance of the anekdot as a genre of expression that 
dialogued with popular culture in television, radio and literature during Soviet times.  
His work specifically explores intertextuality within the genre of anekdoty by 
focusing on those that make references to movies, books, and television shows and by 
situating the texts in their historical geo-political context. He argues that many of the 
most notorious characters of the anekdot are drawn from other Soviet cultural works, 
but then used as a vehicle for critiquing Soviet power or highlighting the absurdities 
and contradictions promulgated by Soviet propaganda.  
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Although Graham does not make explicit use of Henry Jenkins’ (2005) 
Textual Poachers, his argument is reminiscent of Jenkins’ descriptions of trekkies and 
other fan groups who take ownership of the characters in the published stories or 
movies by expanding the storylines with their own narratives. The actions of these 
fans become powerful as they extend these stories and characters beyond the screen 
or book page and use them to make commentary on real-world social issues in a 
collaborative and improvisational way. The Russian anekdot involved similar 
poaching of propaganda, textbooks, and other State-disseminated discourses, 
refashioning the morals or arguments of these narratives to better match their lived 
perspectives.  
Anekdoty served as a form of everyday resistance, in taking ownership over 
the ability to construct truth, yet this analysis was left underdeveloped in Graham’s 
work. Although he did argue that anekdoty serve as a self-reflexive voice, responding 
to the otherwise unidirectional Soviet popular culture, after finishing his work, the 
reader is left still hungry for elaboration on how these folklore narratives transcend 
boundaries between the fictional and real, or the playful and subversive. This genre of 
popular culture anekdoty is also explored in relative isolation in that the gendered and 
racialized elements are similarly left under-theorized.  
My work fills this gap in the research by looking at these multiple varieties 
together in order to understand the intersectional discourse that is articulated by these 
stories; one that both creates a coping identity of solidarity for Russians while 
subjugating a number of other groups through a process of exclusion and 
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scapegoating of particular marked groups. In this dissertation, I look at all of these 
different genres from a historically and culturally situated perspective, an approach 
that enables me to understand how these narratives engaged with the Soviet Russian 
collective identity that in some instances sought to self-define independently of the 
State, while in other instances these narratives created meaning and bolstered 
significance through the cooption of state definitions. 
 
Anekdot Discourse as the Perspective of “We” 
In this dissertation, I argue that the narratives running across anekdoty serve to 
simultaneously reify and challenge Party rule, define social collectivities and 
highlight and engage with the conditions of everyday existence under Soviet power.  
Anekdoty engage in the construction and destruction of these numerous discourses 
that police minds and bodies (Foucault 1977).  The narratives can be categorized into 
those that are (1) identity-based, (2) state-oriented and (3) experience-based. Mapped 
onto social movement and everyday resistance literature, we see how the discourses 
expressed in the anekdot reflect both types of activism and resistance respectively.  
Social movements are conceived of as coordinated, identity-based that engaged with 
the State in an attempt for political power (Klandermans 2001; Tilly 2008) while 
everyday resistance is typically a spontaneous, needs-based, coping strategy, a set of 
narratives that do not focus on the state or on collective identities, but rather on the 
experience at hand (Scott 1985, 1990, 1999; Collins 1990). 
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As part of my argument, I will illustrate how Michael Herzfeld’s (1997) 
concept of “cultural intimacy” is articulated in the discourse of anekdot, and as such 
enables the outsider to peek into this “insiders only” worldview. Anderson’s (1983) 
definition of an “imagined community” offers an important lens in terms of 
understanding Russian collective perspective. However, it also overlooks the 
significant amount of embarrassment for failed endeavors, inward recognition of 
injustice, or non-ideal actions that are part of national history. It is this “rueful self-
recognition” that is captured in the bottom-up concept of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld 
1997: 6). 
Anekdoty reflect the constructed contours of the Russian “imagined 
community” in the ways they include or exclude particular heroes or leaders, 
historical events, and ethnic or religious groups in order to position Russian ethnics as 
the core population.  However, what anekdoty express is more than the passive 
internalization of this state-defined collectivity. Anekdoty are active, they involve the 
“textual poaching” (Jenkins 1995) of characters from Soviet propaganda films and 
Party slogans. Anekdoty adopt such elements, reifying some aspects of power while 
simultaneously twisting, revising, and reinventing other parts of the story and the 
truth. The ironic tone of these texts expresses and assumes the disenchantment of both 
performer and audience. They express discomfort with the current direction of Soviet 
power, but without offering an alternative direction, the voice admits regret, 
embarrassment, and insecurity. As such, the anekdot exposes a level of “cultural 
intimacy” via the ways they support or challenge the importance or power of these 
events and people and redefines how they are understood through the voice of 
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ordinary people. The inclusion of some national symbols serve to support or 
authenticate official Party discourse when used uncritically, but in other instances 
when they are referred to cynically or attacked directly, their legitimacy is challenged.  
There have been other scholars who have studied the consequences of legal 
formulations upon the population’s daily life. For instance, Laitin (1995) studied how 
the Soviet Union was a single unified entity in name, but was rhetorically divided into 
nations through the passport system. Brandenberger (2002) explored how Russia was 
positioned at the core of the empire through political and economic dependence as 
well as through explicit definitions of “the great Russian people” by Stalin and other 
leaders as ‘the first among equal peoples of the USSR’” (277). While it is important 
to understand how such “categories are proposed, propagated, imposed, 
institutionalized, discursively articulated, organizationally entrenched, and generally 
embedded in multifarious forms of ‘governmentality’” from above, it is equally as 
important to understand “the ‘micropolitics’ of categories, the ways in which the 
categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade or transform the categories that 
are imposed on them (Dominguez 1986)” (Brubaker 2004: 13). As such, it is 
important to find ways to access the voice of the collective in order to better 
understand how it self-constructs and self-articulates groupness which in turn can 
motivate political action.  
Brubaker argues that ethnicity, race, and nationhood are “are not things in the 
world, but perspective on the world,” ways of “perceiving, interpreting, and 
representing the social world.” Therefore the salience or power of a group lies not in 
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an external definition imposed by an external force, but rather the belief from within a 
group (2004: 14). The ways by which people are classified and categorized by race, 
ethnicity, religion or nationality serve to activate these shared perspectives by 
invoking common histories or values, but they only exist in so far as the members 
identify at some level with those definitions. However, Brubaker also argues that such 
identifications should not be taken as constant (2004: 17). Instead, he encourages us 
to shift attention from groups to groupness, to treat “groupness as a variable and 
contingent rather than fixed and given” so that we understand that such cohesion, or 
collectively felt solidarity is “something that “happens,” as E.P. Thompson (1963: 9) 
famously said about class” (Brubaker 2004: 12).  
It is also this construction of “groupness” (and the consequential framing or 
actions of this group) which I seek to capture in my analysis of Soviet-era Russian 
anekdoty. In this dissertation I will tease out some of the discourses that contribute to 
the construction of people into “us” and “them,” the events (e.g. wars, speeches, laws) 
which define “our collective history,” the leaders and heroes who define “our vision” 
and the cultural artifacts (e.g. books, movies, folktales, museums, anthems) to which 
Soviet Russians orient and how these references (or absence of references) express a 
fomenting nationalism as well as expressions of everyday resistance. These sites of 
interest are informed by Anthony D. Smith’s definition of a nation as “a named 
human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories; a mass, public culture; a common economy; and common legal rights and 
duties for all members” (1991: 14).  
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I seek to measure “groupness” or “nationness” as articulated by the anekdoty 
in my sample, while keeping in mind that these narratives reflect temporally-specific 
feelings of belonging and therefore cannot be generalized to contemporary Russians. I 
call this sense of belonging a cultural consciousness that historically and culturally 
locates this group and allows them to engage in self-definition and develop a political 
awareness apart from official Party rhetoric. I bound my time period from 1951-1990, 
and focus upon the Soviet Russian republic. The anekdoty in my sample were 
authored, told and retold due to their ability to make the audience laugh during Soviet 
times. These jokes may not resonate with contemporary Russians because they speak 
to a different collectivity; even if some of the members of the two collectivities are 
the same, the issues and identities may no longer be salient to these same people. 
Laughter serves as a barometer of salience, of meaningful commentary, identities or 
incongruities between what should be and what is, that are expressed in these jokes.  
Further, I am interested in how the anekdot reveals something more intimate 
and intangible than what is defined as “nation” by a state-authored discourse. I 
illustrate how the anekdot articulated a cultural consciousness among those who 
exchanged them and how the discourses themselves might be considered to be the 
“public secret” (Taussig 1999).  In this study, I reveal the anekdot as a discourse that 
articulates power structures, resistance to the State, and boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion among the Russo-Soviet people. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I outline the methodology employed 
in my research of anekdoty. Informed by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), I 
created a sample of 1290 anekdoty drawn from 12 volumes published between 1951 
and 2010. In this chapter I give background on the CDA movement and theory and I 
describe how these anekdoty were analyzed by hand and using NVivo 9 software in 
order to develop my grounded theoretical analysis of these popular discourses. I 
explain how these anekdoty were coded and how the codes that pattern upon state-
disseminated rhetoric serve to both reify as well as challenge it important ways. 
Included in this chapter are maps of all 158 codes and how they fit into eight broader 
themes as well as a quantitative overview of discourse themes. 
In the third chapter, I explain how the collective identity defined by some 
anekdoty in conjunction with those state-oriented political anekdoty articulate 
resistance to the State and the Party in overtly political ways. I accomplish this by 
exploring the rhetorical strategies used to challenge and subvert Soviet propagandistic 
depictions of daily life, the Party’s definitions of collectivity, history and future goals. 
Drawing from Herzfeld’s concept of “cultural intimacy,” I argue that the anekdot 
reveals a collective identity that may not be visible to the outsider public. This form 
of collective identity is more profound and sincere since it involves elements that the 
collectivity may be ashamed of, uncomfortable with, or confused about more 
generally. These elements do not paint the same rosy picture, or deliberately defined 
image that the outward presentation of the Soviet state or an “imagined community” 
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might do. This is important to understand in that the contours of a collective identity, 
perceptions of present day and historical events and guiding ideologies serve as 
motivators for behavior. As such, comprehending how these different perspectives 
converge and diverge gives us a better sense of who this collectivity is, where they 
came from, and what are their political and ideological aspirations for their future as a 
nation. Although anekdoty were not vocal and engaged in politics-proper, I argue as a 
form of everyday resistance they were incredibly powerful in challenging the 
hegemonic power of the soviet state and Party rhetoric by enabling everyday people 
to personally define their identities, actions, and beliefs. 
In chapter four, I analyze anekdoty that deal with daily struggle, hardship and 
coping without the framing of collective identity or politics. I argue that anekdoty 
might be understood as a both a process of everyday resistance and everyday 
collective coping. In this chapter I make use of Taussig’s (1999) “public secret” in 
order to explain the significance of such “defacement” of official rhetoric and how 
such voicing of “that what is generally known, but cannot be articulated” (p. 5) serves 
to undermine the legitimacy and authoritative power of the Party and Soviet State to 
define truth. The perspective articulated in these narratives is that of perseverance and 
coping in an otherwise strangulating and highly dysfunctional social world. Although 
this type is not explicitly targeting the state, the narratives might be understood as 
“everyday resistance” (Scott 1985, 1990, 1999) in the ways by which they subvert 
State/Party discourse and engage in self-definition of identities and experiences.  
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In chapter five, I describe how anekdoty reflect a top-down “imagined 
community” as codified in passport and immigration laws, language policies, Soviet 
propaganda, official history and holidays and those other state-defined elements of 
Soviet society that have been internalized and reified in the discourse of the anekdot. 
I pair such real world events and policies with their expressions in anekdoty in order 
to illustrate how Anderson’s (1983; 2006) top-down conceptualization of “imagined 
communities” impacted the Russian people living under Soviet rule, particularly how 
anekdoty reflect the internalization of these census, map and museum-based 
definitions of community and identity. As such, I argue that anekdoty are not simply 
transgressive or challenging of Party power, but also reifying of it.  
In chapter six, I explore how the Russian man is particularly centered in 
Russian national identity, through the construction of particular social groups as 
“other.” I argue that these outgroup populations are understood not strictly in terms of 
how the State has defined them in law or propaganda, but also as a tool of exclusion 
and self-definition of the Russian man. In particular, I focus upon those anekdoty that 
deal with the Georgians, Chukchi, Americans, and women.  Other groups are made 
mention, though these groups are analyzed for particular salience and as ideal types 
that lay the framework for my theory of cultural consciousness. Although the 
discussion of women comes up in other parts of the dissertation pertaining to family 
politics or profanity, it is in this section where I discuss how women as a social group 
are explicitly targeted in anekdoty. In exploring how each of these marked groups is 
presented in anekdoty, I also explore how the Russian man is able to occupy the 
“voice from nowhere.”  
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The concluding chapter connects the different perspectives from chapters 
three, four, five and six into a holistic understanding of Russian collective identity 
under Soviet rule, the varied articulations of resistance and power, and lays out 
contemporary issues of Russian collectivity that may be explored in different ways. I 
explore avenues for future research based upon those research questions that emerged 
during research, but did not fit into the scope of this particular project. 
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Chapter 2 Critical Discourse Methodology 
For this study, I have used a mixed-methods approach to collect and analyze 
data. In studying Soviet anekdoty, I conducted a discourse analysis of anekdoty from 
the Soviet period while contextualizing such rhetoric with historical data about 
popular culture (influential movies, television and radio shows upon which anekdoty 
are based), events to which anekdoty react (speeches by Brezhnev, Chernobyl, first 
man on the moon etc.), Soviet legislation and migrations of populations within the 
USSR. My broad methodological approach is drawn from Foucault’s discourse 
analysis (1972; 1977; 1978) and Van Dijk’s Critical Discourse Analysis (1997; 2001; 
2002). I began my analysis exploring the interrelated issues of: “What was the 
relationship between the anekdot and the Russo-Soviet collectivity,” with the hopes 
of understanding what are the discursive formations articulated by the anekdot and 
how they construct the identities of those who tell them. As such, my research focuses 
upon both the text and the context—a relationship that is fundamental to the CDA 
framework (discussed in greater detail below). 
 
Sampling 
The sample of anekdoty analyzed in this study is meant to be thematically exhaustive. 
Although the subject matter—Russian anekdoty from the Soviet era—existed and 
wielded their power as an orally-transmitted underground folklore, for the purpose of 
this historical analysis, they are analyzed as written texts that were drawn from 
published compilations. During my archival research and fieldwork in St. Petersburg 
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and Moscow, I found 12 published compilations of anekdoty that fulfilled the criteria 
for inclusion: they included Soviet era anekdoty and the compilation had a broad 
range of genres, not centered on a single subject (e.g. Jews, Children, women).  These 
12 compilations were drawn from the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg, 
the State Library in Moscow, in addition to contemporary Russian bookstores in both 
cities. The National Library carries almost every book that has been published in 
Russia under Soviet rule and the State Library in Moscow is the third largest library 
in the world with over 17.5 million books, as such, these two libraries served as the 
primary archives from which I collected anekdoty.  
These 12 compilations were published between 1951 and 2010, with the mode 
occurring in 1991. Information about each of these compilations is listed in Table 2.1.  
While my argument is framed by the anekdot’s pre-Stalin and post-Gorbachev 
incarnations, my sample is drawn from the period of heightened and solidified Soviet 
cultural policy from the early 1950s until the end of Soviet censorship in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Although I have a compilation published in 2010, each of the 
compilations was focused upon Soviet humor by definition. The 50 years of Soviet 
history included in my study involved quite a bit of deliberate constructed 
experiences and narratives with which anekdoty engage. Soviet propaganda provided 
ample fodder for anekdoty which often play off or subvert these mass-media 
representations.  
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Table 2.1 The Compilations 
# Title Date 
Published 
Location of 
Publication 
Nationality of 
Author
2
 
1 Kreml’ I Narod: Politicheskie 
Anekdoty 
1951 Munich, 
Germany 
Russian 
2 Rossia smeetsia nad SSSR. 
Chitaite anekdoty! Smotrite! 
Smeites’! 
1980 Paris, France Jewish 
3 Political Jokes of Leningrad 1982 TX, USA Jewish 
4 1001 izbrannyi sovetskii 
politicheskii anekdot 
1986 NJ, USA Jewish 
5 Anekdot: Ul’ibk zhiznii 1990 Moskovskaja 
Oblast, Russia 
Russian 
6 Anekdotii 1991 Maikop, 
Russia 
Russian 
7 Sovetskii Anekdot 1991 Moscow, 
Russia 
Unknown 
8 Anekdotii 1991 Voronezh, 
Russia 
Russian 
9 Sovetskii Anekdot 1992 Moscow, 
Russian 
Russian 
10 Iistoria gosudarstva Rossiskaya 
Sovetskovo b Predaniya I 
anekdotach  
1995 Moscow, 
Russia 
Russian/ 
Ukrainian 
11 Tonna Anekdotov b Sovetskich 2006 St. 
Petersburg, 
Russia 
Jewish 
12 Anekdotii o Politikach ot SSSR do 
Yeltsina  
 
2010 St. 
Petersburg, 
Russia 
Russian 
The first four of these publications were published abroad, since it was illegal 
to publish (or admit to telling) such subversive jokes under Soviet rule. The first was 
published in Munich, Germany in 1951. This volume contains anekdoty that were told 
during Stalin’s time. Although the primary focus of this study is upon those anekdoty 
                                                 
2
 In cases where the nationality was not explained in the authors notes or forward or not listed 
online, I assumed nationality based upon the genealogy of the last name of the author, though these 
names may have been pseudonyms used by the authors to avoid punishment, especially for those 
volumes published before the collapse of the Soviet State. 
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told after Stalin’s death, this volume illustrates how such irony and cynicism was 
present even under Stalin’s rule, though perhaps not as widespread or as frequent in 
exchange. The second volume was also published abroad, in Paris in 1980.  The third, 
published in the United States in 1982, was the only volume in my set that was 
already translated into English for my analysis. The fourth volume with 1001 
anekdoty (the largest volume in my sample), was compiled by a Russian Jew who 
managed to immigrate to Israel in 1970 and publish there before such publications 
were allowed in Russia. The other eight compilations were published after 1990, 
when a relatively free press was reintroduced in Russia. Although there is still 
considerable censorship in post-Soviet Russia, as evidenced by the imprisonment of 
numerous journalists and other vocal dissenters in recent years, these anti-Soviet 
jokes no longer posed a threat since the establishment which they challenge has 
already been dismantled. Appendix A includes a more detailed description of each of 
the 12 compilations, including descriptions of how the authors were able to compile 
the assortment of anekdoty.  
 I chose not to limit my sample to compilations published in the first years 
after the dissolution of the USSR, but rather to extend my sample across this 60 year 
time frame in order to understand the thematic changes over time. Even though the all 
the compilations are about “Soviet” jokes, it was interesting to note which particular 
jokes were selected by the editor as typical, meaningful or most memorable of that 
era. These choices of inclusion and exclusion may reflect the how the Russian 
collective memory has developed and changed over time, though is not something I 
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have extensively explored in this dissertation. It is a topic I may explore in 
subsequent analyses.  
In initially considered looking through the KGB archives in order to provide 
greater context to these narratives, as well as to increase my sample. In attempt to do 
so, I was confronted with institutional roadblocks around which I had difficulty 
navigating. For instance, I showed up at the entrance of the archives early on a 
Tuesday morning after I had read online that they would be open at 10am. The guard 
asked me what I wanted. I told him I had come to look at some archival material. He 
told me that they were not open to the public on this day or any day this week. 
Accepting his word, I thanked him, turned around and walked away.  When I returned 
home that evening, I told my cousin about the incident. He told me that I shouldn’t 
have walked away, that “of course” they would tell me they were closed, but that I 
needed to push back. I needed to talk to the rukovoditel’, or the “boss,” and explain 
that I knew that they were open, and that I had official written permission from the St. 
Petersburg State University to see these materials. I went back the next day and 
followed my cousin’s instructions. I argued. I asked to see the rukovoditel’, and as 
promised, I was eventually allowed into the archives and was able to access the 
materials I requested. From this encounter, I learned much more than what I read in 
the archives, I learned about informal codes and negotiations of power in a culture of 
second economies and informal politics. Despite my eventual admission into the 
archives, the organization (or lack thereof) is such that it became abundantly clear 
that I would need to know exactly what I was looking for before I arrived. Sheila 
Fitzpatrick described similar difficulties, calling the archival research “ethnography” 
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in itself (183). As if that were not difficult enough, Brandenberger (2009) points out 
that officers may have recorded anekdoty out of context, transcribed them incorrectly, 
or completely fabricated the narratives themselves in order arrest Russian civilians. 
As such, I decided not to pursue this line of research, instead focusing upon 
publications that were authored by those people who participated in their exchange 
under Soviet rule. 
I found the compilations for this study housed in the National Library of 
Russia, located in St. Petersburg, Russia, as well as the Russian State Library in 
Moscow, Russia. The National Library of Russia is the oldest public library in Russia 
and hosts quite a number of compilations of anekdoty that were published both 
domestically and abroad.  The Russian State Library in Moscow holds every book 
published in the USSR between 1922 and 1991. Using these two libraries to locate 
anekdoty compilations, I was confident that I would find the level of theoretical 
saturation that was necessary for such a corpus undertaking. I search for “anekdoty” 
(jokes), “sovekskii anekdot” (Soviet joke), as well as “politicheskii anekdot” 
(political joke), in the online search catalogues for the two libraries.
3
 From the 
hundred or so compilations that I found, the 12 selected fit the necessary criteria of 
being Soviet-era anekdoty that did not focus on one particular subject (e.g. women, 
soviet leaders, children), but rather covered a breadth of subjects. 
                                                 
3
 I searched for the various conjugations of these words, since in the Russian language, each word can 
be written in 6 different cases and three different genders. I tried all possible combinations in the 
search fields, often beginning the with the stem words. 
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The compilations selected were edited by diverse people. A common theme 
among the anekdoty is of “ingroup” versus “outgroup,” therefore, it was important 
that my sample included collections that were assembled by people on different sides 
of these nationalistic boundaries. I sought to include multiple perspectives in order to 
understand whether the subject of anekdoty differ by nationality, yet the analytical 
focus of the research that emerged was upon the privileged core identity of Soviet 
Russians, a group who are might be better understood as part of the “unmarked 
category.” Therefore, this sample is only of those anekdoty in the Russian language 
(as opposed to other non-Russian Soviet republic languages) and those that were 
labeled as both Soviet and Russian anekdoty.
4
 The editors are varied in their 
nationalities and geographical location. The publishing houses and place of work for 
the set of the compilations spans the breadth of Russia—from North-Eastern Siberia 
to Odessa, Ukraine—as well as a compilation published in Germany, Israel and the 
US. The professions of the editors are also varied, ranging from a neuroscience 
professor to a human rights activist to a stand-up comedian.
5
 Each of the twelve 
compilations included in the sample was an anthology of Russian Soviet political 
anekdoty and was written in the Russian language except for the one published in the 
US by Arie Zand after his immigration. Despite being published abroad, the four 
volumes published in France, Germany and the US (2) each had considerable overlap 
                                                 
4
 Although one compilation in the sample was published in English, they were translated from Russian 
and not other Soviet republic dialects, seep Appendix A for more detail. 
5
 These professions are based on what I could find about these authors in the actual compilations 
themselves or through additional research, though I was not able to find such detailed information 
about each author. 
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with the anekdoty from other volumes in terms of repeated anekdoty,
6
 and similar 
subject matter. The commonality shared between these volumes allows us to conclude 
that these data should be treated as part of the same population.  
 Although there were other compilations published over this period, in order to 
be included in my sample, the book needed to be focused on Soviet era anekdoty in 
general. This was determined by title, table of contents and/or a general perusal of the 
anekdoty included. Compilations that only focused on one genre: children’s jokes, 
sexual jokes, Jewish jokes or another subcategory were not included in the sample. 
These types of anekdoty were included in the sample, but that the compilation needed 
to cover a broader range of subjects in order to be included. I made this decision 
because my research question concerns the (representations of) collective identity of 
the Russian people.
7
 To focus on compilations that were explicitly targeted to one 
group over another, or to focus on one issue over another, would not be as 
representative of those jokes that were “collectively shared.”  
Together, these 12 volumes include several thousand anekdoty. In order to 
create a more manageable sample, I randomly selected one fifth of the anekdoty from 
each of the compilations. Specifically, I began with a random start in each 
                                                 
6
 No two of the same anekdot was included in the sample. In the sampling of counting every fifth 
joke, if the fifth anekdot had already been sampled, I moved on to the sixth anekdot, if that one had 
also already been sampled, I moved back to the fourth, then seventh, then third, until I found a 
unique anekdot to add to the sample. Once a unique anekdot had been found, I then resumed the 
counting process, counting five anekdoty in order to locate the next anekdot to be included in the 
sample. 
7
 It should be noted that all these compilations are geared towards Russian men who more often 
exchanged anekdoty and who were centered by the discourse. The gendered dimension of collective 
identity formation reflected in these anekdoty is addressed throughout the analysis. 
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compilation (I picked from a hat the numbers 1-5 to identify the first) and then 
translated each fifth anekdot to be included in my sample. In other words, in one 
volume I began with the 1
st
 anekdot and then sampled the 6
th
, 11
th
, 16
th
… while in 
another volume I began on the 3
rd
 anekdot and then sampled the 8
th
, 13
th
, 18
th 
etc. My 
random start was between the 1
st
 and 5
th
 anekdot of each volume. If there was a repeat 
in my sample (i.e. the 5
th
 anekdot had already been included in the sample from 
another volume), I would skip the repeated anekdot and move to the next one (the 
6
th
). If the 6
th
 had also already been sampled, I moved back to the 4
th
, then 7
th
, then 
3
rd
, covering all the anekdoty around the target one until I found a unique anekdot to 
add to the sample. Once a unique anekdot had been found, I then resumed the 
counting process, counting five anekdoty from the anekdot that was initially supposed 
to be included in my sample (whether it was or was not due to redundancies) in order 
to locate the next anekdot to be included in the sample. 
Such a method has yielded me a sample of 1290 anekdoty. I translated the 
these narratives from Russian into English and compiled them into separate Microsoft 
Word documents in order to facilitate analysis through Nvivo 9 software. Although 
there are a number of anekdoty in which the humor is involved in a pun, multiple-
meaning word or fragment in the Russian language, I made note of such literary 
elements in parenthetical notes for coding in English. I also kept the original anekdoty 
for reference purposes as I coded and analyzed the sample. 
My “archive” of anekdoty is not completely exhaustive (an impossible feat to 
accomplish with an oral folk genre or unpublished texts) but aims to be thematically 
 
 49 
 
exhaustive based upon my extensive search and coding process. It should be noted 
that more offensive or controversial anekdoty were most likely underrepresented in 
these volumes and as a result in my sample, in that publishers may have chosen not to 
include offensive narratives in volumes that were sold to a popular audience. 
Anekdoty of the more violent sexist (e.g. rape) or xenophobic (e.g. holocaust) variety 
were found with limited frequency in these volumes and in personal conversations, 
but overall were generally rare. Such type of censorship in published texts is to be 
expected, as it was in conversations I had with Russian men. As a female foreigner, I 
would not expect to be privy to the same varieties of anekdoty that are exchanged 
among Russian male insiders behind closed doors. Recognizing this disparity, we 
might infer that these type of outgroup humor may be underrepresented in the sample. 
I will discuss this issue in greater detail in my analysis section.   
Overall, the volumes included in my sample had very significant overlap with 
repeated anekdoty or repeated themes. I found very few anekdoty that did not fit into 
any of my coding categories, therefore I am confident that I reached a level of 
saturation with the size of my sample. The codes themselves developed through an 
iterative process of coding and recoding the narratives based on salient themes and 
power moves. My coding scheme was informed broadly by Foucault’s (1978; 1980) 
understanding of knowledge, discourse and power and more systematically by Van 
Dijk’s (1997; 2001; 2002), Fairclough (1992) Fairclough & Wodak’s (1997) critical 
discourse analysis. I will go into greater detail about my methodology in the 
following sections. 
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Critical Discourse Analysis 
One is not born with opinions, identities and memories and neither are groups; 
they are learned and acquired through a collaborative process of self-definition. The 
collective identity is in part, constructed in semantic space—in terms of the self-
attributed physical characteristics, a common set of values and beliefs and an 
associated narrative or history which constructs the counted individuals as part of a 
bounded entity that moves together through historical space and time.  Discourse 
similarly plays an integral role in the relationships between different (ethnic) 
collectivities. Discourse “is a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about – i.e., a way of representing – a particular topic at a particular historical 
moment… Discourse is the production of knowledge through language. But … since 
all social practices entail meaning and meaning shapes and influence what we do—
our conduct—all practices have a discursive aspect” (Hall 1992: 291). Discourse, 
impels actions, traversing and producing various forms of knowledge. Foucault 
(1976) argued that regimes of truth function not by enacting a repressive function 
upon its audience, but rather through the establishment of a code, one is motivated to 
accept, abide by and participate in the particular knowledge that is established. Every 
text or image is linked to a referent system or dominant code, with which the intended 
audience is expected to be familiar.  
Knowledge is power (Foucault 1978) in terms of having the ability to defining 
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and defining “truth” from an “unmarked” 
hegemonic voice; and power is relational, therefore discourse is essential in 
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constructing group identities and associated relationships. Racial prejudices are not 
innate nor do they develop spontaneously through interaction with the “other.” The 
“other” must be constructed by discourse that is learned through either personal 
conversations or transmitted through some sort of textual form. Privileges of the 
dominant group are established and perpetuated through seemingly nonpartisan laws, 
rules, norms and habits, a discourse that Gramsci (1971) coined "hegemony.” It is the 
interest of the dominant group to defend and legitimate these negative outgroup 
representations in order to maintain the power and privilege afforded by their class 
position. Even if they are not conscious of the personal gain afforded by such 
opinions, they espouse them because the perspective “make sense” according to 
(their) hegemonic logic (Van Dijk 2001: 146). For all of these reasons, studying 
discourse is essential in understanding national collective identity, both in terms of 
the explicit and implicit discourses that bound a group and situate them in relation to 
other groups along a historical narrative.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is both a method and a theory that focuses 
upon “the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (Van Dijk 
1997). The focus of CDA is upon discourse at two different levels—the micro 
analysis of the particular “token” text dissected and at the macro level—in terms of 
connecting that particular text to a larger web of meaning. CDA endeavors to 
understand how discourse connects the micro and the macro through a number of 
sites including: (1) identities at the individual and group level in terms of how 
members are constructed as part of the group, (2) how the actions of these members 
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construct larger social processes (3) how personal and social cognition converge 
through repertoires of memories, knowledge and opinions and (4) how local contexts 
are part of the overarching, pervasive social structure and as part of one set of 
processes, specifically how local and global contexts are interrelated (Van Dijk 
1997).  
A central aim of my project is to pay attention to “voices of the unheard,”  in 
that subjugated groups often “hold markedly different perceptions of the social 
inequalities that surround them” (Collins 2001: 4), an in studying these discourses 
might reveal alternative lived realities and experiences that are omitted from the 
official record.  Studying anekdoty helps us understand how Russians living under the 
Soviet regime understood such incongruity between state propaganda and lived 
realities. 
Although CDA focuses on a great variety of forms of discourse (written, 
spoken or visual), it is distinguished from other forms of discourse analysis by its 
particular affinity for the analysis of social and political issues. Fairclough and 
Wodak (1997) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows: 
1. CDA addresses social problems 
2. Power relations are discursive 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 
4. Discourse does ideological work 
5. Discourse is historical 
6. The link between text and society is mediated through those who consume,  
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interpret, and use narratives 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 
8. Discourse is a form of social action 
(Pp. 271-80) 
 By citing passages from the texts under analysis, those engaging in CDA 
attempt to identify patterned ways by which some groups (and their associated 
interests and perspectives) are favored over others. CDA holds that the social 
construction of text is not merely a representation of reality, but is reality in and of 
itself-as such, the study of discourse is the study of lived realities. Such analyses 
focuses on a dimensions of the text including (but not limited to): grammar and style, 
semantics, rhetoric (metaphor, irony, hyperbole), structural emphasis (headlines, 
summaries, bolding of text), narrative, intertextuality, hybridity, speech acts, turn 
taking, intonation, politeness and face-management (Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 
2008). Since CDA is a theoretical method—there are no standard requirements for 
which discursive strategies are used. Rather, it is left to the discretion of the 
researcher to decide which methods might best suit the text and social issues under 
analysis. CDA theoretical scholars describe their field differently and emphasize 
different properties of the discourse. 
Critical Discourse Analysis is often (at least in part) politically motivated and 
therefore goes beyond simple descriptions of the world in order to delineate 
relationships of injustice and inequality that operates through text and talk. As such, 
“critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, 
expose, and ultimately resist social inequality” (Van Dijk 2001: 352). Rejecting 
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Weber’s goal to conduct “value-free” research, the critical discourse analysis 
developed as a reaction against the “grand narrative” modernist paradigms of the 
1960s and 1970s. Rather, CDA embraces the feminist situated perspective by trying 
to understand how discourses construct bodies and collectivities in different (and 
unequal) ways while simultaneously recognizing how scholarship is also socio-
politically "situated" regardless of our intentions or efforts to combat it.  Therefore 
there is no centered “truth,” but rather a complex web of diverging and converging 
perspectives and relationships. 
In order to understand the web of interconnected forces and structures which 
produces situated discourses, the structural and psychological contexts must also be 
recreated. It needs to be recognized that discourse analysis needs to “account for the 
fact that discourse and social action is being engaged in within a framework of 
understanding, communication and interaction which is in turn part of broader socio-
cultural structures and processes (Van Dijk 1997: 21). While both objective and 
subjective qualities of the broader context are taken into account by CDA, Van Dijk’s 
(2001; 2008) socio-cognitive approach places emphasis upon the properties of the 
subjective mental representation of the social situation which enables seamless the 
production or comprehension of discourse. Those more objective historical 
dimensions of analysis include the temporal and geographical setting, current trends 
and discourses, the various institutions and socio-political structures which define 
relationships between groups of people.  The more subjective dimensions include the 
goals of the actors, their knowledge, opinions, values and shared ideologies. In 
understanding both the objective and subjective elements enables the researcher to 
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understand “the communicative situation, deciding on time and place of the 
communicative event, or on which participants may or must be present, and in which 
roles, or what knowledge or opinions they should (not) have, and which social actions 
may or must be accomplished by discourse” (Van Dijk 2001: 356). Through such 
reconstruction, elements of the text that might have appeared to be arbitrary might be 
recast as integral aspects of the hegemonic discourse. Though not all varieties of 
CDA focus upon the same issues, they all share these important methodological 
emphases upon textual analysis and critical social contextual grounding (Fairclough 
1992; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Van Dijk 1997; 2001; 2002). 
Since I am more interested in what people are doing with discourse (in terms 
of constructing a politicized collective identity), my analysis will focus on the ways 
language constructs social relationships (text) and the historical environment in which 
anekdoty are told (context). Context is central to understanding power relationships in 
that the discourse extends beyond the text to constitute practices, laws and behaviors 
(Foucault 1979; Hall 1992). Since the context is historical, I have relied upon second-
hand sources to reconstruct the interpersonal contexts in addition analyzing the 
relationship between anekdoty and Soviet events, speeches, films and stories. Text 
and context are intimately connected in the process of constructing knowledge and 
power. The anekdot is a form of ironic discourse in both text (highlighting mismatch 
between what the Party says and what the Party does) and context (loyal communist 
workers telling these jokes in back stairwells at work). As such, I will focus upon two 
sets of discourse as represented in the anekdot: (1) the explicitly targeted discourse of 
the Party which was both challenged for the incongruity between words and actions 
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(shared grievances) and reified in terms of glorious Soviet accomplishments (positive 
identity) in addition to (2) the less intentional discourse produced by the collection 
and narrative of the anekdoty themselves in terms of constructing the boundaries of a 
Russo-Soviet national identity and of the nostalgia and regret associated with a 
collective memory or future-guided ideologies.  
In order to operationalize this system of analysis, I focused upon particular 
features of the text that operate as discursive moves of power in constructing groups, 
institutions and ideologies in meaningful ways. In my analysis, I paid heed to those 
rhetorical and discursive moves that require more than a cursory reading in order to 
understand. This was especially necessary with a genre that is so ironic and sarcastic 
in tone. The list of those qualities I particularly focused upon includes: 
1. Rhetoric of nationalism in the anekdot including  
a. Negative metaphors of outgroups which emphasize the contrast 
between them and the civilized ingroup and cast them as deviant or 
threatening in some way. 
b. The use of hyperbole to exaggerate social problems and the 
association and/or causation by various non-Russian nationalities 
and other disfavored outgroups which constructs shared grievances 
as Us vs. Them issues. 
c. At the heart of the analysis of any sort of humor is also irony—in 
terms of how the anekdot itself highlights the incongruity between 
the Party discourse and Party action. 
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2. Structural emphasis of the discourse in terms of the characters, events 
and time periods that are most frequently involved in the anekdoty.  What 
is included in the compilations is meaningful in that it reflects the 
perspective of the compiler—what subjects are deemed most meaningful 
or “popular” might differ by editor and her/his historical and cultural 
location. 
3. Narrative in terms of which historical events and cultural values and 
norms are included and excluded in order to construct a positive (and 
seamless) Soviet and Russian identity and history at both the anekdot and 
Party level discourses.   
4. Intertextuality of the anekdot in terms of how fictional (movies, stories, 
cartoons) and non-fictional events (Party discourses exoressed through 
official textbooks, newspapers and political speeches) are interwoven in 
the world of the anekdot.  
5. Semantic means of constructing Russian and Soviet identity and memory 
as a singular corpus through both Party and anekdot discourse and the 
semantic reversals of blame (“blaming the victim”) and constructing the 
Other as not merely different, but deviant.  
6. Hybridity in terms of how elements of non-Russian Soviet republics 
(individuals, customs, foods, language, historical events) are co-opted and 
cast as “Russo-Soviet” through the process collapsing Soviet victories and 
accomplishes with the Russian identity and history. 
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In terms of how the social context and performance of the anekdot constructs national 
identity and the associated collectivity, I have focused upon: 
7. Irony- again highlighting the incongruity between Party rhetoric and lived 
realities, I will look at both the content of the anekdoty but also to the 
contexts, specifically to those places that might seem sacred to the Party, 
might be attacked from within by these popular narratives. 
8. Face-management - although there may be fewer linguistic cues to this 
process, in terms of the complementary contextual analysis, the popularity 
of the anekdot itself reveals the need for this underground discourse with 
very specific rules of conduct in order maintain a certain public image. 
I explored each of these elements across my sample of anekdoty in order to 
understand the multiple levels of meaning making and social boundary negotiation. 
The focus was upon both intersexual relationships as well as how these texts engaged 
with the broader social context and the implication of expressed opinions and 
stereotypes upon social relations. 
 
Analysis of the Anekdot 
The above list of discourse qualities guided my archival analysis by enabling 
me to recognize how the anekdot is linked to many other facets of Soviet culture and 
history in complex ways. Although the text narratives are very rich in themselves in 
terms of how they employ irony, cynicism and juxtaposition of propaganda with lived 
realities, there is also a lot to be considered in relation to the historical and cultural 
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context to which these jokes refer and from which they are drawn. These stories were 
only found comical among insiders who were versed in the contradictions and 
absurdities of Soviet life; they were only laughed at by people who were familiar with 
racial and gendered stereotypes and by those people who lived under a regime of 
repression that forbade such laughter or recognition at all.  In my exploration of how 
the anekdot served to both challenge and perpetuate the hegemonic discourse of the 
Party, I coded my sample into the categories listed below. Figure 2.1 further 
illustrates the relationship between these coding categories. These categories 
developed through an iterative process of coding in which I expanded and collapsed 
concept clusters as they emerged from the archive. The set of coding categories 
reflects several rounds in which I recoded significant parts of the sample in order to 
produce a map that appropriately captured the topics and relationships most 
frequently addressed by anekdoty. The final coding structure is presented below in the 
following maps:
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The grey boxes on the left side of the page represent the highest order codes, which are comprised 
of the ovals to the right, which are subsequently comprised of rounded rectangles, and finally 
diamonds. The actual shape of the diagram does not have any significance on the relationship 
between coding categories. Each are hierarchical in structure. 
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Figure 2.1 The Party Coding Map 
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Figure 2.2 Social Problems Coding Map 
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Figure 2.3 Non-Soviet Nationalities Coding Map 
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Figure 2.4 Soviet Groups Coding Map
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Russian Culture Coding Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The structure of this coding map is different for the sake of space, but should be understood in the 
same way the other maps are laid out. 
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Figure 2.6 Collective Identity Coding Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Children Coding Map 
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Figure 2.8 Self-Reflexive Coping Coding Map
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These maps illustrate the coding structure that emerged after an iterative process of 
creating, deleting, dividing and merging coding categories. Once all 158 coding 
categories were established (this includes the removal of those categories with fewer 
than three references), these categories were lumped into 51 higher order codes which 
can be grouped into 7 general categories. These categories include anekdoty about 
Party leaders, Ideology, Social Problems, Coping Strategies, Policy, Nationalities, 
Collective Memory, Russian Culture, and anekdoty about children.  The breakdown 
of these categories is displayed in Chart 2.1.  
 
                                                 
10
 The act of telling anekdoty was a process of coping for Russians, but this also emerged as a theme 
of self-reflexive anekdoty that laughed at the culture of laughing and at the ridiculous ways that 
people learned to cope under daily hardship and struggle. These anekdoty were coded in this theme 
even though all anekdoty could arguably be included n a category of coping. 
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Chart 2.1 Anekdoty by Topic
11
 (N=1290) 
 
Based upon an analysis of intersecting codes and connections between anekdoty 
topics and coinciding events, policies, and themes of Soviet daily life, the above 
arrangement was best suited to explain the relationship between the various genres of 
anekdoty according to the rhetorical and discursive styles I observed in my coding 
and analysis. These codes feed into the three broad categories of “Party/State,” 
“Social Problems” and “Collective Identity” which are the organization for the next 
three chapters.  The colors represent the broader codes into which they feed: Social 
Problems, Coping, and Policy are blue, Party leaders and Ideology are red, and 
Nationalities, Collective Memory, Russian Culture and Children are green. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This table breaks up “The Party” into “Party Leaders,” “Ideology,” “Enforcement and Politics” and 
“Social Problems” into “Social Problems” and “Policy.” 
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Chart 2.2 Anekdoty by General Theme (N=1290) 
 
Further breakdown of these three major themes is discussed and analyzed in each of 
the substantive chapters (3-6). Each anekdot in my sample could have been coded in 
multiple categories, but if it was coded at multiple codes within a single theme, for 
example if the anekdot discussed Stalin, Lenin and Communism, the anekdot was 
only counted once as part of the Party/State category. If it was coded across themes, it 
was counted in both broad themes. 
 The primary themes of anekdoty can be understood as part of the three 
categories of subject matter in Chart 2.2: (1) those related to a defined collective 
identity (Nationalities, Russian Culture, Collective Memory, Children, (2) those in 
opposition to the state or the Party (Party Leaders and Ideologies), and (3) those of 
everyday existence, resistance and survival (Social Problems, Policy, and Coping). 
These three categories intersect in a unique way in order to produce an intersecting 
discourse of resistance that is simultaneously identity based, state-oriented, and non-
state oriented.   
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The literature has traditionally divided social movements from everyday 
resistance, arguing that the first is an organized, explicit, identity-based type of 
activism that is directed towards politics-proper (Bourdieu 1984; McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998) whereas the latter is conceived as spontaneous, 
uncoordinated, non-identity based resistance that understands the “personal as 
political” (Scott 1985, 1990, 1999; Collins 1990; Auyero 2004, 2007). Yet in my 
analysis of anekdoty I found that such a clear-cut distinction could not be made. The 
anekdot serves to both reify and challenge the power of the Soviet regime by virtue of 
their simultaneous structural assumptions of class, race, gender, sexuality and religion 
in addition to anarchist sentiments directed towards the Party, the Soviet regime and 
Marxist and Russian ideologies respectively. The following three chapters explore 
how these seemingly-contradictory missions (to reify or to dismantle) and are 
simultaneously articulated via the anekdot.  
In the next chapter, I explain how the collective identity defined by some 
anekdoty in conjunction with those state-oriented political anekdoty articulate 
resistance to the State and the Party in overtly political ways. The focus is upon the 
third of anekdoty that explicitly engage with State rhetoric, national holidays and 
other Soviet discourse. These narratives manage to both reify and challenge the 
Soviet definition of reality by orienting towards a single narrative but challenging 
elements and underpinning ideologies of this narrative. 
In chapter four, I analyze anekdoty that are not overtly political in nature, ones 
that deal with daily struggle, hardship and coping. I argue that anekdoty might be 
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understood as a both a process of everyday resistance and everyday collective coping. 
The anekdoty I draw from for this chapter are primarily from the third about “Social 
Problems,” though many of these narratives also have connections to State/Party 
resistance or to collective identity, even if these other subjects are not their primary 
focus. The perspective articulated in these narratives is that of perseverance and 
coping in an otherwise strangulating and highly dysfunctional social world.  
In chapter five, I describe how anekdoty reflect a top-down “imagined 
community” that engages with and reifies particular state-defined elements of Soviet 
society. I pair real world events and policies with their expressions in anekdoty in 
order to illustrate how Anderson’s (1983; 2006) top-down conceptualization of 
“imagined communities” played out for the Russian people living under Soviet rule 
and how the discourses running across anekdoty are not simply transgressive or 
challenging of Party power, but also reifying of it. This chapter deals with anekdoty 
from both the State/Party third and from the Collective Identity third. 
In chapter six, I explore how the Russian man is particularly centered in 
Russian national identity, through the construction of particular social groups as 
“other.” I argue that these outgroup populations are understood not strictly in terms of 
how the State has defined them in law or propaganda, but also as a tool of exclusion 
and self-definition of the Russian man. In particular, I focus upon those anekdoty that 
deal with the Georgians, Chukchi, Americans and women. These anekdoty are drawn 
primarily from the Collective Identity third of the pie.  
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Each of these chapters illustrates and explicates my methodological technique 
through the usage of both charts and in depth analyses of particularly elucidative 
anekdoty. I pair quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to support my 
overarching argument about the anekdot serving as a means of cultural consciousness 
and Russian national definition.  I accomplish this by providing proportions of my 
sample that focused upon the Communist Party, political leaders, social problems, 
racial, national or gendered groups, popular culture and other subjects of ridicule.  
From this quantified analysis, I analyze particularly elucidative anekdoty, unpacking 
multiple meanings and explaining the historical and cultural meanings and 
reflections.  Pairing these two approaches together, we are privy to a weighted, 
grounded analysis that explores those topics that were most popular in the sample, but 
with an in-depth exploration that enables us to understand the complexity of these 
discourses that both resist and reify official Party discourse that sought to stabilize 
and maintain the Soviet political structure. 
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Chapter 3  Anekdot as State/Party Resistance 
Jokes did not cause the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse was caused 
by a combination of economic, social, legal and cultural factors including a 
government rife with contradictions and the development of many local nationalist 
identities that could no longer be suppressed. Despite this, the influence of these 
narratives in simultaneously challenging and reifying the legitimacy of Party rule, 
social categories, and collective histories must not be underestimated. The 
negotiations of power and constructions of motivating narrative frames and identities 
within the anekdot are strikingly similar to frames used in organized social 
movements. In a significant proportion of anekdoty, there is (1) the construction of a 
collective identity, that is a (2) coordinated effort as reflected by (a) networks 
developed around the exchange of these jokes and (b) the fluency in these 
choreographed discourses of dissent, (3) that is directed against the Soviet State and 
Communist Party in terms of their critiques and challenges to the legitimacy of Soviet 
leadership, its guiding ideology, and the projected future. In this chapter, I will 
explore how anekdoty can be seen as a distinctly political expression that pits the 
people against the State in a number of ways. 
 
Collective Identity and Narrative in State Resistance Rhetoric 
Collective identities are of particular interest to social movement theorists, 
who explore how they are used as collective action “frames” that motivate individuals 
to act on behalf of collective interests (Snow Benford 1988, 1992; Gamson 1992; 
Polletta 1998). Framing has been defined by Snow and Benford (1988) as how “social 
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movement organizations and their agents…assign meaning to and interpret relevant 
events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists” (198). 
Frames enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label events and people 
into meaningful categories (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). Gamson (1992) adds that 
social movement frames almost always include components of injustice, identity, and 
agency. He argues such frames construct a situation as identity-based, empowering 
the group demarcated by the frame to politically challenge or ameliorate a wrong or 
unjust situation. 
Traditionally, social movement theorists tend to pay attention to the role of 
movement organizers in promoting collective identities through framing process. 
What remains underexplored are the other, less-calculated processes of movement 
identity formation. In her account of Civil Rights activists, Francesca Polletta (1998) 
highlights the importance of narratives—stories, tales, allegories—in the power of 
framing. She argues that narratives serve as discourses through which frames are 
“expressed and made concrete,” (Fine 1995: 134), and “exemplified” (Benford 1993: 
196). These functions are important, but also help people locate themselves in a 
broader social and historical context which often results in the alignment with 
particular social causes or issues. Poletta argues that, “Narrative understandings of 
identity… emphasize the structuring of events into evolving wholes… Narratives not 
only make sense of the past and present, but, since the story’s chronological end is 
also at its end in the sense of moral, purpose or telos, they project a future” (1998: 
140).  The process of telling such stories that explain how individuals become a 
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solidified “we” strengthens a collective identity, making possible the development of 
a coherent community, or nation (Sewell 1992; Somers 1992, 1994; Poletta 1998). As 
a consequence, “people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis 
of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiplicity but 
ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narrative” 
(Somers & Gibson 1993). These “narratives” or cultural discourses delineate the 
realm of possible actions and motivations for the associated collectivities. 
Such narratives run across Soviet era anekdoty and they tell stories that 
consciously or unconsciously fulfill Simon and Klandermans’ (2001) five functions 
of a collective identity. They define the Russian collective (belongingness), 
distinguishes this group from other Soviet and non-Soviet groups (distinctiveness), 
highlights the accomplishments (respect) and values (meaning) of these people, all 
through a popularly authored discourse that empowers the group to self-define 
(agency). I term the fluency in these collective discourses, cultural consciousness.  
Russians’ fluency in this popularly-authored narrative that defined them as a group, 
established values and goals produced and reinforced a collective identity and 
reflected a common literacy and identification at the national level. 
Social movement theorists view collective identity as the groundwork of an 
emergent nationalism, which intensifies resultant consequences of such 
collectivization since they might motivate collective action. This perception of 
collectivization and nationalism privileges the institutionalized nation-state. 
“Minority nationalisms” are only recognized once they become an organized, 
political entity that confronts the governance of the “nationalizing state,” or if they 
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orient toward a foreign, external homeland state. In Nationalism Reframed (1996), 
Rogers Brubaker argues that nationalism is a form of politics, and that contestation to 
the dominant nationalism only occurs through direct challenges to power. An implicit 
assumption of such an argument is that if an opposition does not conceive of 
themselves as separate “people,” that they must still align with the dominant 
nationalist sentiment or they are not expressing form of nationalism or collective 
identity.  Without formal organization and overt contestation of the dominant 
nationalism’s political sovereignty, such alternative, possibly resistant, nationalist 
discourses remain unrecognized. This is important in that anekdoty express such 
resistant discourses but did not always express a separate collective identity. The 
discourses express an emergent nationalism, even if it was not as clear-cut across 
peoples, or geographically bounded as traditional nationalisms normally appear, as 
such, they express cultural consciousness, that involves self-awareness and agency, 
but not necessarily with a political goal of collective recognition at a national level. 
Although anekdoty do not necessarily encourage like-minded individuals to 
mobilize visually or publically as traditional forms of collective action might appear, 
their power to chip away at the establishment or express a collective identity that 
challenges the legitimacy of another naming authority should not be underestimated. 
Specifically, by revealing more candid and uncensored opinions of the government 
and other nationalities that otherwise are absent from the hegemonic representation of 
reality produced by the Party this folklore presents a voice for the oppressed 
(Yurchak 1997).  An anekdot only lives on or is retold if it contains some truth; we 
laugh at jokes because they are meaningful, because they reveal the ironic underbelly 
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of groups, governments and historical eras of which we are members. The truths they 
reveal may make us uncomfortable, hence the reason we discuss such issues through 
parables, fictional characters and exaggerated interactions. 
Agent of Socialization into Collective Identity 
In Russia, becoming versed in anekdoty—accumulating a set of these jokes, 
knowing how to tell them in succession, how to integrate them into general 
conversation, and understanding their critiques of everyday life were all part of 
childhood socialization (Moshkin and Rudenko 1996). Although children’s jokes, or 
high school and college jokes have different subject matter than those anekdoty told 
by adults, in a sense, these jokes teach children what it means to be “Russian”—in 
terms of who was included and who was excluded from the collective national 
identity and by learning the defining features of the Russo-Soviet collective 
memory/history.  Children’s anekdoty make use of ethnic stereotypes, but often by 
using animals as the subjects of ridicule. The process of “othering” begins at an early 
age, but in milder and less explicit terms than those used by their adult counterparts. 
Stories told by the anekdot became integrated into the performer and audience’s self-
concept. These identities and values are transmitted by (1) the popular production of 
collective knowledge, (2) affording the teller and listener membership to the 
collective to whom the joke is meaningful and funny, and (3) enabling both to 
transcend the current reality by making light of it, or expressing nostalgia for 
something that happened in the past. Other anekdoty include children in the narratives 
in order to highlight the absurdity of nostalgia for imperial Russia.  The two 
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following anekdoty illustrate how children yearn for the fictional realities from their 
bedtime stories rather than a historical period. 
A Teacher asked a first grade boy, “Who is your father?” 
“Comrade Stalin!” The boy shouted the well-instructed phrase. 
“Good. And who is your mother?” 
“Our Soviet Motherland!” 
“Very well. And what do you want to be?” 
“An orphan…”  
 
A delegation of foreign communists came to see a Moscow kindergarten. Before 
they came, the kids were instructed to answer every question by the visitors 
with just one sentence, "In the USSR everything is the best in the world."  
The visitors came and asked their questions: 
"Children, do you like your kindergarten?" 
"In the USSR everything is the best in the world!" the kids shouted.  
"And what about the food you get?" 
"In the USSR everything is the best in the world!" 
"Do you like your toys?" 
"In the USSR everything is the best in the world!" 
At that, the smallest boy in the group started crying. 
"Misha, why are you crying? What happened?" 
"I want to go to the USSR!" 
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These anekdoty reveal the mismatch between the propaganda “truth” and the 
lived realities of the Russian people. Although adults were socialized to act in public 
as though the presentation of reality and reality itself were compatible, behind closed 
doors, they would laugh or lament the mismatch between these images cast abroad 
and the daily realities of those living in the Soviet Union. Children, before developing 
such ability to manage multiple selves and multiple truths, yearned for the utopian 
vision that was not unlike other fairytale stories that were read to them at night. 
Shmelev and Shmelev (2000) argue that in order to tell the anekdot one must 
be versed in the clichés of Russian culture in both form and content. This fluency 
enables the individual to use the anekdot as a “case” in an argument or to be able to 
tell them in succession around a kitchen table or in another appropriate context. In 
addition to the clichéd intonation, structure and syntax of the anekdot—setting up the 
appropriate contextual lead up and ending with the jarring, laughter-producing punch 
line—the socialized Russian must be versed in the characters and historical memories 
to which the jokes refer. Without knowing the movies and political figures, ideologies 
and their divergent realities, the joke is not funny. Although the anekdot bears some 
similarity to the proverb or prayer, the anekdot differs in that one aims to tell a new 
anekdot, rather than one with “a beard” (an old joke that has been heard before). As 
such, the anekdoty build upon previous anekdoty, some only funny if the one 
referenced has been heard before. 
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Collective Memory 
In addition to the distinction between “us and “them,” a collectivity gains 
strength through a narrative history, one that identifies the collectivity’s goals and 
interests, and which delineates how these interests have been pursued over time. This 
is often accomplished by the successful construction of a “collective memory” (Burke 
1990; Halbwachs1992; Zerubuval 2004; Tismaneanu 1988). Although the Soviet 
Union was greater in geographic space and population than the land and people of 
Russia, I argue that the Russian collective memory may be treated conterminously 
with the Soviet collective memory in regards to a number of important issues. This is 
not to say that the Soviet memory might be reduced to the Russian one or vice versa, 
but as the “unmarked” race (i.e. the centered ethnicity, language, and culture), the two 
perspectives share many central events, language, and nation-defining sites. Some of 
these important overlaps include that (1) Russia comprised 17,075,400 of the Soviet 
Union’s 22,402,200 square kilometers, the majority of the Soviet population was 
Russian
12
, Moscow was the largest city and capital of the USSR,
13
 and the 
contemporary nation-state of the Russian Federation self-defines itself as its 
“continuation state” seeking to fulfill the obligations of the former USSR. The 
geographical or population breadth of the Soviet Union collective memory may be 
greater than that of the Russian and the temporal historical breadth of the Russian 
                                                 
12
 Especially in the last few years when Russians composed 50.78% of the population. 
13
 Moscow had nine million inhabitants and St. Petersburg—formerly Leningrad—was second with 
five million. 
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might be greater than that of the Soviet Union’s, but the two have served to construct 
the other in very significant ways. Such collective memory has both cumulative and 
current aspects: highlighting continuity in some contexts, while integrating new 
interpretation of the past in terms of the contemporary agendas. As Coser (1992) 
writes in regards to collective memory, “a society’s needs may impel it to refashion 
the past, but successive epochs are being kept alive through a common code and a 
common symbolic canon amidst contemporary revisions” (p. 26-7). The past may be 
revised to align with present goals, but it is never completely overwritten or erased 
from the public memory. 
Since individuals cannot remember all historical events directly, many of 
them can only be simulated in indirect ways by reading textbooks, listening and 
participating in festive celebrations in which people congregate together to 
commemorate historical events and accomplishments. As a result, “the past is stored 
and interpreted by social institutions” (Coser 1992: 26-7). Groups of people only 
come to define their collective identity, memory, and history by contrasting its 
present self-collectivity with its constructed past, and in the case of the Russian 
collective, this collective past is pre-Soviet and nationalistic in nature which serves to 
promote a nostalgia for the return of the national identity. Zerubavel (2003) argues 
that this process of collective construction is often articulated through historical sites, 
memorabilia and relics, historical analogies, or holidays that celebrate “anniversaries” 
of events as though it is the “same time”—albeit simply according to a calendar 
date—enables us to “revisit” our collective past. Although the Soviet project sought 
to replace nation-specific memories with Soviet collective ones, the anekdot’s regular 
 
 80 
 
references to particular events, figures, and pop cultural items serves to construct the 
collective memory of the Soviet Union.  
Anekdoty’s reaction to the constructed collective memory invariably produces 
another collective memory. Nostalgia for pre-Soviet times is a topic of some 
anekdoty, serving to fetishize czarist and “Russian” culture. Below are some 
examples: 
A grandmother was asking her grandson to explain Communism to her. 
“They told us in school that when Communism arrives there will be food for 
everybody—meat, poultry, fresh fruits; the shops will be full of all kinds of 
goods; and you’ll be able to buy anything you want without having to wait in 
line.” 
“Ahh,” exclaimed the grandmother expectantly. “Just like in the old days 
under the czar!” 
 
Two old Bolsheviks: 
“Remember Vassya, how we how we stormed the winter palace?” 
“Yeah, that was a bit hasty…” 
Expressed in the above anekdoty is regret regarding how the history of events 
unfolded. In the first narrative, living conditions under the czar are remembered in a 
utopian, nostalgic fashion and in the second, we hear sentiments of regret as earlier, 
“hasty” political actions and unrealistic hopes are reconsidered. What is of particular 
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interest about this nostalgia for pre-Soviet times is that in contemporary Russia, there 
are considerable post-Soviet anekdoty that express nostalgia for Soviet times!  
Collective memory is not held together because it exists in singular or 
continuous time, but rather because it belongs to a common group with strong 
individual ties. The individually experienced collective memory enables the group 
member to take the perspective of this group, and ultimately adopts its interests 
(Halbwachs 1992:52). The anekdot’s recollection of historical events, collective 
identities and sentiments can serve to construct and define the contours of the national 
identity in terms of memorialized events, highlighted “Russian” character traits, 
included and excluded subgroups etc.   
The definition of who belongs to the collectivity or who occupies the role of 
the hero has changed over time. In older, long-form anekdoty, the stories operated 
along class and geographic lines and the tsar was villainized (Alaev 1995; 
Brandenberger 2009). As the textbooks and official memory was altered to confirm 
with contemporary Communist Party goals and ideologies, the contours of such a 
collectivity shifted.
14
 James Wertsch (2002) conceives of the collective memory as 
textually-mediated and conditioned by various cultural instruments such as historical 
narratives in annals, chronicles and history textbooks. Wertsch argues that there is 
often a “schemactic narrative template,” or common narrative structure to the 
collective memory story.  In Soviet textbooks, Wertsch (2002) identified this pattern 
                                                 
14
 The contours of the collectivity, as reflected by those social groups who are cast as “other” in 
anekdoty, have shifted over time.  Unfortunately in this study of printed and published narratives, it is 
impossible to discern the exact dates of any of the specific anekdot.  Although it is possible to locate 
these anekdoty within a general time-period by taking into account publication date or the editor’s 
note at the beginning of some compilation, a systematic analysis by date is impossible to conduct 
with this data. 
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as consistently ascribing to the following trajectory: (1) A starting point of a peaceful 
existence which is later interrupted by: (2) an external force which produces some 
sort of difficulties or frustrations for the people, which leads to (3) a period of crisis, 
struggle and suffering, that is later (4) is ameliorated by a triumph over the 
antagonistic group. This actor-hero narrative constructs the past (or stage 1) as a 
peaceful, problem-free era to which the people want to return. In order for this story 
line to work, the people who lived through this earlier time must comply in re-
remembering this historical with the nostalgia articulated in the anekdot.  
The Soviet Party’s narrative adopted a Marxist perspective that constructs 
capitalism as the intruding external force that produced a period of crisis, suffering 
and struggle. In order to believe this storyline, the current time must be perceived as 
more pleasant or conflict-free than the past. This was not a narrative that many 
Russians were willing to accept as evidenced by the many anekdoty that challenged 
Party rhetoric and lamented about daily social problems. Russians were aware of this 
revisionist, triumphant refashioning of the past and expressed their cynicism toward it 
in anekdoty. For example, 
Granddaughter: Was Lenin a Good man? 
Grandma: Yes, he was a good man. 
Granddaughter: And Stalin was a bad man, right? 
Grandma: Yes he was a bad man. 
Granddaughter: What about Khrushchev? Is he a good man or bad? 
Grandma: We’ll know after he dies, dear. 
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  Such anekdoty as the one above challenge the argument that Russians 
uncritically believed the collective memory presented in the official realm; instead, 
these narratives recognize and draw attention to the power of official History to 
dictate a “truth” that sharply contrasts with personal lived experience. Russians’ 
relationship to this performance is more complex than one of acceptance or rejection. 
As the core of the Soviet empire, it would follow that Russians want the empire to be 
glorious and successful, even if they recognize that Party’s propaganda that depicts 
such a glorious and successful empire has little overlap with reality behind it. Similar 
to the common use of irony in anekdoty in order to reflect the daily practice of 
Goffman’s front and back stages, anekdoty enable the audience to recognize their 
shared experiences and backstage opinions with other Russian Soviets who in public 
rarely dissent. 
Zerubavel (2003) argues that the process of constructing a collective identity 
and associated memory is often articulated through historical sites, memorabilia and 
relics, historical analogies, or holidays which celebrate “anniversaries” of events as 
though it is the “same time”—albeit simply according to a calendar date—enable us 
to “revisit” our collective past. He argues further that such collectivities are often 
constructed through ancestral ties, in that we link ourselves to other members of our 
imagined community by thinking in terms of relatives and generations—so that we 
are “20 persons away from Christopher Columbus” as opposed to 500 years. 
Knowing that we descend from some common ancestor makes us feel connected.   
“And yet, despite the fact that this pronouncedly monogenist vision of all 
humanity descending from some common ancestor is commonly accepted by 
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scientists today, some anthropologists nevertheless advocate an alternative 
polygenist narrative essentially attributing to the various human ‘races’ 
altogether separate ancestries…Racism has always played a major role in 
polygenism” in serving to construct kinship structures in such a way as to 
exclude other races from one’s collectivity of Mankind, and the natural rights 
or essences of that collectivity” (Zerubavel 2003: 85).  
 
This polygenist narrative was used in Soviet organization in order to 
distinguish Russians from Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, etc. Although 
they were all allegedly equal citizens in the USSR, by virtue of their different 
passport-identifying nationalities, they were not equal. Such differentiation serves as 
further evidence that Russia served as the core of the imperialist Soviet Union empire.  
 
Coordination in a “Backstage” 
Under a totalitarian regime that required resolute compliance in behavior and 
belief by its citizens, the anekdot stood apart as one of the only means by which 
voluntary collective action, dissent, and identity could be expressed. The anekdot 
enabled the Soviet citizen to manage and express two different selves—the official 
public law-abiding Party member, and the unofficial, private satirical Russian.  The 
anekdot expressed self-reflexive and ironic reflections upon Soviet life. In doing so, 
they highlighted shared grievances through both the context in which they were 
exchanged (private/backstage spheres) and the content that blamed the government.  
They also implicated complicit Russian citizens for playing along.  
 
 85 
 
In his seminal work The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Erving 
Goffman argues that individuals are constantly shifting between “front” and “back” 
stages in various environments of their life. It is on this front stage that people feel 
greater need to act in a particular way, wear the appropriate mask in order to play the 
appropriate role of the friendly waitress, warm mother, serious businesswoman etc. 
Throughout our lives, we play a number of different roles with corresponding 
“masks.” Goffman argues that these roles might be divided into “public” and 
“private” selves, which correspond to varying levels of self-presentation. Since our 
public roles often expect more stringent regulation, people may feel more relaxed in 
their private domains. Such a division conveniently maps onto the lives of Soviet 
citizens.  
Soviet citizens became accustomed to playing the part of the upstanding 
citizen through participation in political rallies, attending Party meetings, and 
“voting” appropriately at work. Although the Goffman comparison is elucidating, one 
must be careful not to privilege the private self as the Russian’s “true” self—in 
contrast to the public “fake” self—but rather appreciate how Soviet citizens became 
accustomed to living two parallel worlds of actions, opinions and self-expression. The 
anekdot appears more genuine than behavior in the public sphere because it is told in 
third person and therefore enabled more direct expressions of cynicism and 
skepticism of the Politburo, Congress and the Party. Yurchak (1997) coined the 
private, unofficial expressions as “parallel events,” “parallel meanings,” and “parallel 
cultures” that existed along official rhetoric, presentation and events. Although 
official symbols were not taken at face value, they were not openly challenged by 
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most Russians, since such open dissent often made life even harder than it already 
was, sometimes with lethal consequences. As such, the ability to participate in 
parallel events, construct parallel meanings and cultures was a means of survival in 
Soviet Russia (Yurchak 1997).  
The anekdot was an exemplar of this process in that it enabled Russians to 
participate in these parallel universes, by providing a venue to relax one’s official 
presentation without being subject to the label of a disloyal dissident who was denied 
membership to the Soviet collectivity. Yurchak (1997) explains, 
“For the normal subject the only sensible behavior in the public sphere was 
the pretense that one did not see the falsity of official claims. I will call this 
type of relation to the symbolic order in late socialism pretense 
misrecognition. For example, in the early 1980s practically everyone routinely 
went to Komsomol, and other meetings and, especially in the case of the last 
Soviet generation, routinely paid little or no attention to what was going on 
there. Practically everyone voted in favor of the resolutions, often while 
reading a book and oblivious to what the vote concerned. Most people 
recognized the inevitability of the meetings and the falsity of the decisions 
taken at the, and precisely for these reasons preferred to feign 
misrecognition…people participated in two events simultaneously-in the 
official event (which they pretend to misrecognize) and the parallel event” (p. 
171-2) 
The ideological power that the Soviet government reined over the people produced 
this pretense misrecognition—the purposeful internal suppression of critical analysis 
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or rejection of the Soviet order. Realizing that speaking out as dissident would only 
make their lives—and their friends’ and family’s lives—more difficult, Russians 
learned to play the part of the unquestioning Party member with complete irony. 
Anekdoty expressed how nothing could be taken at face value in the Soviet Union—
how everything is the opposite of how it is depicted in the media and that the lives of 
the Russian citizens were defined by the mismatch between ideology and reality. The 
following two anekdoty spoke to this regular contradiction present in Soviet life.  
Six Paradoxes of Soviet life: 
1.  Nobody worked, but the plan(Five-Year Economic Plan) was always 
fulfilled 
2. The plan was fulfilled, but the stores’ shelves were empty 
3. The shelves were empty, but nobody starved 
4. Nobody starved, but everybody was unhappy 
5. Everybody was unhappy, but nobody complained 
6. Nobody complained, but the jails were full. 
 
In a questionnaire for applicants to the communist Party membership one of 
the questions was, "What is your attitude to the Soviet authority?" One 
applicant answered, "The same as to my wife." To the request to elaborate, 
the applicant explained, "First, I love her; second, I fear her; third, I wish I 
had another one." 
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This daily presentation produced a type of humor “in which one admitted not 
only one’s inability to struggle against the official ideology, but also one’s inability to 
struggle against one’s own simulated support of this ideology” (Yurchak 1997:178). 
The political anekdot often operated by making fun of the performer and audience 
themselves in terms of their incongruent self-presentations across disparate contexts. 
The backstage involved such ironic mutual understanding and cooperative coping 
mechanisms among citizens, while on the front stage these same people performed 
unflinching support of the State and its associated ideology. 
Anekdoty enable once-strangers to laugh together at their common values and 
shared experiences—especially at those things that produce great discomfort, fear or 
internal conflict when openly discussed. The balancing of public and private selves is 
a forbidden topic of discussion, since it would reveal a loss of faith or express distrust 
of the Party. Therefore, Soviet citizens might have been unaware of this collective 
practice if it had not been for the anekdot, which expressed such sometimes subtle, 
sometimes-scathing mockery of the “official discourse.” There are many jokes about 
telling anekdoty: about how frequently and repetitively they are told that they are 
numbered and memorized or about the potential penal consequences of telling them. 
In prison, jokes are retold thousands of times, so they are numbered to as not 
to waste time. 
“Number 67!” Laughter. 
“Number 52!” Laughter. 
“Number 41!” One of the inmates starts laughing hysterically. 
“I’ve never heard that one before!” 
 
 89 
 
 
A competition for the best anekdot has been announced. First prize: twenty 
five years; second prize: twenty years, and two condolence prizes: fifteen 
years each. 
 
A judge walks out of the courtroom, laughing loudly. A colleague asks, "What 
are you laughing about?" 
"Ah, I just heard an excellent anekdot," the judge says, wiping away tears of 
laughter. 
"An anekdot? Tell me!" 
"Are you crazy? I just sentenced a man to ten years for it." 
 
The self-reflexivity of these jokes illustrates just how ubiquitous the anekdot was in 
this period and just how well versed some Russians were in them. These narratives 
further highlight how popular they were despite the severe punishment that would 
befall someone who was caught telling one. This collective perspective might be 
extended beyond the anekdot itself to omnipresence of general criticism and 
disapproval of the State which only occurred in private spheres where people felt 
safer from punishment. Although in public Russians had to display their unwavering 
support of communism and the political leaders who were in charge, we see how 
anekdoty often highlight the empty promises of the ideology of communism and the 
ineptitude of Soviet leaders. In this way, anekdoty offered Russians an outlet for 
critique and resistance. 
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Resistance against the State 
American sociology tends to define social movements as collective action that 
is oriented toward the State in terms of legal recognition or political resistance (Piven 
and Cloward 1971; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Gamson 1975; Jenkins 1983). 
Specifically, the two primary frameworks of political activism studies of “resource 
mobilization” and “political opportunity” both focus upon when and why social 
movements are able to develop in relationship to the State at particular historical 
moments (Edelman 2001; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998). Leading 
scholars in the field, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, define contentious politics as: 
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects 
when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the 
claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants” (2001:5). This paradigm presumes that only through formal recognition by 
those who are in power, does the acting entity have the ability to realize legitimate 
change. The call for change must be directed towards the State and negotiations must 
be made through the political system in order for a regime to change its ways. 
Although anekdoty are not visible as overt dialogue with or protest against the state, 
their anti-hegemonic expressions that reject the state’s power to control or define 
identities serve as an important form of resistance.  
Over two-thirds of my sample of anekdoty criticized Soviet leadership, 
communist ideology, State power, or a future under communism more generally. In 
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order to explore the ways by which anekdoty resist the state or challenge its 
legitimacy, I will walk through these four topics in greater detail. 
 
Political Leaders and Soviet Power 
 
 The genre of anekdoty that most explicitly challenges the State apparatus is 
the one that involves narratives about Soviet leadership. Although there has been a 
debate as to what extent anekdoty were told under Stalin’s rule (Brandenberger 2009; 
Sturman 1984; Dolgopolova 1981), from a number of rare published volumes, it is 
evident the political jokes did begin to some extent as early as 1918 in reaction to the 
revolution and civil war.  Further evidence from these volumes and interviews, 
indicate that anekdoty from the 1920s focused upon the construction of socialism and 
the Soviet State, and in 1930s about the shortages and famines associated with the 
new political regime (Brandenberger 2009; Harvard Soviet Social Project).  
Chart 3.1 Party Topics (N =722) 
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Chart 3.2 Anekdoty by Leader (N=316) 
 
 A popular character in anekdoty was Vladimir Lenin, the “father” of the 
Soviet Union. He—and his political and theoretical work—was blamed for the 
contemporary living situation of the Soviet Russian people who told these jokes. Born 
Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, he changed his last name to “Lenin” when he became 
involved with the Russian revolutionary movement in the early twentieth century. 
Lenin served as the leader of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labour Party, and he was involved in the orchestration of the October Revolution in 
1917 (Fischer 2001; Service 2000).  The storming of the Winter Palace led to the 
takeover of the Russian Government and the establishment of the Russian Socialist 
Federative Soviet Republic, the first constitutionally socialist state in the world. 
Although Lenin was rhetorically cast as the father of the Soviet Union as a result of 
his contributions to the October Revolution and Soviet policy, such as the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1921, few people knew his name or 
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argues that Lenin remained such an influential character due to his institutional 
legacy. It was his revolutionary activities and the doctrines he left behind that 
justified these actions and instructed the Soviet people to carry out his vision.  
 In his first pamphlet, What is to be Done?, Lenin argued that Marxists should 
form a political party, or "vanguard,” of dedicated revolutionaries to spread Marxist 
political ideas among the workers. This theory, coupled with Lenin’s April Theses, 
came to be known as Marxism-Leninism, a “pragmatic” Russian application of 
Marxism. Lenin argued that class political consciousness can be brought to the 
workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle; Lenin 
believed that workers must be taught class consciousness (Service 2000). This 
orientation is the source of much anti-Soviet humor that mocks the idea that this 
“correct” ideology will bring about a bountiful future of prosperity and equality. 
Although Lenin died in 1924, it was upon his legacy that the Soviet Union derived 
legitimacy and hope and therefore he was also a site of incredible cynicism and 
regret: 
“Lenin died, but his cause lives on.” 
An Armenian, having read the slogan, said: 
“Eh, Lenin, Lenin…it would have been better of you had lived but you cause 
had died.” 
 
“Lenin was a very, very, kind man,” said the school teacher to the children, 
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“One day, he was sitting on his porch peeling an apple with his knife and a 
hungry child came by and asked him if he could have a piece. He yelled ‘Go 
to hell!’ and the boy ran off” 
The students were confused as to how this illustrated Lenin’s kindness, so the 
teacher explained further, “You see! He could have slit the boy’s throat with 
his knife, but he did not! What a kind man he was…” 
 
Lenin and Lunacharsky went to an exhibit of futurist art in 1920. 
“I don’t understand anything!” says Lenin. 
“I don’t understand anything!” says Lunacharsky. 
And this was the last Soviet leaders who did not understand anything about 
the arts 
Anekdoty about Lenin differ from those about other leaders, in that Lenin is presented 
as a kind man who was straightforward and not versed in “the arts.” He did not share 
his apple with the starving boy who crossed his path, but he was a kind man because 
he also did not slit the throat of the child. This is sarcastic of course, but this narrative 
does make a point about how kind Lenin was in comparison to his successors (e.g. 
Stalin) in that he was not directly malicious towards ordinary citizens. Instead, the 
violence he committed was through his ideological legacy or the power he had that he 
did not use to help the commoner, an idea that was figuratively depicted in the 
anekdot about the starving boy asking for a piece of the apple.  Unlike other leaders 
who were cast as inept, dumb, wicked, or criminal, Lenin is presented as a delusional 
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and naïve Russian who acted too hastily, but without malicious intentions. He was 
cast positively only in juxtaposition to other Soviet leaders who were seen as overtly 
evil and corrupt. 
 Anekdoty about Stalin were more explicit in their resentment, disapproval, and 
desire to live under different leadership or an alternative political system. Few 
anekdoty were told during the height of Stalin’s reign between 1930 and 1950, due to 
the great number of purges and executions under his reign. As a result, the bulk of 
anekdoty exchange began after Stalin’s death in 1953 (Dolgopolova 1981). Ayling 
(2008) argued that most political humor circulates in a post-totalitarian regime, 
because under totalitarian rule, citizens are too afraid to laugh and many of the 
subjects are just not funny. Although humor thrives upon repression, if the fear is too 
all-consuming, then the act of such release is too risky (Freud 1960; Ayling 2008). 
Although it took some time to become comfortable telling such jokes about Stalin, 
when they began, they flooded the streets in full force (Yurchak 1999; Brandenberger 
2009). The theme of many of those anekdoty about Stalin is that of resentment and 
fear. 
At a May Day parade, a very old Jew carries a slogan, "Thank you, comrade 
Stalin, for my happy childhood!" 
The Party representative approaches the old man.  
"What's that? Are you deriding our Party? Everybody can see, when you were 
a child, comrade Stalin was not yet born!" 
"That's precisely what I'm grateful to him for!" the Jew said. 
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Stalin is giving a report. All of a sudden someone in the hall sneezes. 
“Who sneezed?” (Silence.) 
“First row, stand up. Fire! (A standing ovation) 
“Who sneezed?” (Silence.) 
“Second row, stand up. Fire! (A prolonged standing ovation) 
“Who sneezed?” (Silence.) 
“Third row, stand up. Fire! (Everyone in the hall stands and cheers “Thanks 
to the great Stalin!”) 
“Who sneezed?” (Silence.) 
“I did I did! I sneezed! (One man says through sobs) 
“God bless you, comrade!” 
Such illogical and dysfunctional terror was common to Stalin’s regime. Although 
laughter was less common under a reign of terror, it appears as though those 
previously silent critiques were given voice during the time period after Stalin’s 
death. A number of the anekdoty compare life under different Soviet leaders. None of 
the assessments are positive, but we get a sense of the lasting memories or 
constructed collective memories of what it was like to live under each ruler. 
Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev are travelling on a train. 
The train breaks down. 
“Fix it!” orders Stalin. 
They repair it but still the train does not move. 
“Shoot everyone!” orders Stalin. 
They shoot everyone but still the train doesn’t budge. 
 
 97 
 
Stalin dies. 
“Rehabilitate everyone!” orders Khrushchev. 
They are rehabilitated but still the train won’t move. 
Khrushchev is removed. 
“Close the curtains,” orders Brezhnev, “And pretend we’re moving.” 
 
During Lenin’s rule it was like a tunnel: all around was dark, in front was a 
light. 
During Stalin’s rule—it was like a bus—one is driving, half are sitting (in 
prison) and the rest are shaking 
Under Khrushchev and Molotov—like an airplane, two are driving, the rest 
are sick and there is no way to leave. 
 Under Khrushchev—like a circus: one is talking, the rest are laughing. 
 Under Brezhnev—like a movie: everyone is waiting for the end of the show. 
These comparative anekdoty articulate a collective critique of textbook memory. 
Anekdoty offer a populist perspective that serves as a counter-argument to the state-
disseminated version of these leaders and their accomplishments. The two anekdoty 
above highlight how people felt living under the rule of these leaders. Ineptitude and 
corruption were two common themes among such accounts of leadership, yet there 
were also details specific to particular leader articulated in such narratives. These 
person-specific critiques contrast with some of the other anekdoty, which cast the 
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leaders and fools or crooks without giving us a sense for what they specifically 
disliked about their leadership. These are more similar to the ethnic/national variety 
of anekdoty casting groups as dumb or greedy as a means of “othering,” these people 
from the Russian collective: 
Nixon asked God when will there be and end to unemployment. 
“In 20 years,” replied God. 
“Sad, it won’t be under me!” said Nixon. 
Brezhnev asked God when there will be happiness in Russia. 
“Sad, it won’t be under me!” replied God. 
 
Brezhnev, in Georgia, is buying a watermelon. 
- Are these watermelons sweet? 
Salesman: 
- Yes of course! 
Brezhnev: 
- May I select one? 
The Georgian salesman shows him a watermelon and says: 
- Here! Choose one!!! 
Brezhnev: 
- How can I select just from one watermelon? 
The Georgian: 
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- And how do you think we all select you? (in Russian “to select” and “to 
elect” is the same word: выбирать). 
 
The phone rings in Brezhnev’s apartment. His wife answers the phone. 
“Hello, could you please call Leonid to the phone?” 
“And who is asking?” 
“I am one of his classmates!” 
“Fuck you, you’re not a classmate of his! Leonid never went to school.” 
 These narratives reject Soviet leadership by naming particular leaders and 
criticizing them for their character traits. Although these narratives are not very 
specific, they express general dissatisfaction with those in power, portraying them as 
dumb, and inept. When these leader-focused anekdoty are told alongside those that 
discuss the state and its associated policies, the anti-State discourse becomes even 
more prominent. 
 
 Dissatisfaction with the Soviet system was also expressed in general terms 
about “Soviet Power” without naming the particular names of historical figures or 
social policies of which people were resentful.  The jokes about Soviet power focus 
upon the structure that is created by this political power and the impact that such 
structure (or lack thereof) has upon Soviet citizenry. For example: 
 A question: 
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What is it like to live under Soviet power? 
First answer: 
--It’s like a bus: one is driving, and the rest are shaking. 
Second answer: 
--It is like on an ocean liner: the horizon stretches out forever, you’re 
nauseous and there’s no way off. 
Third answer: 
--Every day is worse than the day before it but better than the day after. 
 
A pedestrian walking across the Red Square was struck by a drunk driver and 
killed. 
The militia investigated and filed the following report: 
“….Aside from a copy of Pravda, a picture of Lenin, and the new 
autobiography of Gorbachev, no other evidence of violence was found on the 
body.” 
 
A gypsy is asked to sign up for a state bond. He refuses. They try to convince 
him: 
--Come on, help out the Soviet power! 
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--What sort of power can it be it it’s begging for money from a gypsy?! 
 The above anekdoty focus upon those people living under Soviet power as 
opposed to the specifics of the power structure or the leaders. In conjunction with 
anekdoty about specific leaders (Stalin, Brezhnev, Gorbachev etc.) we see the multi-
pronged critique made by these narratives—focusing not only on the leaders as 
unscrupulous, corrupt, or misguided people, but also highlighting the effects of their 
actions upon the common people who live under their rule. These narratives express 
dissatisfaction with those people and associated structures that make decisions about 
their lives, but also a general dissatisfaction with life in the Soviet Union more 
generally.  
 
Ideology 
Russians living under Soviet rule experienced an identity crisis of sorts as a 
result of the mismatch between two collective images that stood in sharp contrast to 
one another. The first image, which was often projected abroad, was rooted in the 
positive collective identity that envisioned the Russian people as part high intellectual 
culture who were leading a revolution that would lead to prosperity and 
enlightenment for all Soviet citizens. The second image reflected Russians’ everyday 
struggle for survival, which reduced people to their primitive functions and desires, 
divorced from their intellectual faculties and lofty visions. This identity crisis is 
expressed in anekdoty that challenge unrealistic ideologies by highlighting hardships 
of their everyday realities, but also reifying a national identity that is constructed as 
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superior to the international Marxist proletariat. Anekdoty about corruption and theft 
and self-interested behaviors imply the downfall of this higher sense of morality and 
purpose of the Russian people, but so do those anekdoty that specifically target the 
communist vision and ideology. The rejection of this ideology serves as a rejection of 
the Soviet government who sought to codify the Leninist and Marxist ideologies into 
law. 
Chart 3.3 Ideological Anekdoty (N=261) 
 
Below are a number of examples of such anekdoty that express such disenchantment 
and cynicism toward the communist vision. 
The shortest joke: Communism. 
 
“Is it true that when communism comes you will be able to order groceries 
over the phone?” 
“Yes it is true, but they will be given to you over the television.” 
Communism 
19% 
Empire 
6% 
USSR 
4% 
Doomed Vision 
20% 
Collectivization 
7% 
Marx 
5% 
Economy 
3% 
Politics 
18% 
Party 
Membership 
5% 
Party Meeting 
3% 
Politburo 
3% CPCC 
3% Kremlin 
3% 
Soviet 
Government 
2% Elections 
0% 
Ideology 
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“Is it possible to build communism?” 
“To build it, yes. But to live through it—doubtful.” 
 
What is “politically thinkable” is defined by the vocal and visible dominant classes. 
As a result, less powerful social groups become politically silent and invisible. 
Disadvantaged groups are unable to engage in politics-proper or to challenge the 
reigning political ideology since they are not recognized as legitimate voices. Yet in 
these anekdoty, which challenge political entities or their underpinning ideologies, 
enable a creative negotiation and redefinition of what these ideologies represent.  
Instead of a struggle for power, they afford a “productive” power (Foucault 1980) that 
redefines the truth. As a result, these narratives serve to reconstitute power and the 
logic underpinning that power in meaningful ways.  
Although the Soviet Union claimed to be a single union of people, it was in 
fact a political entity comprised of multiple national, ethnic, religious and racial 
groups.  And despite its communist claim to equality, the way such policies played 
out in practice yielded a nation of complex interconnected inequalities (to be 
discussed in greater detail in chapters five and six). These contradictions are 
important to understand in that they did not produce uniform anti-State sentiment as 
one might imagine. Instead, resistance often manifested as such recognition and 
vocalization of incongruity between law and practice. In tandem with the subversion 
of its underpinning ideologies, the legitimacy of the Soviet Union was also threatened 
by these narratives. James Scott (1990) argued that “hidden transcripts” are not only 
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direct critiques of the state, but they also show that a major part of one’s political 
experience is through everyday lived realities: everyday life is political. The rejection 
of ideology is a way of rejecting the Soviet plan for the Russian people. It is a way of 
challenging whether this ideology is legitimate and can in fact bring about positive 
change, but it is also a way of taking control over the ability to define goals, dreams 
and visions at a very personal level. Discussions of what the future would be like if 
the Communist party remained in power is another popular subject of anekdoty. 
 
 
Future 
 Marxist and Leninist ideology promised a utopian future with the realization 
communism.  This vision of a future of equality and prosperity was used by State 
propaganda as a means of justifying contemporary social problems such as shortages, 
famines, overcrowding in apartments and factories and the general low standards of 
living. When they acknowledged any sort of hardships at all, state-disseminated 
discourses cast these adversities as necessary but temporary struggles through which 
the Soviet state and its citizenries must pass through. The people were all part of the 
“great Socialist experiment,” and as it was the first attempt in applying Marx’s theory 
to real people, there was no other country or people with whom to compare. Yet the 
narratives expressed in anekdoty challenged the idea that the future will be better and 
brighter than current conditions. Instead, these stories describe a future that is even 
bleaker than the current state of affairs. The following anekdoty express such a 
sentiment: 
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A socialist, a capitalist and a communist decided to get together. The socialist 
was late and said when he arrived: 
- Sorry for being late, I was standing in line to buy sausage. 
The capitalist asked in response, 
-What does the phrase “standing in line” mean? 
And the communist asked: 
-And what is ‘sausage’? 
 
During a meeting with Kalinin, some peasants complained: 
--Comrade Kalinin, it’s impossible to live like this. We walk around in rags 
and barefoot. 
Kalinin tries to console them: 
--That’s nothing, comrades, be patient. It’s not that bad. There are some 
countries where people walk around entirely naked.  
--How long have the Soviets been in power there Mikhail Ivanovich? Fifty 
years? 
 
- How will a man who lives under communism look like? 
Armenian Radio answers: 
- He will have very small hands, since everything will be implemented by the 
robots. He will have very small legs, since he will be driving, flying or going 
by boat everywhere. He will have a very small stomach since he will eat only 
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the high calorie pills. And he will have a very big head, since he will think a 
lot...He will think all the time about how to get these pills. 
 
These anekdoty challenge the idea that living conditions will get better with time; 
instead they highlight the absurdities of the current system and describe a future 
where such bureaucratic dysfunctionality becomes even more exacerbated. These 
narratives reject the ideological underpinning of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and therefore a challenge the legitimacy of these authorities. Another anekdot 
speaks to this disenchantment with Soviet power even more directly: 
How was the Soviet system successful? 
It was successful in overcoming problems that were absent from other 
systems. 
Soviet citizens were not duped by what the newspapers, posters and movies claimed; 
instead, these narratives give voice to their critical perspective. Russians did not 
believe that there was a better a brighter future towards which they were progressing. 
Instead, these narratives express a cynicism toward the Soviet State in terms of its 
leadership, guiding ideology and future promises.  The folklore character of the 
“fool” served as one voice that was particularly able to make a mockery of Soviet 
power, through his naïvely direct remarks and critiques. 
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The Fool  
There were three major “fools” who played central roles in Soviet anekdoty: 
Chapaev, Shtirlitz, and the Chukcha. These characters are used to highlight 
absurdities and inconsistences in Soviet power, in that the fool is in a special position 
where he can see things simplistically for what they are, without being brainwashed 
by propaganda or other discourse. The “fool” plays a prominent role in Russian 
folklore in that he represents connection to peasant life, which is idealized for its 
simplicity, morality, and purity.  The most famous of the Russian folklore characters 
is Ivan the Fool, who serves as inspiration for anekdoty about Chapaev, Shtirlitz, and 
the Chukchi. The youngest son of his family, Ivan was known to spend most of his 
time napping on top of the warm Russian stove, occasionally waking up to perform 
great heroic feats. He is a hero when necessary, but during daily affairs he struggles 
to make basic decisions. He listened to his heart rather than his mind, and this image 
remains central to the Russian vision of the moral character. Ivan was contrasted with 
his two elder brothers who acted rationally, but single-mindedly in search of profit 
and military success. Ivan was the “fool” who unintentionally defeats his “clever” 
counterparts through his direct and moral ways.  Boym (1994) argues that it is this 
idealization of the heroic and romantic by Russian culture that causes the ostracism of 
the everyday (p. 40). In other words, the “Russian Idea” casts Russians people as 
capable of revolutions, realizing utopian visions and achieving world domination, but 
who tend to be less capable with mundane daily endeavors that are perceived to be of 
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lesser (or negligible) importance (Berdyaev 1947). It is the teleological vision of what 
can be, without considering the route to get there.  
 
Chapaev 
 
Vasilii Ivanovich Chapaev (1887-1919), was the commander of the 25
th
 
Infantry Division of the Red Army who died in battle while swimming across the 
Ural River in 1919. Soon after his death, Chapaev was canonized in Soviet 
mythology after the publication of a novel based upon his life written by Dmitrii 
Furmanov in 1923 and more notably after the release of the Vasil’ev Borother’s film 
Chapaev in 1934. These official texts use Chapaev to illustrate Russia’s valiance and 
victory in the Great Patriotic War. As an elite soldier he was a positive hero that 
represented the glory of Russia and the Soviet Union. He was further memorialized in 
Soviet jokelore, but in this context he was memorialized as a “textually poached” 
(Jenkins 1995) character who challenged the official Soviet definition of who he was 
and what he stood for. Critiques of Soviet power were articulated in a variety of 
ways: by subverting the pristine, idealized image of Chapaev as an upstanding, moral 
and honorable man as well as drawing attention to the contradictions in Party 
propaganda more generally. Below are two anekdoty that present these two critiques 
respectively. 
Petka is trying to write an essay for a literature class. He sits there racking 
his brains. 
“What is making you so miserable?” asks Vasilii Ivanovich. 
“I have to write this essay on ‘What I did yesterday.’” 
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“Well, what did you do?” 
“The same thing I do every day! I drank!” 
“What an idiot you are Petka,” says Vasilii Ivanovich. “You can’t write that. 
Go through the essay and every time you wrote “drank,” put “read” instead. 
Replace “bottle” with “book” and then it will sound a lot more cultured.” 
Petka is thrilled and begins to scratch away: “I got up yesterday morning and 
read half a book. I thought for half a moment and then read the other half. It 
didn’t seem like enough, so I set off to the shop for another book. On the way I 
saw Vasili Ivanovich coming towards me… and his eyes were so well read…” 
 
In the Revolution Museum, the guide points out the skeleton of Vasily 
Ivanovich Chapaev: 
 And what is that small skeleton next to him?” someone asks him. 
 “That is Chapaev as a child.” 
The first anekdot characterizes Chapaev and Petka as two dimwitted drunks 
who struggle to complete a simple homework assignment for class. Instead of heroes 
whose days are filled valorous and respectable accomplishments, the two sit around 
drinking all day as the stereotypical Russian man also does. The Russian national 
identity as a cultured, intellectual people is mocked in this narrative that casts this 
image as a false, constructed portrayal of reality. The second anekdot makes fun of 
Russian-Soviet museums, textbooks, and other collective memory artifacts that 
construct history to support the grand narrative of the upstanding, victorious, and 
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moral Russian people. The skeleton cannot be of Chapaev as a child, because then he 
would not have lived on to accomplish all the things that his biographers and the film 
had purported., If he had died so early, then all of the stories about him must be false. 
Both jokes highlight inconsistencies in the constructed and contrived portrayal of 
Russian and Soviet history and identity.   
Seth Graham (2009) argues that anekdoty about Chapaev are “a 
counterimpulse: to rescue the hero from the pedestal, to liberate Chapaev from both 
the Civil War chronotope in which he was ‘crystallized’ by Furmanov and the 
Vasil’evs and from the abstract epic of Soviet history” (p. 112). The elite image of 
Chapaev as an honorable hero is challenged by these anekdoty that depict him as a 
foolish alcoholic. This adulterated image of Chapaev challenges the uncritical and 
unrealistic Soviet discourse about the “Great Patriotic War” and about the honorable 
Russian man more generally. As a drunk who frequents whorehouses, Chapaev is a 
mish mash of the elite image of hero and the stereotype of the common man who 
drinks and sleeps around in order to cope with life conditions. Textually poached 
from official Soviet discourse, anekdoty redefine Chapaev as a true Russian whose 
vision is not filtered (and warped) by Soviet “honor” but rather through alcohol and 
women which allows him to see the troubles of society more clearly. Anekdoty about 
the fictional intelligence officer Max Otto von Shtirlitz operate is much the similar 
fashion as those about Chapaev—subverting the Party propagandistic discourse with 
the intention of making a mockery of the false public image maintained by such 
patriotic films and television series. 
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Shtirlitz 
SS Standartenführer Max Otto von Shtirlitz is a character from the 1973 iconic Soviet 
mini-series Seventeen Moments of Spring. Shtirlitz is the name used by the Soviet 
Army intelligence officer, Colonel Maksim Maksimovich Isaev, who lives 
undercover in Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Working as an 
intelligence officer, Shtirlitz receives directions from Moscow and collects 
information about the German military for the Soviet army. The mini-series 
Seventeen Moments of Spring is very patriotic and was regularly aired on Soviet 
television, especially around Victory Day (May 9
th
), the day that Nazi Germany fell 
to the Soviets. Victory day remains one of the most patriotic celebrations in present-
day Russia, glorifying the Soviet army’s role in the “Great Patriotic War.” The mini-
series, Seventeen Moments of Spring, serves as homage to the war, and serves as part 
of the collective memory making machine. The movie was and still is a very 
influential cultural item, so much that it has been called a “cult” classic (Kharkhordin 
1999) and “a television blockbuster” (Stites 1992). According to Brezhnev’s personal 
assistant, Leonid loved the show and watched it over 20 times, arranging the CPSU 
meetings so as not to miss an episode (Olcott 2001). The importance of this show to 
the collective memory project was central and therefore was part of the “hegemony of 
representation” (Yurchak 1997) experienced by Soviet citizens. The show was used 
as a means of solidifying a patriotic collective identity of the Russians living under 
Soviet rule. In response to this show, anekdoty about the main character, Shtirlitz, 
became quite popular. These narratives challenged this positive, patriotic image of the 
Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War by portraying redefining Shtirlitz, the 
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“intelligence officer,” as humorously dense or obtuse. Many of these narratives 
positioned Shtirlitz as a detective who must solve a mysterious situation, and in these 
events, he almost always manages to miss the obvious: 
Shtirlitz came into Muller’s office and saw that on the floor was lying the dead 
man. “The poor fellow was poisoned,” thought Shtirlitz, stroking the handle 
of an ax protruding from the chief’s back. 
Another anekdot challenges Shtirlitz’ ability to think independently, or to think at all: 
Shtirlitz had a thought. He liked it, so he had another one. 
We might interpret this narrative as a commentary that extends beyond Shtirlitz and 
Seventeen Moments of Spring, to speak to Russians living under Soviet rule more 
generally. The Russian people were regularly instructed by the Party and the 
government as to how to behave, which goals to strive for and which ideologies to 
believe. As a result, there was not a great deal of room for independent thought or 
independent will. The above anekdot speaks to these conditions, specifically how the 
Soviet system encouraged complacency and group think.  
Shtirlitz was intended to represent the idealized image of the Russian man 
(Graham 2009). As such, he was sober, incredibly loyal to his country and his family. 
Anekdoty about Shtirlitz sought to subvert this image by instead characterizing 
Shtirlitz as a dumb drunk. In these narratives, Shtirlitz does think about his home and 
wife often, but he adheres to the idealized Soviet vision of patriotism by 
subordinating his personal feelings to his civic duty.  The following anekdot casts 
Shtirlitz as a dupe who is being cheated on by his wife while he serves his nation 
dutifully in war: 
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Shtirlitz received a coded telegram: “You have given birth to a son.” A tear 
slowly rolled down the cheek of the Soviet spy. For twenty years he has been 
away from home… 
These narratives argue that Shtirlitz is being used by the Soviet Army for the benefit 
of the Soviet empire, but his own needs and dignity fall by the wayside. These jokes 
challenge the idealized image of Russianness by attacking this central figure in Soviet 
propaganda. 
 
Chukchi 
Another genre of anekdoty that challenges official discourse features the 
Nordic people “Chukchi” (Chukcha in the singular), who mock Soviet power in very 
astute, unassuming ways, oftentimes by taking Party slogans literally that serves to 
reveal the inherent contradictions between official discourse and reality. Jokes about 
Chukchi might be grouped under ethnic humor since they represent a real population 
from the Soviet Union, yet they differ from other ethnic groups that are commonly 
represented in anekdoty in that they are not perceived as threatening to Russians. 
Instead, reference to Chukchi is used as a means of dissociating from parts of 
Russian/Soviet culture, or to make Russians look superior in some way. The 
Chukotka Peninsula is the northeastern tip of Siberia just 50 miles west of the Seward 
peninsula in Alaska (probably that which was “seen” from Sarah Palin’s window) and 
is home to the Chukchi people. Most Russians have never been in contact with these 
people who number around 15,000 and who live in Arctic temperatures (average 
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temperature in January ranged from 5° to -38° degrees Fahrenheit). It is the only part 
of Russia that partially lies within the Western hemisphere (east of the 180° meridian) 
(Gray 2005).  
Why have this Eskimo people become so prominent in the Russo-Soviet 
anekdot? Seth Graham (2009) argues that this cycle of jokes was inspired by the 1966 
film Nalchalnik Chukotki (Head of Chukchi). Specifically, he argues that this film 
made Chukchi salient to Russians who for the most part would live their entire lives 
without personally interacting with this far-East Nordic group. Another explanation 
for the Chukchi’s visibility argues that Russians became familiar with this group as 
consequence of a 1972 English-language textbook that contrasted the happy lives of 
the Soviet Chukchi with the dismal ones of the American Eskimos (Rabinovich (989). 
In this context, and arguably as an inspiration for the most common stereotype of the 
naïve, the Chukchi serve as the traditional fool that occupies a central role in Russian 
folklore. This stereotype stems from the perception that Chukchi are geographically 
isolated and therefore must be illiterate and cut off from the general social world. 
Anekdoty about Chukchi often focus upon frigid conditions and the perceived simple 
mindedness of this people: 
A Chukchi wants to buy a refrigerator.  
“What do you need that for?” the salesperson asks, “You live in Siberia.” 
“To warm up during the winter—imagine the comfort, it’s -40 degrees outside 
and only 0 in the fridge!” 
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Once upon a time, a smart boy was born in a Chukchi village. The envious 
villagers expelled him, however just for being too smart. He gave birth to a 
new nation—the Japanese. 
These jokes act in a similar fashion as the previous outgroups—as a means of 
bolstering the ingroup presentation of a comparatively intelligent people. Yet the 
Chukcha “fool” was more than just an outsider, he was a political commentator. 
Similar to Simmel’s (1971) “stranger,” the Chukcha has the social distance from 
Russians in order to say things that the Russian is unable. His ignorance and illiteracy 
relegates the Chukcha to the “other” category, but it also safeguards him from 
Communist indoctrination. As a result, the Chukchi are able to highlight the illogical 
events or irrationalities of the USSR in a more explicit or direct manner, a role that 
was traditionally filled by the Ivan the Fool in pre-Soviet, Russian folklore (Tolstoy 
1886).  The following anekdot uses the Chukchi’s literal interpretation of Party 
discourse in order to highlight the illogical focus on the future and the Party’s 
propagandistic portrayal of daily life: 
A Soviet journalist interviews a Chukchi man: 
“Could you tell us briefly how you lived before the October Revolution?” 
“Hungry and Cold.” 
“And how do you live now?” 
“Hungry and cold, but with a sense of deep gratitude!” 
Soviets were instructed to appreciate everything in the Soviet Union was 
heartfelt gratitude. Russians were socialized (by textbooks, Soviet propaganda, 
parents) to focus on and take pride in collective accomplishments, even if these 
 
 116 
 
“accomplishments” had no positive impact upon their daily lives. The above anekdot 
makes a mockery of this set of values, highlighting how little the situation has 
changed, despite the outward presentation of happiness and improvement. This false 
presentation was maintained so that the Soviet Union can maintain an image abroad 
of prosperity, success, and a satisfied populace. The following two narratives poke 
fun at the intelligence of Soviet leadership more generally: 
A Chukchi comes to the Politburo and says: 
‘I want to become a Politburo member. What do I need in order to become  
one?” 
“What are you, an idiot?” 
“Is that a requirement?”  
 
A Chukcha applies for membership for the prestigious Union of Soviet 
Writers. He is asked what literature has influenced his work.  
“Have you read Pushkin?”  
“No.”  
“Have you read Dostoevsky?”  
“No.”  
“Can you read at all?”  
The Chukcha, offended, replies, “Chukcha not reader, Chukcha writer!”  
This anekdot was very popular among Russians (it was found in every 
anthology that had anekdoty about Chukchi), so much so that its punch line, 
“Chukcha not reader, Chukcha writer!” was (and still is) an expression used in regular 
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conversation when discussing someone’s lack of credentials or someone who is 
perceived to be an overconfident fool. I found this particular anekdot in multiple 
volumes in my sample.
15
 The anekdot is especially powerful in that it expresses a 
distrust and misguided bureaucracy of Party leadership and intellectuals. There are 
multiple meanings to this narrative. One meaning deals with the misguided vision that 
the Soviet people will become the world leaders across all domains, despite the fact 
that newspapers, books, television and other sources of education were strictly 
controlled and censored by the state. State ownership of all production facilities 
ensured complete control of the content of such media outlets and translations of 
foreign publications were often produced in a truncated form, accompanied with 
extensive corrective footnotes. Textbooks and newspapers recounted events with 
serious omissions and revisions in order to legitimate the actions and vision of current 
Soviet power. As such, Chukcha’s response in this anekdot captures the absurdity of 
the idea that Soviets are world leaders in literature, technology, and other innovations 
during a time when they were isolated by censorship and therefore unable to read or 
view the accomplishments of the rest of the world. A similar sentiment is expressed 
in the anekdot below: 
What is the difference between a Communist and an anti-Communist? 
The Communist has read Marx and Lenin. An anti-Communist has understood 
them.  
These anekdoty are less of a reflection upon the Chukchi, but more of the Party, the 
Soviet regime and the Russian people. They highlight those aspects of Russian 
                                                 
15
 See methodology for explanation of how anekdoty repeated in multiple volumes were coded in the 
sample. 
 
 118 
 
culture that the Russians themselves recognize to be absurd and incongruous with 
official Party rhetoric. 
Many of the ethnic and national minorities are stereotyped by physical or 
linguistic features in anekdoty, similar to Chapaev’s speech impediment, and Stalin’s 
Georgian accent. These linguistic markers help identify and distinguish the character 
in the anekdot while simultaneously constructing him as an object of ridicule. The 
Chukchi are often identified in anekdoty by their constant usage of “odnako,” a word 
that roughly translates to "however" depending on context. These anekdoty are 
difficult to translate, in that their meaning / humor is mostly linguistic. That said, 
these anekdoty may be understood as “light” stereotyping, in that they construct the 
group as other, but without especially harsh prejudice. An example of such a “light” 
stenotype in anekdoty is as follows: 
On the Soviet-Polish border, a flea runs into a pig. The pig asks: 
--Where are you running from? 
--From Germany. The Germans are cleaning and scrubbing everything. 
There’s nowhere left to live. And what about you? 
--Well I’m running away from the USSR. I just about starved to death when 
people started to eat up all my slop. 
These caricature-like features operate very similarly to those exaggerated 
characters in fairytales that are employed to help children classify the world into 
meaningful categories. In the anekdot above, the Soviets and the Germans serve as 
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the butt of the joke. The stereotypes of Germans as incredibly clean and sterile
16
 and 
the Soviets as incredibly desperate and poor are used to make this narrative about the 
flea and a pig humorous.  Chukchi jokes are especially popular among children, and I 
would argue contribute to the children’s socialization by encouraging them to divide 
the world into "us" and "them" – especially according to nationality. The 
development of nationalist thinking begins at an early age in that “getting” humor is 
an indication of group norm socialization and as such integration into the cultural 
consciousness.  
 
Together, the articulations of a collective identity, coordinated effort and 
resistance to the State, enables us to understand how the discourses that ran across 
anekdoty served as an expression of a political opposition. Both the subject matter 
and form appear to reflect a collective coordinated effort to resist the discourse and 
power of the Soviet State. Under leadership that did not listen to its people and under 
which opposition or free speech was suppressed, these narratives functioned as a type 
of democratic dissent. These jokes were exchanged within communities of trusted 
members, where the boundaries distinguishing performer from audience, joke and 
truth, were fluid and permeable. What was important about such a “safe place” 
(Collins 1990) is that it created opportunities for self-definition, the first step to 
empowerment.  If a group is not involved in self-definition, then it is being defined by 
and for the use of others. The anekdoty enabled Russians (and allegedly other groups 
as well) to escape and resist “objectification as the Other” (Collins, 2000: 101).  
                                                 
16
 There may also be a reference to the Holocaust here with reference to cleaning gas chambers, 
though this would not be the primary interpretation of the anekdot. 
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Such resistance is central to the anekdot, but there is a significant number of 
anekdoty which are not directed towards the State, are not resistant toward State 
definition, and/or do not appear directly concerned with self-definition for political 
recognition. These anekdoty—to be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter—are not overtly state-oriented or concerned with revolution or revolt; and 
yet, they too are intensely political. This genre is directed toward the process of 
coping with everyday struggles and general life under Soviet rule. Their narratives 
connect people through expressions of repressed sentiments, attitudes and opinions, 
but there is they are not necessarily concerned with revolution or reform. They do not 
propose alternative structures and do not always make mention of political entities or 
goals, they simply give voice to the lived realities of the otherwise voiceless, yet, 
they, too, are a means of everyday resistance in that they challenge official Party 
discourse, redefine collective identities and ideations of the future, and generally 
express a counterhegemonic cultural consciousness.  This cultural consciousness 
expresses a perspective of lived realities that contradicts and challenges the State and 
Party’s definition of truth and identity.  These anekdoty are discussed in further detail 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Anekdot as Everyday: Coping, Resisting & Surviving 
 
In his seminal work, The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau wrote 
a history of the “everyday.” He did this by tracing the separation between knowledge, 
“savoir,” and knowledge of skills, “savoire-faire.” De Certeau focuses on the rhetoric 
of everyday practice, and upon the regular use of discourse as a way to reinterpret or 
subvert cultural practices in order to make them one’s own. Henry Jenkins (2005) 
similarly explores the constructed boundary between text and reader, arguing that 
these readers are not docile consumers of text (cf. Adorno and Horkheimer 2002), but 
rather that viewers, listeners, or readers engage in a meaning-making process 
alongside the text, negotiating narratives and power structures and therefore 
contributing to a “participatory-culture.” I believe that both of these models are 
crucial in the understanding of the Russo-Soviet anekdot as a spontaneous, popularly 
authored discourse that re-negotiates and challenges the meaning of everyday life and 
produces a cultural consciousness.  
There is a considerable proportion of my sample that does not engage with 
politics-proper (the Party, the Soviet State, or guiding ideologies), or with collective 
identities codified in law or naturalized by the hegemonic culture. This group of 
anekdoty deals with the everyday experiences of those living during Soviet times, 
often highlighting absurdities and the discrepancies between public presentation of 
success and riches that contrasted with the private reality of failures and scarcity. The 
purpose of these anekdoty is difficult to pin down post-hoc, but interviews from the 
Harvard Soviet Social Project support the conjecture that these narratives were used 
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as a means of coping and connection between citizens who were disconnected or pit 
against each other in their daily struggle for survival (Brandenberger 2009; HSSP).  
Anekdoty are “hidden transcripts” and a means of “everyday resistance” (Scott 
1985, 1990; Collins 1990). In Weapons of the Weak and Domination and the Art of 
Resistance, James Scott offers counter-argument to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
and public compliance. Scott argues that the dominant are able to enforce such public 
conformity and “voluntary” participation in rituals that appear to support the status-
quo (and the power of this dominant class) through the threat of violence. However, 
Scott argues that such coerced public performances do not necessarily reflect inner 
consent; instead, these “public transcripts” or the public interaction between the 
dominant and their subordinates involve a great deal of performativity that is not 
entirely genuine or the “full story.” Therefore, subordinate groups require sequestered 
spaces that are inaccessible to their oppressors so that they may produce and engage 
in “hidden transcripts” that contest elite power, reject the status quo, and sometimes 
rehearse acts of resistance that may later manifest in revolt or revolution.  
Hidden transcripts involve the relaxation of public performances: unbuttoning 
one’s shirt, speaking crudely or simply with greater honesty, but in unequal power 
structures, most often, these backstage interactions involve “everyday resistance” that 
chip away at elite authority through the power of gossip, rumor and distrust. Scott 
argues that everyday resistance involves “dress rehearsals” of revolt in that the acts of 
resistance promote communication among people who otherwise experience their 
subjugation in isolation and that such hidden transcripts propose alternative 
conceptions of society that may also weaken the control of elites (1990: 219).  
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 The Soviet regime claimed to have transformed society at every level. Party 
propaganda presented the Soviet Union as a successful social endeavor fueled by 
booming business: efficient factories and bountiful shops, well-fed children, and a 
devoted citizenry engaged in high culture activities and expressions (Brooks 1999). 
Yet the utopian world depicted by the media had little-to-no overlap with reality 
(Brandenberger 2002; Fitzpatrick 2005). Although upstanding citizens could not 
publically dispute the dishonesty of these presentations or challenge the Soviet 
leadership without risking their lives, the anekdot provided a creative and cathartic 
outlet for critique. Even when not explicitly oriented towards politics or ideology, 
anekdoty illustrate how coping mechanisms and daily struggles shape culture and 
shape one’s politics. 
 
Anekdoty about social problems or the coping strategies of Russians are 
important to analyze in that they challenge many of the assumptions that social 
movement literature make about expressions of social, political action. The bulk of 
this literature focuses upon only those movements that are coordinated, state-oriented, 
claims-making forms of political (politics-proper) action (Piven and Cloward 1971; 
Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Jenkins 1983; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 
1998). There is a state bias in the literature about social change and political activism, 
a Western and Marxist orientation that is constructed by the language of rights and 
citizenship. Such a bias limits the ability to recognize the full spectrum of political 
responses by “ordinary people” who may respond to economic and political 
challenges in non-traditional modes. Further, in order to be a social movement, it is 
assumed that expressions must reflect a collective and coordinated initiative that 
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seeks to improve the situation for everyone in a society, assumptions that Carolina 
Martin (forthcoming) calls the coordination bias and the political ideology bias. The 
bulk of the literature on social movements operates under these biased formulations, 
which inevitably results in undervaluing of these alternative (and powerful) forms of 
social resistance.  
Anarchist scholars argue that this coordination bias stems from a modernist-
Marxist conviction that “real” or “meaningful” social change “can only be achieved 
simultaneously and en masse, across and entire national or supranational space” (Day 
2005: 8). Although there are a few who have challenged some of these assumptions, 
emphasizing the importance of multiple strategies towards achieving similar goals 
(Aparicio and Blaser 2008; Bayat 1997, 2000; Katzenstein 1999), these biases 
continue to shape the scholarly discourse on these subjects. As such, it is important to 
consider power relations separately from political institutions in order to understand 
the potential for political activism to be “productive” power (Foucault 1980), rather 
than as a struggle for power. Foucault (1980) argued that, “power isn’t localized in 
the State apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of 
power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much 
more minute and everyday level, are not changed” (60). Adopting this orientation, it 
becomes clear that there are a myriad of social sites that have the potential to alter 
society, and a great variety in the kinds of human interactions that are better thought 
of as “political.”  
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) similarly challenge the assumptions that (1) 
domination is organized by and around one source of power, and that (2) culture is 
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separate from structure and secondary in importance. In their research, they argue for 
a multi-institutional conception of politics that conceives domination as organized 
around multiple sources of power, each of which is simultaneously material and 
symbolic (pp. 74-5).  They argue that the symbolic and material are intimately 
intertwined, and that “the system of cultural classification is often a precondition to 
the reallocation of resources, while what initially looks like a simple request to 
reallocate resources may ultimately threaten to dissolve social boundaries” (p. 92). 
Their work is grounded in Bourdieu and Foucault’s understandings of cultural 
classification as a means of reifying and reproducing class inequalities. 
 
This chapter adds a layer to my argument about nationalism and collective 
power, by challenging the assumption that social action be is explicitly political, 
coordinated or state-oriented, arguing instead that the everyday is political for those 
who are surviving against the odds. In Chart 4.1, we can see how a considerable 
proportion of anekdoty in my sample pertain to the coping strategies of the Russian 
people in dealing with their lived, political realities.  
Chart 4.1 Social Problems and Coping (N=1074) 
 
Family/Wome
n 
26% 
Alcoholism 
6% 
Dysfunctionali
ty 
16% 
Shortages 
24% 
Humor 
16% 
Obediance 
6% 
Other 
6% 
Social Problems and Coping 
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One third of the anekdoty in my sample deal with social problems or coping 
strategies of ordinary citizens. The subject matter of these ankedoty describe the ways 
that Russians felt their culture was shaped by the state. These anekdoty portray a 
people whose everyday lives and culture have been shaped by the state; often in a 
very dysfunctional way. While the dominant narrative promoted a vision of an 
equitable state that promoted the success and prosperity of the Russian people, 
anekdoty describe a very different relationship between the state and its people.  
Although their culture was shaped by the state, Russians were not ideologically 
brainwashed in to believing everything as depicted by propaganda and ideological 
teachings. The Russian culture was a product of constant negotiation with these 
multiple realities and sources of definition. Russian cultue, as expressed in my sample 
of anekdoty, is largely a product of their lived political realities.  
Michael Taussig’s concept of the “public secret” offers one explanation to 
account for the multiple and sometimes-conflicting performances that Russians 
maintain among audiences. Russians know “what not to know” and therefore are able 
negotiate with various authorities accordingly—with an outward presentation of 
belief in and respect for Soviet power and its organization, but with concurrent access 
to another repertoire of knowledge that enables their successful survival under such a 
dysfunctional and corrupt system. Inspired by Elias Canetti’s (1962: 290) dictum that 
“secrecy lies at the very core of power,” Taussig understand the public secret to be 
the basis of society, social formations, and their attendant knowledges. As “that 
which is generally know but cannot be articulated,” (p. 5) the public secret involves 
the creation of social subjects who “know what not to know” thereby instituting a 
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pervasive “epistemic murk” whose core is an “uncanny” dialectic of concealment and 
revelation, though the secret revealed in this case is qua public secret, not really a 
secret (p. 49). Everyone knows this “secret,” so it is not a secret in the traditional 
sense, but since everyone treats the knowledge, actions, and opinions as “secret,” 
there is a great deal of self-policing of this publically-closeted information. Taussig 
believes that this arrangement is the strategic ground of society’s power in that the 
process of collective and cooperative concealment produces a more meaningful 
shared secret between those who participate in its concealment. 
In his definition of the “Russian Soul,” Nikolai Berdyaev (1947) insisted that 
the Russian identity is rooted in a divine or extra-ordinary purpose. In his view, 
Russians were the “‘chosen people’; and also ‘a People of the End.’ Such people need 
not be concerned about the process of everyday living and common survival, which is 
often more difficult than imagining some kind of ‘future perfect’” (Boym 1994: 31).  
Those series of anekdoty that deal with the everyday or the unrealistic nature of 
Russian and communist ideologies push back against this lofty vision of what it 
means to be Russian. Challenging the Russian Orthodox, otherworldly orientation, 
these narratives provide their own perspective on the Russian experience and the 
“Russian idea,” one that involves means of coping with shortages and 
dysfunctionality, family politics, and a self-reflexive genre of anekdoty about 
anekdoty.   
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Anekdot as Network: Coping with an Uncertain Reality 
On November 9, 1917, Lenin signed the Bolshevik “Decree on the Press” 
which shut down all newspapers in Russia that demonstrated “open opposition or 
insubordination to a worker-government” (Brooks 2000: 3). This decree translated 
into the Bolshevik nationalization of all publications. There was no pluralism under 
such law and the official published story was often a fictional glorification of Russian 
life—sharply contrasting with the more difficult and impoverished lived realities of 
Russian citizens. As a result, Russians became accustomed to the ironic performance 
in which official state laws and published documents describe one world—glorious 
and triumphant--while they live in another—abound with shortages and failures. 
Although such incongruity has never been easy, I would argue that it is a central 
element of the Soviet Russian identity and is simultaneously a source of numerous 
popular, underground coping mechanisms that have also come to define the Soviet 
Russian condition. Some of these ways have been through blat: an informal network-
based system of favors through which Russians obtained scarce goods and services, 
samizdat: underground, often-subversive publications, and anekdoty. Russians have 
found ways to create their own communities, lifestyles, and identities through non-
centralized, non-censored, and non-policed venues.  
In Alexei Yurchak’s (1997) description of Soviet Russian’s cynical realism, 
he explains that the people who exchanged these anekdoty were not dissidents who 
sought to dismantle the state since they had little confidence that change was possible 
under such totalitarian rule. Instead, he argued that life under communism required 
perpetual theatrical engagement—performing the necessary dramaturgical roles and 
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pretending to believe these parts when necessary (Yurchak 1997; Goffman 1980).  
This performance occurred on multiple levels in reaction to different audiences. For 
instance, there was an “official” version of reality that people recognized as a 
constructed image that was used to project greatness to external actors. Part of this 
image was Party propaganda that showed abundance of wealth, prosperity and 
generally idealized narratives about “happy life” under Communism.  
Citizens played by the rules of reality when in public, and even when it 
became obvious that nobody actually believed this version of reality, people 
continued to contribute to its production and reproduction. Bradatan (2011) argues 
that the “construction of this reality was dictated not by any need to ‘represent’ 
however loosely, the everyday reality, but rather by a vaguely felt need to ‘fantasize’ 
about it and ‘dream of a better world. It must have functioned as a mechanism of 
psychological compensation” (p. 748). Russians did not have a completely distinct 
public and private self, with one articulating the “true” self, but rather, through a 
process of socialization, they learned how to act appropriately in different situations 
and among different people. And that very process of acting became a key component 
of Russian collective identity. 
Communities that were constructed out of narratives are not unlike those 
relationships that developed from call-and-response songs of slaves working in the 
fields of 19
th
 Century America. Such songs circulated among communities giving 
voice to social ills, hardship, and struggle; producing hope out of all-encompassing 
desperation (Collins 1990; Scott 1989). Patricia Hill Collins’ (1990) argues that these 
songs created safe spaces where self-definition (and empowerment) was made 
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possible. These safe spaces are diverse in nature and enable more complex definitions 
of community identities. Collins elaborates further: “the resulting reality is much 
more complex than one of an all-powerful White majority objectifying Black women 
with a unified U.S. Black community staunchly challenging these external assaults” 
(Collins 1990: 101). Although these realities are divergent and contradictory in nature 
since they are no longer able to reduce heterogeneous experiences to a single 
stereotype, the presented perspective is nonetheless exclusionary. Collins explains 
that these spaces are safe because they exclude: “By definition, such spaces become 
less ‘safe’ if shared with those who were not Black and female” (p. 110). Collins 
notes the tension that results from such a space that necessitates exclusion, but which 
intends to produce “a more inclusionary, just society” (p. 110).  It is necessary to 
carve out such a “space” for those who typically are scared into submission may 
dissent or offer alternative perspectives.  
In order for this space to work as a place where people feel comfortable 
speaking candidly and openly, it must necessarily exclude those who might impede 
this vocalization. An interesting detail about this particular case of analysis is that 
Russian men—those who were the most common performers and audiences of 
anekdoty—were simultaneously the oppressed and the oppressors. Russian men were 
voiceless in the face of Soviet power, yet had the voice-from-nowhere in defining 
“others.” As such, we see how this “safe space” did allow for the vocalization of 
public concern, but simultaneously privileging the social problems and perspective of 
one group over others. It did not allow everyone to speak out candidly or self-define, 
instead it served as one way to further the process of “othering” that was produced by 
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State discourses. The intersectional nature of these narratives that both resist and 
maintain inequalities is a theme of the Soviet Russian nationalism and is articulated in 
anekdoty that operate as outlets for experienced repression in some narratives, while 
operating as a form of repression in others.  
 
Coping with Social Problems 
Many anekdoty deal with serious social issues such as alcoholism, misogyny, 
suicide, mafia and corruption in addition to more minor issues such as mothers-in-
law, money, and cheating. The diverse subject matter enables these narratives to 
express shared grievances and facilitate recognition that these are not individual 
problems but rather collectively experienced social issues. Many of these jokes deal 
with generic situations in which the performer or audience of the joke can identify 
with the described situation while others have a voice of social commentary.  
Patricia Hill Collins also explores the unique perspective afforded by such 
lived experiences in her book, From Black Power to Hip Hop.  Collins argues that the 
“hip hop generation” grew up in a time which the promises of equality and 
advancement of the Civil Rights movement and proved to be empty as colorblind 
racism become more rampant and institutionalized. As such, this group similarly 
grapples with a disjuncture between ideology and practice: 
“This cohort embraces the beliefs of American society concerning 
individualism, personal expression, and material well-being, yet it also sees 
how social issues such as incarceration, poor schooling, no jobs, drugs, and 
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the erosion of family structures arise not just from individual failures but from 
racially disparate, group-based treatment” (p. 5). 
By paying attention to the “voices of the unheard,” Collins demonstrates that 
“racial/ethnic groups can hold markedly different perceptions of the social 
inequalities that surround them” (2001: 4).  This is an important methodology, which 
I employed in this study as a means of understanding how Russians living under the 
Soviet regime understood such incongruity between state propaganda and lived 
realities and how cultural consciousness reflects a unique perspective and 
interpretation of events that markedly differs from official presentations of reality. 
 The focus of the following few sections is upon the social problems that were 
particularly predominant in my sample. I interpreted these frequencies as reflective of 
social problems that were particularly salient or difficult for the Russian people, and 
therefore a collective site of negotiation and coping. These social problems may be 
particularly common in anekdoty because they involve complex issues that social 
groups perceive differently. For example, alcohol was both a social problem and a 
method of coping—there are those who would classify the high consumption of 
alcohol as a problem, and others as a blessing. These divergent interpretations may 
fall along gender lines, or between non-drinkers and drinkers respectively. What 
comes to be defined as a “problem” and who must assume the responsibility or blame 
for this “problem” is a theme that is also common to those anekdoty that deal with 
marital and family issues including abuse, infidelity, poverty and misogyny. 
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Alcoholism 
 
Russia has one of the highest alcohol consumption rates in the world (McKee 
1999).  Although such consumption has a long history dating back to the tenth 
century and levels of consumption were difficult to measure under Soviet rule 
(McKee 1999) one study indicated that by 1965, the consumption of vodka was six 
times what it had been in 1926 (Davies 1990). The tax on alcohol provided a large 
part of the state’s income, which is arguably the reason why there were so many 
anekdoty connecting the socialist political system to the growing alcohol problem 
(Zlobin 1996: 227). From the other end of the spectrum, there were those who saw 
the tax as a deterrent to drinking and resented the State’s attempt to control one of 
their last freedoms. The following anekdot describes the social issue of alcoholism at 
a broader level whereas most other anekdoty highlight this issue in more isolated 
person-level incidents. 
It is a well-known fact that before communism reaches its final and most 
perfect form it must first pass through a preparatory period of socialism. 
Currently, however, the Soviet Union is in an intermediary stage not 
described by Marx. This stage is called ‘alcoholism.’ 
This anekdot draws connections between Marx’s communist ideology and the social 
problem of alcoholism, which is also necessarily political in nature. Implied in the 
narrative is that in order to reach this unattainable goal of communism, everyone must 
drink themselves into delusion or use alcohol as a coping mechanism. These anekdoty 
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are ambivalent in their attitudes toward alcoholism—some view drinking as a means 
of coping with the dire social reality, while others see drinking as a major contributor 
to these social problems. There is a Russian proverb, “What is on a sober man’s mind 
is on a drunkard’s tongue,” as such, we see how there is a wisdom or directness that is 
valued of the drunkards. The parallel between alcohol and humor in terms of their 
power to uncover suppressed truths should also not be overlooked (Abdulaeva 1996). 
Both alcohol and humor enabled people to step out of their otherwise-censored 
performances and speak in vulgar and contentious ways. Connections between 
alcoholism and the Bolshevik revolution, storming of the Winter Palace and 
Socialism more generally were common in my sample. Below is a sampling of such 
anekdoty: 
October 25, 1917. Revolutionary sailors called Smolny (where the revolution 
started): 
- Is this Smolny? 
-Yes, it is. 
- Do you have vodka in Smolny? 
- No. 
- Do you know where we might find it? 
- The Winter Palace. 
- Hurray!!! To the Winter Palace!  
 
“Rykovka,” the first NEP-era Soviet vodka, was 84 proof, while the previous, 
tsarist-era vodka was only 80 proof. People grumbled: 
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--Was the revolution really worth that 4 extra proof? 
 
 - What is the “Soviet choice”? 
- It is the choice between standing in the waiting line to buy vodka or the 
waiting line to leave the USSR. 
These anekdoty express shared sentiment about the hopelessness of the Soviet idea 
and the resulting social problems that have developed. Part of the Russian collective 
identity is the capacity to outdrink their counterparts, as Erofeev (1997) described the 
major difference between Russia and her neighboring countries: “On one side of the 
border they speak Russian and drink more, on the other they drink less and don’t 
speak Russian (p. 100, cited in Draitser 1999: 85). There are many Russian proverbs 
about the curative powers of vodka for physical and psychological health. As such, 
alcohol was also perceived as a problem-solving technique, even if it only created 
more hardships and scarcity.  The tone of alcoholic anekdoty vary from a light-
hearted stereotype of Russians as drunk fools to more serious frames which link 
alcohol to abuse, corruption and starvation. 
A cop stops a motorist. He checks the vehicle and then checks the driver’s 
papers. Unable to find anything wrong with either the papers or the vehicle, 
the cop decides to go for his favorite trick and pulls a bottle of liquor out of 
the trunk of his own car and offers it to the driver,  
“Would you like a drink?” 
“No thanks, I’m driving officer,” the motorist responds, puzzled. 
“Are you sure?” 
 
 136 
 
“I can’t—I’m driving!” 
“Well sir, it is your choice. The fine is 800 rubles for impaired driving or 
1,000 rubles for not following the orders of an officer of law, it’s your 
choice!”  
In this anekdot, we see social issues pertaining to alcoholism and police 
corruption, as well as how dysfunctional situations are produced by defective laws. 
Forced into obedience to avoid a higher fine, the motorist must play into the officer’s 
corruption and into the stereotype of drunken Russians.  
Russian men suffered disproportionately from alcoholism during both Soviet 
and post-Soviet times. Although Russian men were the population who consumed the 
most alcohol, entire families were torn apart by alcohol and the men who chose to 
consume instead of helping to contribute to the support of the family. Domestic abuse 
was another byproduct of such heavy alcohol consumption and a frequent subject of 
anekdoty narratives, but this subject will be discussed in greater detail in the section 
about Women and Family later in this chapter. The next three anekdoty draw a 
connection between alcohol and starvation: as a choice either between alcohol and 
food or of alcohol as a way to deal with impending death. 
An America and a Russian historian were comparing notes about their 
respective leaders who were contemporaries. 
“President Hoover is much better than Premier Stalin,” the American argued. 
“He taught the Americans not to drink.” 
 
 137 
 
“Ha. That’s nothing,” countered the Russian historian. “Stalin taught the 
Russians not to eat.”
17
 
 
A provincial party committee inspector pays a visit to a rural Committee of 
the Poor. He finds the chairman completely intoxicated. 
The inspector asks: 
--So how are things going? 
--Hic… They’re fine… Hic… 
--Are the ranks of the village poor contracting? 
---Er, yes… they’re dying off, all right. 
--And how’s the struggle with moonshine going? 
Rubbing his eyes the chairman replies: 
--Hic… We’ll have that finished off too, real soon. 
 
Son: Papa, vodka is getting more expensive, it will be difficult for you: you 
will have to drink less! 
Father: No, my son, it will be more difficult for you: you will have to eat less. 
These fictional situations blame alcohol for social issues, but also laud alcohol 
as a coping mechanism for those living under such difficult living conditions. Alcohol 
offered a mental escape from daily hardships, albeit creating more hardships in its 
consumption.  Since the drinker is always male, the “coping” benefit is notably 
afforded to one gender at the expense of the other who must deal with the social 
                                                 
17
 This anekdot makes reference to the state and was not included in the “social problems” category, 
but it is included here for the sake of thematic comparison. 
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problems that are tied to its consumption. The last anekdot above draws particular 
attention to the impact of such rampant alcohol consumption upon families who 
spend their meager wages upon alcohol rather than food or other necessities, and how 
alcoholic parents neglect or abuse their children. 
 
Shortages / Famine 
 
After the October Revolution of 1917, the primarily agrarian economy of Russia (and 
the rest of the Soviet Union) was rapidly industrialized. Guided by a series of 
ambitious five-year plans enacted by Stalin’s government, the entire nation focused 
the majority of labor upon increasing exports of heavy industrial products such as 
iron and coal.  Part of this industrialization process, was the collectivization of 
individual land and labor into collective farms, kolkhozes in Russian. The belief was 
that the replacement of these individually managed farms with collective ones would 
immediately increase the food supply for urban population, the supply of raw 
materials for processing industry, and agricultural exports. By 1936 over 90% of 
agricultural land was “collectivized” as rural households entered collective farms with 
their land, livestock, and other assets (Davies 1980; Heinzen 2004). Collectivization 
was intended to serve as a solution to the food crises that had developed since 1927, 
yet the shortages and famines only exacerbated under this new policy (Heinzen 
2004). The repeal of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1928 made it even more 
difficult for peasants since they could no longer sell their surpluses on the open 
market. Below are a couple jabs at these policies. 
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A collective farmer returns home from Moscow and announces with 
amazement: 
--It’s a miracle, my brothers! They’re building now in three months what 
would have taken three years to build before. 
A neighbor interrupts him: 
--That’s nothing. We’ve got even more wondrous miracles here. Take a look 
at our graveyard. Before, it would have taken us fifty years to fill it as full as 
we have during the past three. 
 
-How do you deal with mice in the Kremlin? 
-Put up a sign that says "collective farm.” Then half the mice will starve and 
the others will run away. 
Both of these anekdoty refer to the spike in deaths after the collectivization of farms. 
Although the collectivization was supposed to increase food supply, in effect it did 
the exact opposite and farmers were worked to death.  The number of deaths is highly 
disputed, since many Soviet sources deny famine all together or severely 
underestimate its fatal effects. The second anekdot also makes a joke about the 
increasing proportion of Russians who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union as a 
result of these dire conditions. Living conditions were difficult, and Soviet citizens 
had to find ways to deal with perpetual shortages and harsh work conditions. These 
issues touched upon in many other anekdoty. Below are just a few examples 
This is Armenian Radio! Our listeners asked us: What is the most permanent 
feature of our socialist economy? 
 
 140 
 
Our answer: Temporary shortages! 
 
A communist boss refuses to relieve a hungry worker engaged in an urgent 
task 
--But I’m exhausted, comrade. I need a break. 
--We’ll rest when we get to heaven. 
 
Does Russian government believe in God? 
What do you think? Who else makes us fast for so long? 
Life under the collectivization and industrialization policies posed many challenges 
for Soviet citizens. Buying basic staples such as food, clothing, and hygiene products 
such as soap, toilet paper, and toothpaste was a recurring obstacle for Russians. Food 
shortages were a constant problem and as a result led to regular long lines outside of 
market shops (Fitzpatrick 2000). There was very uneven distribution of such goods 
even among the Soviet population as noted in the earlier anekdot about the peasant 
returning from Moscow where construction was successful. Since Moscow and 
Leningrad had higher tourist traffic they were much better supplied than the rest of 
the USSR; rationing did not begin until the 1980s in these two cities even if their 
shelves were also often empty and city dwellers were accustomed to long lines. This 
is noteworthy in that the presence of goods on the shelves in a state store in a smaller 
village often could simply mean that these goods were rationed and could not be 
bought at will (Fitzpatrick 2000).  
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At a meeting in a factory, a lecturer from the district Party committee tells the 
workers about their bright future in the USSR. 
"See, comrades, after this five-year plan is completed, every family will have a 
separate apartment. After the next five-year plan is completed, every worker 
will have a car! And after one more five-year plan is completed, every family 
will own an airplane!" 
From the audience, somebody asks, "What the hell one may need an airplane 
for?" 
"Don't you see comrades? Let's say, there are shortages in potatoes supplies 
in your city. No problem! You take your own plane, fly to Moscow and buy 
potatoes!" 
 
A man walks in a bakery: 
- You wouldn’t have milk, would you? 
Salesman: 
- This is a bakery. We don’t have bread here. The store that doesn’t have milk 
is across the street. 
 
Yuri Andropov was visiting a collective farm to check on the progress of his 
announced reforms. 
“Do you have a house?” he asked the farmer. 
“Yes.” 
“Do you have a car?” 
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“Yes, oh yes.” 
“Do you have money?” 
“Yes, of course.” 
“Do you know who I am?” the Premier inquired. 
“You’re an American spy!” the farmer declared. 
“How dare you say that?” the former KGB chief huffed as he reeled back in 
shocked amazement. 
“Because any real Soviet would know we don’t have shit!” 
These anekdoty poke fun at the disjuncture between propaganda and lived reality. As 
Party newspapers and political speeches bragged about the accomplishments of the 
Soviet state and the joyous people who live under this political order, the common 
people struggled under much more difficult conditions: at best freezing outside in in 
long lines for food, at worst starving or being sent to jail. The outward presentation of 
a life of prosperity stood in stark contrast with the lived realties of the Russian people. 
Russians learned how they were expected to act in public from State-run newspapers 
and television that presented a view of social life that had little to no overlap with 
reality. 
Two old friends meet on a street in Volgograd. 
“How’s life treating you?” asks one. 
“Just great,” replies the other. 
“Have you been reading the papers?” 
“Of course, how else would I know?” 
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A commissar was visiting a collective farm to check on the season’s crops. 
“How are the potatoes,” he inquired. 
“The potatoes are plentiful,” a farmer replied, “that if we put them end to end 
they will touch the feet of God.” 
“How can that be?” blurted the commissar. “There is no God.” 
“Well, there are no potatoes either.” 
Although the big lies and false propaganda could not be challenged publicly, these 
anekdoty give voice to the doubts and criticisms of Soviet people who otherwise had 
to maintain public complacency. James Scott argues that hidden transcripts serve as 
dress rehearsals of revolt, and in the narrative about the farmer and the commissar, we 
get a glimpse of what those living under Soviet rule would say if they could talk back 
without repercussion. Anekdoty were a psychological safety valve in that they enabled 
the subjugated to act out impulses of rebellion in a safer way, but also that they 
emancipated them from the straightjacket of naiveté and stupidity that they were 
required to project in pretending to believe overt lies of the State.
18
 Through these 
narratives, Russians were able to prove to themselves, and to others that they were not 
gullible fools convinced by Party propaganda. The two major newspapers in the 
Soviet Union were called Pravda, which is translated to “truth,” and Izvestia, which 
translates to “news.” One of the most popular anekdoty in my compilations is as 
follows: 
 In Truth there is no news and in News there is no truth. 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter three for more discussion on the role of the “fool” in Russian and Soviet folklore in 
highlighting absurdities and inequities of official discourse. 
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This anekdot was particularly popular in regular conversation as a way of articulating 
the censorship policy in the USSR and its effect on all forms of media. It also 
provided a voice of rebellion against outward complicity and support. Although all 
social problems are experienced to some degree on a personal level, those that occur 
within the family structure may be even more invisible to the outsider because what 
goes on behind closed doors (even in a communal apartment) are issues that may be 
rarely spoken about in public settings. 
 
Family Politics 
The trials and tribulations of life under the Soviet regime were not limited to 
the public sphere. Shortages, famines, repression and other difficulties put significant 
pressures on the family unit. As a result, many social problems manifested in the 
private space of one’s home—between husband and wife, parents and children, and 
between neighbors who were cramped into overcrowded living arrangements. Major 
themes of anekdoty about family issues include are included in the chart below. 
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Chart 4.2 Anekdoty about Women and Family (N=205) 
 
Most Russians living in major cities lived in shared communal apartments called 
kommunalkas. Between two and seven families share such an apartment, each family 
with one room per family to serve as the living room, dining room, bedrooms and 
then the bathroom, kitchen, telephone and hallways were all shared among the 
families. Driven from the countryside by poverty, collectivization, and Soviet 
industrialization campaigns resulted in a severe housing crisis in the urban 
districts.  Kommunalkas were implemented as a “revolutionary solution” in “uniting 
different social groups in one physical space” (Attwood 2010).  Neighbors were 
forced to interact with each and often knew everything about each other, due to the 
close quarters (Utekhin et al. 2012) Such overcrowded living space made even it 
difficult to relax even when home. The following anekdot makes a jibe at these living 
conditions: 
One day, a school teacher gives portraits of Stalin to three students in her 
class. The next day, she asks them what they had done with them. 
Sex 
40% 
Cheating 
13% 
Divorce 
2% 
Abuse 
12% 
Marriage  
29% 
Mother in Law 
4% 
Ankedoty About Women/Family 
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--I hung the portrait directly opposite of our front door at home so that all 
entering could see it. 
--I hung mine in the corner where the icons used to be. 
The third boy remains silent. The teacher asks him: 
--And you, Petya, where did you hang your portrait? 
--I didn’t hang it anywhere. 
--What?! Why not? 
--There was nowhere to hang it. 
--What do you mean, ‘nowhere’? 
--Well our family lives in the middle of a room. The four walls belong to the 
four other families who live with us. 
Not only does this narrative criticize overcrowded living conditions, but it also 
criticizes the role that Soviet power has usurped in the daily life of Russians by 
replacing “the old icons” with Stalin as the new object of worship. The Soviet Union 
was the first nation to establish atheism as its official religion. Based upon Marx’s 
words that “religion is the opiate of the people,” the Soviet state was actively 
involved in the control, suppression, and elimination of religion through the 
confiscation of church materials, criminalization of religious activities and teaching 
of atheism in schools. Although religious activities were outlawed, the way that 
Soviet citizens were expected to revere political leaders and put up with a life of 
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extreme austerity with the hopes of a brighter future, were strikingly similar to 
traditional religious rhetoric. God had been replaced by Stalin and Soviet power. 
Marital relations were also stressed by such cramped living conditions and 
economic hardship. There is a considerable bulk of anekdoty about cheating between 
husband and wives and of the general promiscuity of women. A few examples of 
such anekdoty are below: 
A working man comes home and finds his wife in bed with a neighbor: 
“Why are you doing such dumb things when across the street they’re giving  
out oranges!” 
 
Late in the evening in a bar, two elegant gentlemen are eating. 
“Tell me, does your wife really not say anything when you come home this  
late?” 
“Can’t you see sir that I am single?” 
“Pardon me! Well then, what is the need to stay out so late and drink so  
much?” 
These stories recount (and normalize) cheating in relationships, but also highlight 
other related social issues in the process. The first anekdot draws attention to the 
shortages that were common to Russian life. Fresh produce was always in short 
supply. As a result, whenever there was produce available, one would prioritize 
getting some before it disappeared, even if that meant waiting in line all day. The 
focus of the joke is upon the shortages and the stupidity or irresponsibility of the wife, 
while the fact that she was cheating fades into the background. Both anekdoty 
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normalize cheating, the first does so by not even acknowledging it as something 
abnormal and the second by treating infidelity as some sort of inevitability produced 
by the living condition of cramped living quarters. In the statement made by the 
drinking buddy, it is implied that he is out late drinking avoiding his wife and/or 
looking for another woman to be with. Other anekdoty similarly construct the role of 
the woman in the household as negative. These issues range from abuse to 
frustrations with mother-in-laws to incest with children:  
Sara had a black eye. 
“Who did that to you?” asked a neighbor. 
“My husband.” 
“But I thought he was on a business trip.” 
“I also thought that…” 
 
A husband comes back unexpectedly 
French wife: Jacques, move over, my husband is back. 
German wife: Hans! You are two minutes early! 
Jewish wife: Haim! Is that you? Then who is this in bed with me? 
Russian wife: (falling to her knees) Ivan, hit me, but not in the face. 
 
A call to a veterinarian: “My mother-in-law will come to you with an old dog. 
Please give an injection of the most painless, powerful drug to put her out of 
her misery and euthanize her. 
Vet: OK… but does the dog know its own way home? 
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Sister to brother: “Your dick is bigger than Papa’s” 
“I know,” replies her brother. “Mama says the same thing.” 
A number of anekdoty are very inappropriate and offensive. There were four 
anekdoty in my sample that explained how rape was something that women desired, 
that it was a “beautiful blessing to be so lucky.” Domestic abuse was also a theme, 
appearing in at least ten anekdoty. Although these separately are not huge portions of 
the sample, we must remember that this sample is based upon printed and published 
volumes of jokes sold to a popular audience. As such, we would expect a level of 
censorship in these volumes. As such, one would expect that the unpublished oral 
folklore variety would be more crude and offensive in nature. There are a number of 
anekdoty about women fighting with their drunken husbands and the resultant 
domestic abuse. These narratives serve to highlight multiple social problems, while 
normalizing such contentious marital relations. The next anekdot describes in detail 
how these troubles developed inside of the home, especially between husband and 
wife.  
“You know, I think I’m going to abstain from drinking today,” says one friend 
to another, “I think I have developed an allergy to vodka—every time I drink I 
develop bruises on my body…” 
 
“Well of course I understand you. My wife also has a heavy hand.” 
A drunk man comes home, tiptoes along the floor and then yells out: 
“Wife, start fighting with me, otherwise I won’t be able to find the bed” 
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These narratives of abuse and family conflict are part of a series of anekdoty 
that expresses tensions and conflicts that occurred in the private sphere between 
family members, most often between husband and wife. Since topics like abuse may 
be difficult to talk about as a personal experience, these narratives create the space for 
this discussion, or at least serves to recognize these social problems, without engaging 
in self-implication. These narratives make light of these serious issues, without 
necessarily encouraging serious discussion or constructive action, yet the prominence 
of such problems in the discourse is indicative of saliency—one of the first steps in 
amelioration. Yet such humor also normalizes or justifies such subjugation. The genre 
of obscene anekdoty, which employs “mat,” is a particularly strong example of a type 
of political humor that simultaneously subjugates some groups while revolting against 
other forms of subjugation. 
 
Profanity / Mat 
 
 Mat is the Russian term for obscene profanity. Linguists believe that the word 
mat derives from the German word matt "dull, weak" and Italian matto "mad, crazy.” 
Both the German and Italian words are related to the term “check mate” used in 
chess, whose origin is the Arabic еš šâh mât "the king is dead" (Mikhailin 2004). 
Similarly, the use of such profanity is a way of challenging the king or the system in 
power. Mat was publishable by law by the Soviet constitution therefore when used it 
was classified as disorderly conduct or anti-State activity. But mat’ is also the word 
for “mother” in Russian, or “mother-related,” this is important especially since the 
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most offensive of these profanities are often directed towards women (Draitser 1999). 
The common insult associated with the word is “I fucked your mother” or “You 
fucked your mother”—the first implying the promiscuity of your mother, and the 
second implying incest. Draitser (1999) argues that mat has agrarian origins in folk 
consciousness, that young men used this language as a means of establishing their 
maturity and sexual virility (p. 36). Although mat is often used without distinguishing 
the target of its attack—women and/or other objects of ridicule—I will first address 
the subversive nature of mat as related to the Party or State, and then discuss the 
gendered nature of the profanity.  
Gusejnov (2003) argues that there were three distinct uses of mat for the 
Soviet Russian people. He argues the party elite initially used mat as a means of 
uniting insiders, but that over time commoners began to use mat to describe hardships 
and the hopelessness of life. As a result, mat began to flourish in social locations 
where people’s freedom was suppressed. Finally, as a way to vent frustrations, mat 
was a source of people’s verbal creativity and a reservoir of folk wit. It emerged as a 
public discourse during the first post-Soviet decade. As a freedom of speech, mat 
served as a way to disrupt the prescribed norm. Since the goal of the Leninist-
Marxism was to produce a “correct” worldview to guide the thoughts and actions of 
the proletariat, mat served as a transgressive disruption to the official ideology by 
being direct and transparent and deriding the exaggerated seriousness of official 
propaganda” (Gusejnov 2003; Yelenevskaya 2006: 367).  
 Mat is mentioned here since it was found in a number of anekdoty in my 
sample, though its analysis is more difficult to accomplish in the English language 
 
 152 
 
since the obscenity is often lost or confused in translation. The following anekdot 
serves as an example of such untranslatable narratives. 
What’s the difference between a diatribe and the Marxist dialectic? 
A diatribe helps to set people straight, while a dialectic allows you to spin 
them in circles. Both are powerful in the hands of the proletariat. 
In Russian, the two words “diatribe” and “dialectic” sound similar: mat and diamat 
respectively. Mat is an abbreviation for materialism as well as the term for obscene 
language. Diamat or dialectical materialism is a complex part of Marx’s theory that 
few Soviets understood. Therefore, mat is cast as the “clarity” or the ability for 
straightforward language, whereas diamat, or Marxism, is used to control and confuse 
people and trap them in a cyclical condition of suppression and oppression. A similar 
anekdot discussing the purpose of mat: 
Marina, the teacher, asks the class to produce a word that starts with the 
letter "A.” 
Vovochka happily raises his hand and says "Asshole!" 
Marina, shocked, responds "For shame! There's no such word!" 
"That's strange," says Vovochka thoughtfully, "the asshole exists, but the word 
doesn't!" 
 
Two communists get together. One asks the other: 
- Why are you so sad today? 
- Well, I’m feeling a bit nervous, they told me to attend a committee meeting, 
they said they want to listen to me... 
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- What are you, a nightingale? Why would they listen to you? You are going to 
be fucked there, not listened to!!! 
Such profanity was used as a means of resistance. It was sometimes used against the 
Party, but was also directed against any form of control or forced politeness or as a 
means of expressing the public secret, or “knowing what not to know” (Taussig 
1999). In the second anekdot the discourse implies that to be “fucked” is a 
euphemism for the control and power over a person. To be the object of affection 
and/or the object and receiver of a sexual act is constructed as without agency, voice 
or power.  
 Although the above anekdot is not explicitly about women, it does make 
reference to a sexual act in which a female is arguably implied. The normalization of 
heterosexuality is produced not only by the wealth of narratives that assume female-
male coupling, but also by anekdoty that cast homosexuality as perverse, for which 
one should be ashamed.  
What is the difference between homosexuals and the Secretary General?  
The first hugs and kisses in private and the latter in an airport in front of 
everyone. 
Homosexuality is not something openly discussed or displayed in Russia. There is 
considerable denial about its very existence at all. Draitser (1999) argues that many 
anekdoty attribute homosexuality to non-Russians as a way of dissociating from it 
entirely. Many of these narratives describe sex as something that a man does to an 
objectified other—be it a woman or an “other” not-fully-masculine/Russian man. As 
such, the act of sex is an act of power or control over another—for a man to be on the 
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receiving end of this sex (or to desire to be on the receiving end) is a sign of his 
emasculation.  The usage of mat exacerbates this effect by attributing violence to the 
sexual act. More examples of anekdoty utilizing mat that are directly disparaging to 
women are below. 
A husband comes home from work, hungry and tired. 
“Wife, give me something to eat!” 
“And what is the magic word?” 
“God, fuck your mother!” 
 
Petka comes to Vasilily Ivanovich and tells him that he wants to get married, 
but doesn’t want to marry a slut. 
Chapaev lines up all the women in his regiment. 
“All of you who are sluts, step forward!” he commands. 
All but one step forward. 
A month later, Chapaev asks Petka how he likes his new wife. 
“She’s also a slut, Vasiliy Ivanovich. She’s just a deaf one!” 
 Mat is typically used among men, in that these words often refer to sex or 
sexuality in a vulgar way or are particularly disparaging towards women. The role 
that these anekdoty play in constructing women as “other” or excluding them from 
the Russian nationalism, is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five and Six. 
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Self-Reflexive Popular Resistance 
Hearing an anonymously authored joke gives voice to one’s personal 
experience and enables the performer and audience to each recognize that s/he is not 
alone in her/his experiences and associated feelings. The joke reveals the shared 
experience and the shared discontinuity between image and reality, associated 
criticism and discomfort with the incongruity. The joke also serves as a means of 
democratic dissent or critique of the establishment. From the outside, institutions may 
appear eternal and immutable, yet as Scott argues in Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance, actions that are not traditionally recognized as rebellion or dissent (i.e. 
feet dragging, working slower, creating strong community events, art and music etc.) 
may actually serve to chip away at such institutions in much more powerful ways 
than are recognized. One of the most notorious variations of a joke is about the 
consequences of being caught sharing them: 
“Could you please tell us about your hobby, Comrade Brezhnev? 
“I collect jokes about myself.” 
“How many do you have?” 
“As of today, two prison camps”  
Since being caught telling even a non-political anekdot could result in 
imprisonment, a series of anekdoty made fun of the paranoid nature of the 
government which deemed even the most apolitical political. The casual telling of the 
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anekdot revealed just how easy and frequent such unfounded arrests and deportations 
were under Soviet rule (Brandenberger 2009). 
These jokes cannot transform history on their own and do not necessarily 
encourage like-minded individuals to collectivize or mobilize publically.  That said, 
they do express a shared set of sentiments which in itself produced invisible 
horizontal ties between citizens, irrespective of a government that some may have 
perceived to be illegitimate. I call the fluency in these discourses and the resultant 
connections, cultural consciousness.  In the same way that James Scott argued in 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance and Patricia Hill Collins in Black Feminist 
Thought, this political humor did serve as a way to chip away at the public image of 
the establishment. The critiques voiced by anekdoty in combination with the groups, 
identities and collective memories that were reified by such narratives, may have 
contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  An anekdot only lives on if it 
contains some truth; we laugh at jokes because they are meaningful, because they 
reveal the ironic underbelly of groups, governments and historical eras of which we 
are members. The truths they reveal may make us uncomfortable, hence the reason 
we discuss such issues through parables, fictional characters and exaggerated 
interactions. 
The historical role of the court jester was to problematize the social order of 
the world. The jester was allowed to laugh at the king when no one else was. Comedy 
serves as a way to criticize in an accepted way, but only under two conditions: (1) if 
those in power allow it and (2) if the public finds the subject matter salient and 
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meaningful. There are those who have argued that without some form of 
censorship—formalized through law or discursively according to a Foucaultian 
paradigm—there is no need for humor or satire. Humor expressed those ideas and 
opinions that counter the hegemonic discourse, and therefore brought people together 
in expressing their “backstage” or private self-attitudes. Further, since the opinions 
expressed in a joke are found to be meaningful by those who hear them, the joke has a 
democratic nature. Mikhail Bakhtin’s exploration of the Renaissance carnival offers a 
theory of how shared laughter can promote feelings of collectivity. Bakhtin (1984) 
argues that those attending a carnival are not simply a crowd of disconnected 
individuals, but rather should be viewed as a collectivity, organized in such a way that 
defies the socioeconomic and political ranks of those attendees. At the carnival, all 
are considered equal:  
Here, in the town square, a special form of free and familiar contact reigned 
among people who were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property, 
profession and age. … This temporary suspension, both ideal and real, or 
hierarchical rank created during carnival time a special type of communication 
impossible in daily life. This led to the creation of special forms of 
marketplace speech and gesture, frank and free, permitting no distance 
between those who came in contact with each other and liberating from norms 
of etiquette and decency imposed at other times” (p. 10).  
By wearing costumes and masks people can semi-anonymously participate in the 
absurdity and laugh together at their shared experience. It takes on a universal nature 
that implicates all of the participants. “The people do not exclude themselves from the 
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wholeness of the world…he who is laughing also belongs to it.” The laughter is 
ambivalent: it “is gay, triumphant and at the same time mocking, deriding. It asserts 
and denies. It buries and revives. Such is the laughter of the carnival” (Bakhtin 1984: 
11-12). This type of laughter and mockery is similar to that expressed in the anekdot 
and of the role of the “public secret” (Taussig 1999).  
 Bakhtin argues that people who establish informal, friendly relations are able 
to engage in mutual mockery. Unlike formal settings where only a third person can be 
mocked, once a level of trust and closeness has been established between two people, 
the nature of the relationship changes and allows for a more open exchange, including 
abusive or insulting language that would be shamed in more formal settings and 
relationships. As such, they tell the anekdoty about their shared experiences, history, 
popular culture and everyday hardships and the laughter is about these external 
things, as well as about themselves and their participation or membership. 
 The carnival challenges the idea of a fixed reality or of a single “truth.” 
Instead, the carnival enables the participants to parody the formal official realm, but 
without directly challenging or rejecting it. Bakhtin argues that, 
“All the symbols of the carnival idiom are filled with the pathos of change and 
renewal, with the sense of gay relativity of prevailing truths and authorities. 
We find here a characteristic logic, the peculiar logic of the ‘inside out’ (an 
l’envers), of the ‘turnabout,’ of a continual shifting from top to bottom, from 
front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, humiliations, profanations, 
comic crowning and uncrownings. A second life, a second world of folk 
culture is thus constructed; it is to a certain extent a parody of the extra 
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carnival life, a ‘world inside out.’ We must stress, however, that the carnival 
is far distant from the negative and formal parody of modern times. Folk 
humor denies, but it revives and renews at the same time. Bare negation is 
completely alien to folk culture” (Bakhtin 1984: 11). 
We see a similar perspective articulated in the discourse of the anekdot. The laughter 
produced by these jokes is not directed at one individual or one group of people or a 
singular historical event. Instead, while the laughter is provoked by a particular 
recounting of the anekdot, what makes the anekdot so funny is the way that the 
situation speaks to the absurdity of the everyday reality of this collectivity.  
What is left unresolved is the relationship between real attitudes of the 
performer and audience and those expressed in the anekdot.  Christie Davies argues 
the real attitudes of participants of joke exchange cannot be determined by content or 
in conversational context (1990: 3). Shared joke scripts draw upon historical and 
mythological stereotypes, sometimes related to historical events or cultural texts.  
Instead of alleging to understand actual attitudes—even interviews and surveys have 
proven to be poor measures of such attitudes (Bonilla Silva 1997)—the analysis of 
such stereotypes and cultural scripts is intended to understand public reactions and 
perceptions of historical events and groups of people by looking at how they are 
framed in these jokes. Although it is impossible to measure whether people truly 
“believe” these stereotypes, their very existence and endurance over time must be 
recognized as something telling about their salient and influence.  
Foucault (1980) argues that regimes of truth function not by enacting a 
repressive function upon its audience, but rather through the establishment of a code 
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that people are motivated to accept and participate in its creation and maintenance. 
Every text or image is linked to a referent system or dominant code, with which the 
intended audience is expected to be familiar. Knowledge is a primary vehicle of 
power and control, therefore the collective histories, objects of ridicule, and 
perspectives upon current affairs in the anekdot must be recognized as powerful 
arbiters of truth.  The Russian people who exchanged and perpetuated these jokes 
were well-versed in anekdoty’s associated subjective meanings which implicated 
them in the process of knowledge production and cultural consciousness. These 
narratives may be understood as articulations of a self-reflexive popular resistance 
that was not necessarily directed against the State or seeking to engage in politics-
proper, but instead to establish a self-definition of Russian collective identity and its 
associated values and aspirations, to maintain a collective consciousness. The process 
of such collective definition will be explored in greater detail in the following two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5 Anekdoty’s promotion of an “Imagined Community” 
 
“There used to be a saying among Soviet intelligentsia—‘to understand each other 
with half-words.” What is shared is silence, tone of voice, nuance of intonation. To 
say a full word is to say too much; communication on the level of words is already 
excessive, banal, almost kitschy. This peculiar form of communication “with half 
words” is a mark of belonging to an imagined community that exists on the margin of 
the public sphere….Communication with half-words secures the unspoken realm of 
cultural myths and protects the imagined community from outsiders and, in a way, 
from its own members. Among the dissidents of half words very little dissent is 
permitted. If all at once those other halves of words were to be spoken, intimate 
gatherings of friends might end—in fistfights.” (Boym 1994: 1-2). 
 
Folklore serves as an important role in defining and maintaining collective 
identities, memorializing collective memories, and moralizing the actions and actors 
involved in these collective negotiations of power and truth (Klandermans 2001; 
Zerubavel 2003; Polletta 1998; Foucault 1980). It accomplishes these things by 
constructing a single narrative with internally consistent heroes and villains. Those 
who are familiar with the folklore (and the historical context to which it refers) are 
taught who are the perpetrators responsible for particular injustices, who are the 
victims, and how we should feel about these different (groups of) people.  
In a cultural space like the Soviet Union in which it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to assert any account of reality other that the official Party word, the 
power of such folklore in defining truth should not be underestimated. In the above 
passage from Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, Svetlana 
Boym explains how under a regime of tightly controlled public discourse, Russians—
who were almost all dissidents in some form due to their words or actions—learned to 
communicate with “half words.” This entire population was versed in the same 
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textbook history that defined their collective memory, the same propaganda slogans 
pasted on every exposed wall, and shared daily experiences that served to undermine 
or challenge these false truths memorialized in common spaces and Party media 
(Wertsch 2002; Fitzpatrick 1999). As a result of this fluency in truths and false-truths, 
Soviet Russians were able to communicate with these small bits or “half words,” 
knowing that others could fill in the implied alternative meaning or the entire 
narrative that a single word might invoke. This type of communication was common 
to anekdoty that regularly reference party slogans, Marxist ideologies, characters from 
Soviet films, or current events. 
Boym (1994) calls such popularly-authored, meaning-making discourses that 
were pervasive throughout a culture, “mythologies.” She argues that mythologies are 
“cultural common places, recurrent narratives that are perceived as natural in a given 
culture but in fact were naturalized and their historical, political, or literary origins 
forgotten or disguised” (4). In the Soviet Union, where there was extreme political, 
administrative and cultural control and censorship, such “mythologies” played a 
particularly important role in guiding and informing daily life. They situated the 
Soviet people in a historical and cultural narrative that positioned them on a trajectory 
towards prosperity and ideological utopia. They justified contemporary hardships on 
behalf of collective goals and values. Such “mythologies” served as reference points 
to which the Soviet people could use half words to communicate politically 
unsanctioned or subversive attitudes and opinions. They enabled people to speak out, 
while still using permissible and endorsed words or phrases. 
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It is the content of the joke that triggers laughter, but it is the social context 
that makes the narrative meaningful and the content jarring. Even if read in isolation 
in a textual form, a joke always refers to a social environment, deriving its power 
from the society to which it refers.  Although the temporally local setting carries 
significant meaning and the power dynamic between performer and audience is 
important to understand, the actual discourses articulated by the joke are in 
themselves abundant in meaning and power. The congruence between the social 
context to which a joke refers and the one in which it is told, has a huge impact on 
what is found to be funny (Chapman 1976; Bakhtin 1984).  
Assuming a situated perspective of reality, there can be no objective reality 
from which the anekdot converges or diverges, therefore, this dissertation does not 
seek to assess whether the narratives expressed in the anekdot are “true to reality.” 
Instead, it will examine the different ways that these stories reify Party propaganda 
truths versus the ways by which they challenge these truths with alternative, less-
picturesque descriptions of daily life. In some cases, the anekdot served as an 
amalgamation of many perspectives of those living in Soviet times, while in others 
the anekdot articulate an unmarked voice, therefore privileging a hegemonic 
discourse that “centers” the ethnically Russian man. This second category of anekdoty 
most likely severely underrepresents the perspectives of the ethnic, religious and 
gendered minorities who are often the targets of the jokes (bell hooks 1984; Collins 
1990; Draitser 1998, 1999; Krylova 2005). By focusing upon political and topical 
jokes in relation to their historical context, we are privy to some of the uncensored 
perspectives of those who lived through the period and the different ways by which 
 
 164 
 
these people negotiated the politics of definition and meaning making. The jokes 
included in this analysis were published in volumes by a diverse group of authors as 
such we can treat them as salient and powerful truth-arbiters of the time. 
 
Identity Formation in a Social Context 
Identity is a psychological place in the social world and a road map orienting 
us towards others who also occupy that world. In contrast to individual identity, a 
collective identity causes people to direct attention to their collective rather than their 
individual interests and produces a group-consciousness. Simon and Klandermans 
(2001) identify five functions of collective identity that are requisite for such an 
identity to take precedence over a person’s “individual” or personal identity. These 
five functions include basic psychological needs, namely, belongingness, 
distinctiveness, respect, meaning, and agency. Without these functions, people may 
feel some connection to others, but will not be necessarily motivated to give 
preference to and act upon collective interests. Collective identities are particularly 
powerful in that they cause people to discriminate against out-groups in favor of in-
groups (Gamson 1992; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Nevo 1985), and influence 
people's justice concerns (Polletta 1998; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008), their 
willingness to engage in social protest and general engagement in social action 
(Melucci 1989; Simon et al., 1998; Klandermans, 2000).  
Collective identity is socially constructed and relational in nature. It results 
from ongoing interaction with other groups in a specific historical, geographical and 
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cultural environment (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Collective identity implies a 
demarcation from other groups while maintaining continuity between generations of 
members (Zerubavel 2003). The process of its construction and maintenance in 
relationship to historical events, other social groups and collective goals, enables 
participants to engage in self-reflexive social action (Melucci 1989: 34; Gamson 
1992). This is important to recognize since such distinctions have material 
consequences: they determine how people are treated, how resources are allocated, 
and who is privileged in the legal system. Gamson argues that,  
 “The construction of a collective identity is one step in challenging cultural 
domination. The content must necessarily be adversarial in some way to 
smoke out the invisible and arbitrary elements of the dominant cultural codes. 
No matter how personally important it becomes for participants, it is never 
merely a fulfillment but a strategic step in achieving cultural changes that are 
mediated by the movement’s external targets” (1992: 60).  
Although the “content must necessarily be adversarial in nature,” we must be careful 
not to conflate collective identities with what can often slide into fixed "essentialist" 
singular categories, such as those of race, sex, or gender, which presuppose that such 
boundaries on inclusion or exclusion are impermeable and eternal (Somers and 
Gibson 1993). Collective identities “challenge the logic of complex systems on 
cultural grounds… linking personal change with external action, collective action 
functions as a new medium which illuminates the silent and arbitrary elements of the 
dominant codes as well as publicizes new alternatives” (Melucci 1989: 23, 63). Power 
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structures are negotiated by such boundary and meaning making, therefore the 
renegotiation of power is more difficult with essentialist categories that do not bend 
or lend themselves to revision. In the Soviet context, we are able to see situations in 
which such essentialist categories did take precedence in collective identification, and 
as a result made it difficult to for those who opposed the social structure of society to 
regroup and articulate their collective goals. Individuals belong to many different 
groups and associated identities, identities that become more salient in some 
circumstances while falling to the background in others. The changing of roles and 
identities may was especially common in the Soviet context.  During pre-
revolutionary times, Russians primarily identified at the class or regional levels while 
under Soviet rule, their national identity took precedence (Fitzpatrick 1982: 205). 
Collective identity is a “social fact” that has sui generis, an existence greater 
than that the mere culmination of people who contribute to it (Durkheim 1982). The 
collectivity develops from the sum of actions or beliefs of these individual actors into 
a collective culture that can affect individual consciousness and behavior.  As such, 
collective identity is measured through the analysis of written documents, by studying 
the symbols of the group, its common language or its group culture, whereas social 
identity is measured through interviews or questionnaires (Klandermans 1997). 
Svetlana Boym (1994) argues that the collective identity was the naturalized 
or privileged identity of Russians, explaining that, “Russians identify themselves with 
their duties to the Church, the state, and the bureaucracy; a Russian does not possess 
an autonomous personal identity independent of his social and religious role” (pp. 75-
6). In Russian, there is no word for “private life,” the closest the language comes to 
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this concept is, “chastnaia zhizn” which is directly translated into “particular” or 
“partial life.” The concept of privacy was especially absent from Soviet life in that it 
was considered to be ideologically incorrect and politically dangerous. The concept of 
privacy is considered Western in nature and reeks of egoist connotations in the 
Russian language. As a result, Russians were trained to identify at the collective level, 
orienting themselves towards state-sanctioned collective goals and ideologies (Boym 
1994: 73). This was accomplished in large part by State-making initiatives that 
codified various national and ethnic groups in law and how they were subsequently 
circumscribed in Party rhetoric. 
 
 
Anekdoty Promoting an Imagined Community 
The tension of the Russo-Soviet collective identity between a supra-national 
Soviet and a national Russian level was a product of both socially constructed and 
primordial discourse (Brandenberger 2002; Laitin 1998; Fitzpatrick 1982, 2000). 
Although newspapers, political speeches, and propaganda rhetoric treated the Soviet 
Union as an empire guided by a single political ideology and vision of the future, 
discourses of nationality, race, gender, and religion continued to be employed as a 
means of defining and organizing populations. The power of those legally recognized 
categories and groups of people as identified by State discourse in propaganda and 
textbooks is especially evident in the narratives of the anekdot. Who was considered 
part of the “we” and who was “marked” or cast as “other,” was oftentimes dictated by 
these top-down, State-disseminated discourses. 
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The USSR did not define itself as a nation-state or a group of nation-states, 
but through the process of ascribing nationality to component parts of the state and 
citizenry it introduced the concepts of nationhood and nationality as categories of 
identification (Laitin 1998; Brooks 2000). These categories served to conceptually 
divide people. This was institutionalized by the 5
th
 line of the passport, which Soviet 
citizens carried around everywhere and whose nationality came to define a 
categorical group identity (Laitin 1998). Such “nationalities,” included “Russian,” 
“Jew,” “Armenian,” “Ukrainian” etc. Yet this arrangement created a paradox in that,  
“The Soviet scheme of institutionalized multinationality was characterized not 
only by a legal incongruence and spatial mismatch between its two 
components—national territories and personal nationalities- but also by a 
fundamental tension, at once conceptual and political, between two 
independent, even incompatible definitions of nationhood: one territorial and 
political, the other personal and ethnocultural” (Brubaker 1996: 34). 
Citizenship was conferred not by territory of occupation, but by an ethnic-cultural 
sort of “nationality,” yet each of these “nationalities” was associated with a territorial-
political “homeland” despite the fact that many of them did not live there. If these 
citizens had lived in the territory associated with their ascribed nationality, the 
definitions would have been congruent, but since many of them did not, this created a 
tension which highlighted the mismatch between state definitions and lived 
realities—a theme very common among anekdoty.  This mismatch was most notable 
amongst Jews, whose “homeland” existed in both a different space and different time: 
before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1967, their “homeland” was the 
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historical Palestine of their ancestors—a place that did not officially exist on a map at 
the time. Unlike personal stories, anekdoty in circulation reflected shared 
perspectives, serving as a gauge of collective sentiments, rather than personal ones. 
As such, the anekdot reified ethnic and gendered boundaries through the articulation 
cultural consciousness. This was particularly accomplished by highlighted the 
importance or centrality of particular events/political figures and labeling outgroups 
as “other.” 
 In the same way that contemporary social problems were cast as “necessary 
but temporary” hardships on the road to a problem-free, ever-abundant communist 
empire, social divisions such as nationality and gender were treated as temporary and 
insignificant means of organization by propagandistic discourse. They were treated as 
labels that would disappear when communism was finally realized despite the fact 
that these identifiers continued to wield considerable power and discrimination. One 
anekdot that expresses skepticism of such contradictory prophecies:  
- Is there going to be a fifth line “Nationality” during the communism?  
- No.  Instead there will be the question: “What was your nationality during 
the socialism?”  
This narrative challenged Party claims that national identification is 
something temporary, but rather argued that they reflect an enduring xenophobic 
trend of the Soviet regime. Laitin (1998) argues that “social solidarities are built on 
real foundations” (p. 20) in that groups (ethnic, national, religious etc.) are founded 
on primordial similarities among members, but that as social opportunities change, 
new identities may be adopted, constructed or reconstructed in order to take 
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advantage of the situation. Although people did identify as “Russian” before the 
Russian Revolution in 1917, more often, Russians identified according to class and 
geographical identities (Fitzpatrick 1982: 205). Arguably, as the Soviets came to 
power and the Russians were established as the core-elite of this new empire, the 
most salient identity was that of the national-supranational Russo-Soviet identity in 
that it privileged all Russians to a privileged space where they might associate with 
Soviet accomplishments and dissociate from its failures by blaming peripheral 
nations. 
Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that citizens recognized the modern nation-
state as a legitimate source of power, citizenship, and identity only if it was able to 
construct an “imagined community.” Anderson identifies the census, the map, and the 
museum as exemplars of the conceptually bounded and interchangeable units typical 
of modernist thinking facilitated both the formation of a world economy of nation 
state in orders to providing the conceptual categorical apparatus for constructing both 
boundaries and identities through “imagined communities.”  Such a “totalizing 
classificatory grid,” was flexible in terms of its ability to categorize both real and 
imagined phenomenon as “us” or as “other” (Anderson 1983: 184). This grid linked 
every part of the world with relational meaning and a particular place—
institutionalizing and fixing understandings of each of these realms. Other scholars 
have similarly identified the census (Bourdieu 1999) and passport (Laitin 1998) as 
powerful governmental categorical tools by which a population is defined as the 
benefactors and beneficiaries of the state. The state in this sense is a powerful 
“identifier” because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose categories, 
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classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with which 
various social actors must work and to which non-actors must refer (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000: 16). The lines of fragmentation were not devised by the anekdoty 
themselves, but rather the opposite: the different groups or identities included in the 
anekdoty served to reflect which of these categories were meaningful and salient and 
in what particular ways. For instance: Georgians were nearly absent from Russian 
anekdoty until after the New Economic Policy (NEP) was repealed and Georgians 
were able to profit from selling fresh fruit in Russia (Draitser 1998). Russians were 
jealous of what they perceived to be Georgians prosperity and began to define this 
group as amoral, greedy, rich, dumb market vendors. Other national groups in these 
narratives illustrate the Russian perspective of the world and their own place within it.  
One of the prominent Russian cultural “myths” (Boym 1994) or “ideas” 
(Berdyaev 1947) that shaped both Party-disseminated discourse and popularly held 
beliefs is the idea that Russian culture is deeply rooted in the great literary classics of 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries including Pushkin, Tolstoy, Akhmatava. This 
“high” culture was central to the Russian collective identity and was also promoted 
by Soviet discourse. The image of the Russian people as literary, cultured 
intellectuals was something that cultural discourses sought to maintain since it 
allowed people to maintain a positive self-image. In contrast to Marx, who argued 
that the proletariat was capable of emancipating itself from bourgeois ideology, 
Lenin’s theory of revolution required that the proletariat should first acquire the 
“‘correct’ ideology – the only means that would enable it to acquire power over 
reality” (Yelenevskaya 2006: 361). This “correct” ideology involved the 
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circumscription of the “correct” group of people oriented towards the same morals, 
values and future goals. Such an ideology relies upon a collective narrative (Polletta 
1998) by enabling people to locate themselves (or be located) within a repertoire of 
emplotted stories. The following anekdot pokes fun at the contrived nature of this 
construction of collective identity: 
The Party announced a contest for the best sculpture depicting the famous 
writer Pushkin and his Jubilee. 
The third prize was awarded to a statue of Pushkin. 
The second prize was awarded to a statue of Lenin reading a book by 
Pushkin. 
The first prize was awarded for a statue of Pushkin reading a book by Lenin. 
Pushkin died over thirty years before Lenin was born, therefore it would have 
been impossible for Pushkin to read Lenin, but this anekdot makes fun of how 
Russian history has cast Lenin as the source of a traditional Russian identity that dates 
back before his own birth.  Yet, the construction of Lenin as the father of the Soviet 
Union (and Russia) makes the image of Pushkin reading and being inspired by Lenin 
much more plausible.  Regular reference to national symbols is one way by which the 
exchange of these jokes serves to construct and challenge the contours of such a 
collective identity (Zerubavel 2003). It enabled a single collective memory to define 
the population’s historical leaders, victories, and cultural values. National symbols 
serve an important function in creating “nationness” or a sense of cohesion among 
disparate people. This is especially the case in Soviet Russia in which censorship and 
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repression produced such disconnect between citizens, friends, neighbors and family. 
The anekdot—that was presumably not authored by teller or hearer—represented a 
perspective that was salient, but one for which no one had to take responsibility.  
Through a process of recursive communication,
19
 national symbols help 
assure loyalty to the nation as they function as “historical ‘bookmarks,’ links to actual 
or legendary events in the nation’s past. Each time a “bookmark” is actualized (e.g. a 
flag being saluted or a national anthem played), it is a flashback reminder of our 
collective history as a nation, a shared past that makes us a nation, bestowing upon 
each of us a sense of collective identity” (Geisler 2005: xix; Zerubuval 2003). The 
anekdot’s habitual reference to national holidays, historical events, heroes and 
leaders, cultural trends, ethnic and religious groups, political parties, national writers 
and artists serve to reify the cultural contours of this “we” who participate in anekdot 
exchange.  
The boundaries of “we” and the national symbols or events that influence 
these demarcations do not come from the anekdoty themselves, but rather from other 
forms of media, such as propagandistic films, television/radio series, or nationally 
syndicated events. Many anekdoty refer to such symbols or events such as political 
speeches, events from the Party Congress, the 1980 Olympics, new laws or 
commemorative coins; their inclusion serves as evidence of a shared cultural 
environment and fluency in a particular set of narratives and symbols. Below we are 
some examples of orientation towards a singular collective history: 
                                                 
19
 By ‘recursive communication’ I mean that symbols (and their associated meanings) are so 
enmeshed with other symbols and other articulations of nationness that they appear to be “natural” 
or “logical” components of the national identity. They are treated as an assumed quality before 
anyone has the opportunity to question them or demand an explanation. 
 
 174 
 
 Is communism going to be built by 1980? 
 - No, instead of building communism they decided to have the Olympic Games  
 in Moscow.  
 
A friend visited the home of a Russian cosmonaut and found only the children 
there. 
“Where are your parents?” the guest inquired. “Will they be home soon?” 
“Father is on a space flight,” they replied. “He’ll be home soon. But mother 
went to the store to buy butter. We don’t expect her for some time.” 
 
The class instructor asked Vovochka, why he came to school with wrinkled 
pants. 
“Yesterday we turned on the television and heard: Lenin’s work lives on! 
Then we turned off the television and turned on the radio. Again we heard 
“Lenin’s work lives on!” After that we were too afraid to turn on the iron.” 
The first anekdot about the Olympic Games argues that the Soviet State is less 
concerned with the actual project of communism but rather with the outward 
presentation of success. The second anekdot about the child of an astronaut similarly 
questions of the priorities of the Soviet State. The joke highlights the absurdity of the 
Soviet Space program that has enough funding and organization to send the first 
astronauts into space, but how the Five Year Plan fails to secure food in the stores for 
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the common people. The third anekdot makes fun of the redundant and profuse 
propaganda that was common under Soviet rule – the slogans lost their meaning and 
this joke, only incite paranoia and fear that Lenin (and the State) is everywhere. 
Geisler (2005) proposes thinking of national symbols as a mass media system 
since symbols are rarely experienced in isolation, but rather in conjunction with other 
symbols in order to produce and maintain a power structure (flag as power of state, 
capital as geographic center, currency as economic structure) in addition to cultural 
membership into the dominant value system. As such, tracing which types of national 
symbols are expressed in anekdoty, we might gain a better idea of what the nation’s 
collective identity looked like at one moment in time. Below are two charts that 
illustrate the themes of those anekdoty that articulate a Russian cultural identity and a 
Russian collective history. 
Chart 5.1 Anekdoty About Collective Memory (N=187) 
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Chart 5.2 Anekdoty About Russian Culture (N=132) 
 
These anekdoty serve to reify the concept of a Russian collective identity by 
orienting around those historical and contemporary events, cultures, and ideas that are 
distinctively Russian. Anniversary celebrations and symbolic references to war 
heroes, victories or other nationally based accomplishments remind those who hear 
anekdoty, that identification at the Russian national level is both meaningful and 
powerful, and something to remember with pride. When contrasted with those 
narratives about hardships of daily life, the glorious past serves as a discursive 
strategy in elevating the stateliness of the Russian collective, to focus on glorious 
accomplishments rather than the harsh conditions of daily survival. 
From museums to national holidays, state-mandated textbooks to propaganda 
films, all Soviet citizens were required to be versed in those cultural elements that 
together constructed the prideful image of the Soviet Union. Everyone who lived in 
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the USSR was versed in the collective memory and identity discourse that was so 
saturated in daily life. As such, the possibility of detachment or repose from the 
official discourse would have been a blissful escape. The following joke emphasizes a 
litany of historical events, literature, ideologies, and political leaders in which Soviet 
daily life was saturated.    
A Student is taking an oral exam in Soviet history. He is apparently doing  
well until the professor asks him: “When was the Bolshevik revolution?”  
“I don’t know” 
“Well then, who wrote DAS KAPITAL?” 
“No idea.” 
“Who was Comrade Lenin?” 
“I’ve never heard that name before,” said the student unabashedly. 
“Well, young man, you must be able to tell me this: Who is Comrade  
Brezhnev?” 
“Br-, Br-, who??” 
“Listen, where are you from?” 
“I’m of the village Petrov in Siberia…” 
The professor is thoughtful now, “Petrovka, Petrovka… sounds like a  
heavenly place!” 
The professor in this anekdot is envious of the student who knows little about 
Soviet History, the foundations of the Party, and the details of the socialist endeavor. 
These are some of the national symbols that were used by Soviet propaganda to unify 
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the Soviet people and were central to Soviet education and official discourse.  As the 
Soviet system made life increasingly difficult for its people and the promises of 
communism were not realized, these founding fathers and utopian ideologies came to 
be associated with their failures as opposed to their aspirations or promises. To live in 
Russia during this time and not know these particular details meant that one lived in a 
place isolated from Soviet power and perhaps a place where the challenges and 
injustices of daily life were less severe.  
Anderson’s conceptualization of “imagined communities” is important in 
understanding the significance of the anekdot. In a similar fashion to the newspaper, 
the anekdot connects these otherwise disconnected individuals into a singular 
collective with a singular homeland, identity, values and set of aspirations. If we 
accept this proposition, then the decline of the anekdot in contemporary culture might 
be a reflection of a weakening of the “imagined community” or cultural 
consciousness for contemporary Russians as compared to during the Soviet era. 
Alternatively, the collective identity may be strengthened as protest and satire go 
public and visible in contemporary Russia—two explanations that I will explore in 
greater detail in my conclusion. 
 
Who are “We”: Anekdoty promoting Cultural Intimacy 
With his theory of the “imagined community,” Benedict Anderson offers an 
explanation why citizens were willing to die for their country, in that such a death 
afforded the citizen the honor of being part of an immortal collective identity and 
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memory. However, his theory does not ground itself in the action of everyday life. 
Instead, similar to Gellner (1983), Anderson argues that the citizens lack the ability to 
shape this nationalism; they simply assume the national identity that is bestowed upon 
them from the State or those in power.  His account also offers only the positive 
aspects of national identity—pride, victory and honor. What is absent from this 
account is the aspects of a national identity that are more complicated and difficult to 
reconcile for a people, a “rueful self-recognition” that “we” are not perfect and that 
our collective memories and histories involve a modicum of denial and 
reinterpretation in order to maintain a confident outward collective image (Herzfeld 
1997: 6). 
The concept of “cultural intimacy” explains how top-down national identities 
may be internalized, reproduced and refigured. This term, coined by Michael 
Herzfeld (1997) refers to the active involvement of ordinary people to maintain and 
redefine a national identity, which involves self-reflexive recognition and reflection 
as opposed to simply outward pride that is common to state-disseminated discourses.  
He argues that “ordinary people reify, all the time, everywhere. They, too, invoke 
solidified histories, rediscovering in the official mythology some aspects that will 
serve their own cause” (25). Herzfeld stresses the importance of not overlooking 
these everyday actions in the state’s ability to achieve stability (or at least the illusion 
of it). Building upon Max Weber’s definition of the state as an entity that possesses a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force, Charles Tilly’s argues that nation-states are 
“relatively centralized, differentiated organizations.  The officials of which more or 
less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a 
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population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory” (1985: 170). If we accept this 
definition, it follows that the association with such a war-making collectivity may 
produce some incongruent feelings of unease or disagreement with the state’s 
“legitimate” use of violence. Embarrassment, regret, denial, and self-reflexive 
identity construction are at the heart of “cultural intimacy” or nationalism 
experienced at the individual level and serve as important glue for the national 
collective identity to stick.  
Cultural intimacy expresses the dynamic embedded in disemia—tension 
between outward presentation of confidence and inward self-doubt. Herzfeld argues 
that the disemia exists most extremely for those national groups that have an 
ambiguous relationship with the constructed ideal images of a powerful culture, in 
that irony serves as an important resource for political negotiation. In these cases 
there is requirement of all citizens as part of the collective to maintain a “dual 
identity, balancing foreign-directed display against sometimes rueful introversion” 
(Herzfeld 1997: 14-15, 16). These are not merely personal feelings or identities, but 
rather a collective, cultural representation of intimacy (pp. 6-7). 
For Russians living under Soviet rule, such negotiation with official rhetoric 
was a daily endeavor. Both formal education and Party propaganda were centrally 
organized and framed in terms of the teachings Marxist theory. Children and adults 
alike were well versed in Marxism and Leninism as a result of Party propaganda, yet 
the glorious utopia depicted in this public presentation had very little to do with the 
actual conditions of daily life in Russia. In an act of rebellion against these false 
depictions, many anekdoty subvert Marxist and Leninist teachings by laughing at 
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their failed utopian vision, and by arguing that the contemporary social problems (e.g. 
shortages, famine) are not merely temporary byproducts of the development of 
communism, but rather a direct product of the socio-political system: 
The year is 2010. In Moscow, a boy asks, "Grandpa, what is a line?" 
"You see, some twenty years back, there was not enough meat in stores, so 
people had to form long queues at the stores' entrances and wait hoping some 
meat would appear on sale. That was called line. Do you understand?" 
"Yes, Grandpa. And what is meat?" 
 
Is it possible to build communism? 
To build it, yes. But to live through it—doubtful. 
 
What is a dry sardine? 
Answer: a whale that has lived 30 years under communism. 
Each of these anekdoty expresses cynicism toward the Communist vision and the 
collective identity that is alleged to be derived from it. Soviet rhetoric is oriented 
towards the future, explaining low standards of living as one of these temporary 
conditions that are necessary in the transition and reconfiguration into a prosperous, 
class-free society. These anekdoty challenge these false promises and express a 
sentiment of despair and hopelessness if the Communist Party stays in power. Some 
anekdoty make fun of the convoluted and doomed vision of the Party even more 
explicitly,  
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At a factory meeting, a member of the district Party committee tells the 
workers about their bright future in the USSR. 
"See, comrades, after this five-year plan is completed, every family will have a 
separate apartment. After the next five-year plan is completed, every worker 
will have a car! And after one more five-year plan is completed, every family 
will own an airplane!" 
From the audience, somebody asks, "What the hell do we need an airplane  
for?" 
"Don't you see comrades? Let's say, there are shortages in potatoes supplies 
in your city. No problem! You take your own plane, fly to Moscow and buy 
potatoes!" 
 
A speaker says that communism is already on the horizon. Someone asks him: 
“And what is a “horizon’?” 
“Imagine a line where the sky meets the earth and which moves away from us 
as we try to approach it.” 
These anekdoty challenge official Party rhetoric by describing a future that is worse 
than the present social situation. These narratives reject the idea that current problems 
are merely temporary sacrifices for a glorious future under communism, and argue 
instead that these struggles are merely a foreshadowing of exacerbated difficulties to 
come. Such resistance and dissent expressed in anekdoty may have strengthened the 
bonds between the Russian people in the safety of an un-policed backstage. Rejecting 
 
 183 
 
the Party rhetoric about economics and history served as one of the first steps in the 
rejection of a Soviet identity at a supra-national level. 
 
“Russianness” Through Contrast 
The joke is an important barometer of group membership given that an 
experience (attitude or opinion) that is normally isolated within the subject becomes 
sharable through humor. The taboo, censored, and uncomfortable are more easily 
conveyed in a third person structure, since the person telling the joke can simply say, 
“this isn’t about me or you,” even though the laughter produced is an indication that it 
is about me and you. Group-specific jokes are only funny if the members of this 
particular group are the ones sharing them. For instance, it is acceptable for victims of 
a disaster to tell jokes about the event, though it is in bad taste for those who were not 
victims to tell the same jokes. There is an informal policing of who may participate in 
certain circles of joke exchange and who cannot. However, those group-disparaging 
jokes told among insiders, may not be self-aimed. Instead, these jokes either 
explicitly or implicitly cast blame on non-group members such as leaders or majority 
groups are responsible for creating or maintaining the unjust environment in which 
these unfortunate situations come about. 
Although anekdoty that challenge Soviet authority bring performers and 
audiences together through shared laughter and rejection of this definition from 
without, self-definition at a national level occurs more explicitly when Russians are 
contrasted with other nationalities.  
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The most frequent type of anekdoty that juxtaposes the Russian with other 
nationalities involves the Russian with two other non-Soviet men. Most frequently, 
these two men include a combination of the Frenchman, the American, the German 
and Englishman. Although this genre of anekdoty cycles these different nationalities, 
most often there are three characters (including the Russian) as a result of the Russian 
superstition/belief that that in that three is the optimal number of drinking buddies. 
Soviet folklore treats the number three as having magical qualities. Below we see an 
example of such a joke which simultaneously serves to construct the desires of the 
Russian man—to drink with friends, without a desire to return to his homeland and 
the difficulties of life associated with it—and to stereotype the other men and their 
nationalities. 
An American, a Frenchman, and a Russian are the only survivors of a plane 
crash, somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. They manage to swim to a small 
island nearby. Lady Luck continues to smile on them—they catch a magical 
Golden Fish! 
“Let me go back into the ocean, good men, and I will grant each one of you 
two wishes,” the Golden Fish says. 
 So the American asks for a lot of money and a trip back home. 
 The Frenchman asks for a beautiful woman and a trip back home. 
The Russian, in his turn, says, “I want an endless fountain of beer on the 
island. And I want those two back.” 
While the American and the Frenchman wish first and foremost to be off of the 
island, the Russian wishes to be anywhere but home. Russian men most often found 
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escape from the hardships of Soviet in a setting similar to this deserted island: sitting 
with three friends at a bar or kitchen table, drinking copiously, and avoiding struggles 
associated with daily, public life. The juxtaposition of Russians with other 
nationalities, similarly serves a self-deprecating function, highlighting the positives of 
another culture in contrast with the Russian’s own. We see this structure and function 
in the following two anekdoty as well. 
An Englishman, a Frenchman and a Russian brag about their wives: 
“When my wife rides horseback, her legs touch the ground,” says the 
Englishman “not because the horse is low to the ground, but because my wife 
has such long legs!” 
“I can hug my wife’s waist with two fingers from the same hand,” says the 
Frenchman “Not because I have a big hand, but because she has such a small 
waist!” 
“Before leaving for work,” says the Russian “I smack my wife’s ass and when 
I return from work, it’s still giggling. But this isn’t because my wife has a 
flabby ass, but because in the Soviet Union we have the shortest workday in 
the world!”  
 
An American risk: choose one out of ten cars, and one will have defective 
brakes.  
A French risk: choose one out of ten prostitutes, and one will have syphilis.  
A Soviet risk: tell political anekdoty with company, and one will be a rat. 
Everyone knows who he is, but everyone still tells the anekdoty. 
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These anekdoty operate by using national stereotypes to tell the story. The French are 
depicted as sex crazed, the American as concerned with money, and the Englishman 
as government oriented. These anekdoty construct the Russian (man) as a hopeless 
drunk, who lives in a country where nothing is accomplished, and from where 
everyone wants to emigrate. The abusive relationship between men and women as 
expressed in anekdoty is discussed in further detail in Chapter Four. The intersection 
of this national juxtaposition with gendered stereotypes produced an intersectional 
logic that especially privileges the Russian man. 
Russian identity is particularly salient in the many anekdoty that directly 
contrast the Russian man with other nationalities in order to highlight his distinctive 
Russianness. There is another genre of anekdoty that is less focused on the 
distinctiveness of the character or behavior of the Russian man, but more of the 
doomed vision or daily struggles of the Russian people. Although this theme is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, below we see how the function on 
contrasting the Russian experience with other nationalities serves to highlight this 
despondent perspective. 
An American, Japanese, and a Russian dentist at an international conference 
were discussing the relative costs of pulling teeth. 
“How much does it cost to pull a tooth in the United States?” the Japanese 
dentist inquired. 
“Oh, on average forty to sixty dollars,” replied the American. 
“And how much does it cost in Japan?” he asked in turn. 
“In Japan it costs between sixty and eighty yen,” the Asian dentist replied. 
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“And how much does it cost in the Soviet Union?” the both inquired of their 
Russian counterpart. 
“In the Soviet Union it costs 3,500 rubles to pull a tooth,” the Russian dentist 
said. 
“Why so much?” asked the other two. 
“With us it is a very complicated procedure,” the Russian dentist explained. 
“We have to pull teeth through the rectum, because everybody is afraid to 
open their mouth.” 
 
–What is the difference between India and Russia? 
–In India one man starved for everyone and in Russia everyone 
starved for one man. 
 
A farmer in the Zemaitija region of Lithuania, characterized by stubborn, 
independent-minded folk, was walking along a river bank when he heard cries 
from the middle of the stream. 
“Help! Help!” a man pleased as he desperately treaded water. 
“Can you say it in Russian?” the farmer asked without breaking stride. 
“Pomagaite! Pomagaite!” He repeated in flawless Russian. 
“You see. Now, if you had studied something more useful, like swimming, you 
wouldn’t be in this fix,” the farmer said and continued on his way. 
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In Russia there is a rumor that the schools will soon teach two foreign 
languages. Hebrew for those who plan to leave and Chinese for those who 
plan to stay. 
These anekdoty that play on the extreme censorship under Soviet rule, the doomed 
vision of Russian imperialism, immigration by the Jews looking to escape Soviet life 
or about future conquer by the Chinese highlight the insecurities of the Russians 
living under a failing regime. By using these other characters, these issues may be 
addressed in a less explicit ways since Russians might be less comfortable talking 
about these feelings directly. Therefore, the Russians who exchange these anekdoty 
are able to not only to blame other entities for the failures of the regime, but also to 
commiserate in daily struggles. These two issues will be explored in Chapter Six of 
this dissertation. 
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Chapter 6 Adversarial Attributions: Knowing Thyself through 
Construction of “Other” 
 
Power relations are rarely symmetrical and a frequent source of group 
conflict. More powerful groups have greater control over the social environment in 
terms of material resources and the ability to define “truth” via hegemonic discourses. 
Such struggles for power do not only exist between groups with established power 
relationships but also in situations in which power is unstable, and therefore groups 
are more aggressive in their struggle for self-definition and control. We can see how 
this was especially the case for Russians living under the Soviet regime, who wished 
to dissociate from the failures of the Party and self-define a collective identity based 
upon honor and intellectual superiority. 
Chart 6.1 illustrates the frequency with which these various nationalities are 
mentioned in anekdoty.  Of 1290 anekdoty, 271 involved national groups other than 
Russians.  Chart 6.1 illustrates the breakdown of those 271 anekdoty. 
Chart 6.1 Outgroup Nationalities (N= 271) 
 
Jew 
28% 
America 
27% 
Germany 
9% 
China 
9% 
Poland 
5% 
England 
4% 
Czecholovakia 
4% France 
4% 
Ukraine 
4% 
Georgia 
3% 
Chukchi 
3% 
Outgroup Nationalities 
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From this distribution it is evident that anekdoty about Americans and Jews 
far surpass the number of anekdoty about any other group in this sample. We can 
interpret these numbers as a reflection of the saliency of these groups within Soviet 
culture. Soviet propaganda constructed the US as the USSR’s major adversary, yet 
the result was that Americans served as a source of constant comparison and envy. 
Jews were another group that was prominent in Soviet discourse; with rampant anti-
Semitism in both institutional and cultural forms, this group was a constant target of 
attack. A particularly interesting finding in my sample was that anekdoty tended to 
reify negative stereotypes promulgated by Soviet discourse about Jews whereas they 
rejected those about Americans. Even in those anekdoty that presented Jews more 
favorably, as the wily trickster who was able to outsmart the Soviet system, the Jew 
was constructed as “other” in an inassimilable way that Americans were not.  I 
contextualize this discussion in relation to other outgroups that were constructed by 
the anekdot narratives as “others” to varying degrees. 
The fact that there are more anekdoty about non-Soviet nationalities than 
Soviets makes it clear who is the audience of these narratives and who is constructed 
as “other.” The greater proportion of non-Soviet nationalities represented in anekdot 
may also be related to the fact that the audience of these published volumes are 
Russian speakers and therefore more likely of a Soviet nationality, even if they have 
since immigrated (e.g. for the volumes published abroad). It is also fair to assume that 
there is at least some self-censorship in these published volumes, therefore sentiments 
expressed may be only a small taste of an entire genre about a particular group. I 
factored in this assumption of self-censorship by coding and analyzing every national 
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and ethnic group. Even if their percentage of my sample was small, their frequency—
and associated discursive power—in circulation might be much larger. 
 
Adversarial Attributions: Outgrouping via Ethnic Humor 
Group identity exists if there is a population to be included, but also if there 
are populations to be excluded from membership. Ethnic or out-group humor 
constructs who is not considered part of the collectivity through the processes of 
scapegoating and stereotyping of particular subgroups, ethnicities and nationalities. In 
addition to serving as a barometer of popular sentiments towards the state and official 
discourses, anekdoty served to circumscribe the collectivity of the “unmarked”—and 
thereby centered—Russian by scapegoating and stereotyping various outgroups (e.g. 
Jews, Ukrainians, and Georgians). These individuals and groups were either explicitly 
or implicitly blamed for various negative aspects of social and political Soviet life. 
Further, through a process of negation—by blaming these individuals and groups for 
flawed policies, flawed values, or priorities—the values and collective goals of the 
Russian population were defined and the population of deserving citizens was 
circumscribed.   
The first census conducted by the USSR in 1926 listed 176 distinct 
nationalities (democope.ru). For the 1939 Census, these nationalities were lumped 
into larger groups (e.g. four different Jewish ethnic groups were reclassified as one 
group) or omitted entirely if their numbers were too small. As a result, the list was 
aggregated into 69 nationalities (Simon 1991). These 69 nationalities lived in 45 
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nationally delimited territories, including 16 Union-level republics for the major 
nationalities, 23 autonomous for other nationalities within Russian SFSR, and 6 
autonomous regions within other Union-level republics (one in Uzbek SSR, one in 
Azerbaijan SSR, one in Tajik SSR, and three in Georgian SSR).  
Although Russia is a country which hosts over a hundred diverse ethnic 
groups, it is surprising that only a few of these distinctive ethnic groups are 
represented in the Soviet and contemporary anekdot. The existence of jokes about a 
particular ethnic group is an indication of the group’s visibility in the culture (Davies 
1990). Further, their representation in these circulated (and therefore agreed-upon) 
jokes serves to darken the boundaries established between the collective and the 
“other.” Yet the jokes do not simply expel the “other,” but rather serve to construct 
another collectivity—that of the group to which this “other” belongs.  In many cases a 
group is visible because they are perceived as a threat—in terms of greater success, 
wealth or intelligence. In order to dissociate from these groups and bolster one’s own 
collective image, these outsiders are constructed as greedy, immoral or foolish.  
In ethnic anekdoty, non-Russian nationalities are introduced by category and 
associated stereotypes. The audience must be familiar with the social group’s 
positioning in the larger Soviet power-structure and politics in order to for the punch 
line to be jarring and meaningful.  When not explicitly named, these social groups are 
referenced by stereotype markers. For instance, the Jew in the anekdot can be 
described as the man with the large nose, as “Abraham,” “Moshe,” “Rabinovich” or 
another Jewish sounding name. The short man with the cap is Lenin, while a man 
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with a large cap, dark skin, and lots of money is a Georgian. As a result, part of the 
socializing aspect of the anekdot is learning to stereotype by appearance or particular 
qualities. While we recognize that stereotypes persist among many cultures of humor, 
the lines along which people are divided are especially illustrative of who is 
considered and “insider” and who is an “outsider” of the particular culture, 
community, or nation.  
In the Soviet-era anekdot, the “unmarked voice” was that of the Russian man. 
When other social groups or characters were included, they were explicitly gendered 
and racialized in terms of their nationality or geographical region. Such focus on the 
“other” served to simultaneously circumscribe the “we,” and solidify a collective 
identity. Unlike those categories defined and applied by an external actor (e.g. the 
state), the identity described through negation in the anekdot was arguably reflective 
of the performer and audiences’ “self-understanding.”  In this dissertation, I explore 
anekdoty about the Georgian, the Chukchi, the Jew, and the American in greater 
depth. I chose these four groups based upon their popularity among anekdoty despite 
being some of the least populous (Jews), or with whom Russians had the least 
personal contact (Georgians, Chukchi, Americans). By looking at these cycles of 
anekdoty, we get a better sense of how this humor engages with power structures. 
Specifically, ethnic humor that operates along those lines of distinction 
institutionalized by Soviet policy  
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Georgians 
 There were few jokes about Georgians before the death of Stalin in 1953 
(Bradenberger 2009), which may be related to the fact that Georgia was a highly 
nationalist nation-state to the South with whom Russians rarely came into contact 
(Draitser 1998). They were a distinct group, but did not serve to threaten the Russian 
collective and therefore were absent from the nationalist discourse. After Stalin’s 
death, the Soviet government lifted its ban against private enterprise, allowing small 
businesses such as fruit and flower stands to reopen while the state continued to 
control banks, foreign trade, and large industries.  This was when Russians first had 
exposure to the Georgians and other Southern nationalities who were granted 
permission to open small privately owned enterprises for profit (Brandenberger 
2009).  
Georgians look very different from Russians with their dark skin and dark 
bushy mustaches and large oversized hats. As such, they were very visible on the 
streets selling fruit and other southern produce. Although less than one percent of the 
Georgian population was involved in this business, the contrast between these 
presumed-to-be prosperous southern foreigners and the struggling Russians fueled an 
animosity between these two groups (Draitser 1998). The Georgian was often 
described in anekdoty as the worm in the large cap, which served to identify them by 
the large hats they stereotypically wore and the negative feelings towards the group as 
worms who steal from the Russians in duplicitous ways. Russians also participated in 
various “second economies” or “black markets” in order to alleviate consumer 
shortages and bureaucratic bottlenecks, but only Georgians were depicted as 
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materialistic in nature since they appeared to be more successful in these economic 
activities. This negative stereotype was strengthened by the fact that those Georgians 
who did make good money tended to spend the money in Russian cities where they 
were visible to envious Russians, whereas those Russians who made good money, 
spend their money in Yalta, the Crimea or the Caucuses (Draitser 1998).  
An example of this depiction of Georgians as money-hungry and dumb is as 
follows: 
In a school in the republic of Georgia the teacher asked the students to tell 
about their fathers. 
"Turashvili, tell us about your father." 
"My father grows oranges. He takes them to Moscow, sells there and makes 
good money." 
"Now you, Beridze." 
"My father grows laurel leaves. He takes them to Moscow, sells there, and 
makes good money." 
"Now you, Klividze." 
"My father works in the Division for the Fight Against Embezzlements and 
Speculations. When Beridze's and Turashvili's fathers go to Moscow, they 
always first see my father. So he makes good money." 
"Now you, Chavchavadze." 
"My father is a chemical engineer." 
The class burst in laughter. 
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"Children," the teacher said. "It's not nice to laugh at someone else’s 
misfortune."  
In Russia, a chemical engineer is the most prestigious profession one could achieve. 
When children take their entrance exams in the seventh grade, only those with the 
highest scores can go on to engineering school. Despite its prestige, engineers in 
Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union struggled to survive on their wages just like 
all those in other professions. As such, selling fruit—a commodity virtually absent 
during Soviet shortages and therefore an extreme luxury—was considered more 
impressive, even if it is perceived to be a result of fortunate happenstance rather than 
a product of intelligence or achievement. Other anekdoty expand upon the stereotype 
of greedy, overindulgent Georgians by highlighting their dishonest means and 
condescension in relation to the poorer Russian  
In a church, a Georgian prays for money to buy a car. Next to him, a Russian 
prays for half a liter of vodka. Finally, the Georgian gets annoyed and gives 
the Russian ten rubles: “Listen, get yourself a bottle and don’t bother God 
with your trifles.” 
This anekdot simultaneously reifies three elements in the cultural consciousness: the 
insensitive and greedy Georgian, the alcoholic Russian, and the lingering of religious 
traditions in an officially atheist empire. This joke reveals and highlights race-based 
stereotypes, but also gives us an insider view into an everyday landscape in a Church 
where Russians and Georgians still believe in God despite the public Soviet rhetoric 
that seeks to portray the opposite.  Another anekdot about Georgian wealth makes 
reference to a Russian proverb about morality: 
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A Georgian barges into a restaurant, takes a seat at a table, and lets fall with 
a thud a huge, dirty suitcase on a snow-white tablecloth. A waiter approaches 
him:  
“Shame on you! To drop your dirty suitcase on a clean tablecloth!” 
“What’s with you dear man? Where do you see a suitcase? It’s my wallet.”  
This anekdot plays upon two Russian proverbs about quick money that involves 
“raking in the rubles by the suitcase” and that the “Russian way” is clean like a 
tablecloth, unlike the dirty ways of the Georgians (Draitser 1998). Each of these 
anekdoty portray the Georgian’s success and prosperity as an exploitation of the more 
intelligent and honest Russian. In other words, Russians’ poverty is explained as the 
pilfering by other Soviet nationalities, therefore casting blame of the Soviet failures 
upon these outgroups.  
 
Jews 
Some people have argued that anekdoty about Jews are so popular and 
numerous due to the fact that the bulk of anekdoty are authored by Jews (Davies 
2002; Draitser 1998), or that they were the most hated group by the Russians (Pinkus 
1988; Gitleman 1972), and therefore take the perspective of this group more seriously 
and/or take them as objects of ridicule more frequently than others. Jews were 
numerous among the intelligentsia (Hoffman 1980) and since Marx was a Jew, many 
of those anekdoty highlighting the destructiveness of Marxism or the Party find ways 
to cast the blame upon Jews for orchestrating the Soviet agenda. The following 
anekdot articulates this sentiment: 
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Really those Jews—for themselves they invented Zionism and for the others—
Marxism. 
 This anekdot expresses the popular opinion that Jews were responsible for the 
Soviet experiment (Marx was a Jew) and that they could leave once their experiment 
had gone awry (by immigrating to Israel or the U.S.). Out of the 19 national or ethnic 
groups mentioned in the anekdoty, Jews were in more than a quarter of them. 
Although Jews were a very small minority in the USSR, they were very visible and 
salient because of their distinctive accomplishments and recognition before the law. 
Jews typically had much higher levels education and occupational achievement, and 
in response, Stalin reinstated an educational quota
20
 in order to restrict the number of 
spots in prestigious universities that Jews could occupy. This quota involved total 
prohibition of Jewish students from particular schools or occupations or it strictly 
limited the number of Jewish students in order to make sure the percentage of Jewish 
students did not surpass the percentage of Jews in the population. The impact of this 
policy was severe: in 1935 the Jewish enrollment in Soviet universities was 13% of 
the population, but by the 1960s it dropped drastically to little more than 3% 
(Palomino 2007).  
The "appointments policy" further institutionalized such discrimination by 
excluding Jews from all key policy-making positions. Whereas the percentage of 
Jews in the Central Committee of the Communist Party was 10.8% in 1939, by 1970 
only one Jew remained in the Central Committee. There were no Jews in the 
                                                 
20
 Imperial Russia enacted an educational quota in 1887 restricting the share of Jewish students to 
10% in cities where Jews were allowed to live, 5% in other cities, and only 3% in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. This was repealed in 1917 after the revolution, but then reinstated by Stalin. 
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Politburo or the top levels of the Secretariat and in the sensitive areas of diplomacy, 
security, foreign trade, and military affairs there were virtually no Jews, at the top 
levels there was none at all (Palomino 2007). 
 The passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in 1974 that enabled Jews to 
leave Russia only intensified and solidified the resentment of this group even further. 
One anekdot makes particular fun of this, 
In the beginning of the emigration of the Jews, Brezhnev asks a KGB worker: 
- How many Jews are there in the USSR now? 
- I think about two million. 
- And if we let them emigrate freely, how many do you think may leave? 
- I think between five and six million. 
“Rabinovich” is one of the most popular characters in the Russian anekdoty; 
he is used as a character that stereotypes Jews as smart and crafty in finding 
improbable sources of income, being cheap and stingy in some contexts, and, in 
earlier genres, strongly hating the Soviet government (Draitser 1998). One of these 
anti-Soviet jokes involves Rabinovich discussing the relationship between Jews and 
Russia with Pamyat, a Russian ultra-nationalist group:  
Pamyat: Pamyat headquarters, what is the nature of your inquiry?  
Rabinovich: Is it true that Jews sold Russia out?  
Pamyat: Damn right!  
Rabinovich: Great! Could you tell me where I might get my share?  
Many other anekdoty cast the Jew as cheap and money-obsessed. This stereotype 
stems from the perception in of Jews as the rich money-grubbing bankers and 
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lawyers, and from their high educational and occupational attainment in Russia and 
other countries. The thrifty stereotype also stems from the historical condition of 
Russians and Jews alike in which food and necessities were scarce—yet the Jew is 
disproportionately the centerpiece in these narratives that seek to highlight poverty 
that all groups experienced under Soviet rule. Compounded with institutionalized 
anti-Semitism, frugality was necessity rather than a talent.  
“Abraham, I saved five kopecks” 
“How did you do that?” 
“I ran behind a tram.” 
“Well, you would have saved more if you ran behind a taxi”  
The above narrative involves a creative and positive interpretation of a 
potentially anti-Semitic event. Denied entrance to the tram because he was a Jew, the 
narrator “saved five kopecks” because he had to run after it instead of paying to ride 
inside.  This witty interpretation of an unfortunate series of events mimics the way by 
which anekdoty served as a coping mechanism during difficult times—re-casting 
misfortune as humorous or even advantageous. The anekdot also draws upon the 
classic stereotype of the cheap Jew who seeks all opportunities to save money.  
Another anekdot that makes light of a serious issue while simultaneously drawing 
upon the stereotype of the cheap Jew is the one below: 
--Rabinovich, where are you going with all of that toilet paper?! 
--To the dry cleaners! 
This narrative finds a way to make people laugh about the shortages that were 
common during Soviet times, by showing how the frugal yet wily Jew is able to come 
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up with a solution to this issue. Most Soviets used old newspapers cut up in squares in 
place of toilet paper during such shortages.  Although this was not a laughing matter 
in the daily struggle with such scarcity and famine, anekdoty afforded people a way to 
release the stress and anger associated with these conditions. Although the expression 
of coping strategies and daily struggles were discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Four, we see how these narratives sometimes employ identity markers (above) and 
sometimes without (below):  
Question: What is more useful — a newspaper or television?  
A: A newspaper, of course. You cannot wipe yourself with a TV.  
(An alternative response was: You cannot wrap herring in a TV).  
This anekdot highlights how traditional or intended purposes of items are 
useless in the dysfunctional world of the Soviet Union. While a television was a 
luxury in other parts of the world, it was not practical or as enjoyable for the Soviet 
people for a number of reasons. In order to understand these reasons, one must 
understand just how strictly controlled media outlets were under Soviet rule. 
Everything published in a newspaper or broadcast on one of the few channels of 
television was controlled by the State. The media was a propaganda machine. As 
such, the idea of the newspaper or television as entertainment or enlightenment is an 
idea that comes from a non-totalitarian place in which uncensored ideas can be freely 
exchanged.  The other reason that such luxuries like a television were humored to be 
useless is that people living with shortages and famines had much more pressing 
needs than that of a television. There were documented shortages or absences of toilet 
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paper in the Soviet bloc for almost all of the 20
th
 Century therefore, the need for such 
a basic amenity was much greater than that which could be provided via television.   
The theme of money is common among ethnic jokes, sometimes in regards to 
spending habits (such as the stereotype of the cheap Jew) and others about economic 
advantages of some groups over others (Georgians or other caucus ethnic groups). If 
we were to glean economic situations from these narratives, we would assume that 
the Georgian was incredibly successful and the Jew incredibly poor, though neither 
stereotype holds. Instead, Georgians and Jews were in similar financial situations as 
Russians—struggling to survive in an impoverished economy and scarcity of basic 
staples (Draitser 1998). By casting Georgians or Jews in such economic terms, 
Russians could focus blame on these groups, rather than upon other Russians or the 
Soviet state which privileged Russians in a number of socio-political ways (Laitin 
1998; Brandenberger 2002). 
Although the anekdot is anonymous by definition, there were many 
researchers who believed that a large contingent was written by the intelligentsia or 
Jews (Lauchlan 2009).  Lauchlan (2009) argues that Jews brought to Russia their 
brand of humor which highlights the irony of being God’s chosen while suffering 
centuries of repression. He argues that this type of humor was popular among Russian 
“proletariats” who now similarly were a “chosen people” excluded from power. The 
richest source of this humor was the intelligentsia. They turned to joke-telling after 
Stalin subordinated Russian writers by making them work as part of the industrial 
planning. As a result, writers could either devote their writing to the celebration of 
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Soviet power or they could live backstage and make their commentary in private 
(Lauchlan 2009). 
The source of authorship is significant in that anekdoty about Jews might be 
divided into two categories—those authored by Jews themselves (which casts the 
group in a more positive light) and those authored by Russians as a means of 
constructing Jews as an out-group from their collectivity. Although both 
subcategories construct the Jews as a distinct non-Russian ethnic group, the ways by 
which they do it—from an external source (Russians) or as an internal self-definition 
(Jews)—might emphasize negative or positive stereotypes respectively. Although this 
study cannot distinguish which jokes are told by anti-Semites and which are told by 
Jews, all of these jokes show cynicism, self-irony and wit that are characteristic of 
Jewish humor both in Russia and other parts of the world (Davies 2002; Hoffman 
1980; Nevo 1985). The jokes are usually told with a stereotypical Jewish accent or 
mixed with Yiddish phrases. The following anekdot speaks to anti-Semitism and the 
trend of Jewish migration from Russia to Israel or the United States in the late 70s 
and early 80s. 
 - How does a smart Jew talk to a stupid Jew? 
- By telephone, from New York to Moscow! 
This anekdot implies that only a stupid Jew would stay in Russia where s/he is must 
endure anti-Semitism in addition to the regular hardships that all Russians faced 
under Soviet power. There were a fair number of anekdoty about immigration. This 
was especially the case after the state of Israel was established in 1948 and the “Law 
of Return” was passed in 1950 granting every Jew the right to settle in Israel. Despite 
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the establishment of a Jewish country and the implementation of the “Law of Return,” 
the Soviet Union continued to bar such emigration.  In fact, Brezhnev’s “diploma tax” 
forced those who wished to emigrate from the Soviet Union to pay a “tax” back to the 
state for the “free” higher education they received under the Soviet system. This 
legislation particularly targeted Jews who disproportionately attended college and 
graduate school.  This was a fee that almost no one living in the USSR could afford to 
pay.  In 1974 the Jackson–Vanik amendment was passed by the United States, 
legislation that dramatically changed the situation for Jews in the USSR. The 
amendment restricted trade to those socialist countries which restricted emigration 
and other human rights to its people. Although the law made no mention of the Jews 
specifically, this group particularly benefited from its passage, since the Soviet 
government had to allow Jews to leave if they wanted to maintain “most favored 
nation” trading status with the United States (Korey 1988; Jochnick 1991). By 1975, 
over half a million refugees (e.g. Jews, Catholics and evangelical Christians) had 
immigrated from the Soviet Union to the U.S. and over a million Jews to Israel 
(Korey 1988). 
Although the majority of the anekdoty narratives dealt with Jewish 
immigration to Israel or the US, there were an increasing number that dealt with a 
unanimous desire to immigrate away from Soviet power as illustrated in the anekdot 
below.  
 - What is the “Soviet choice”? 
- It’s the choice between standing in the waiting line to buy vodka or the 
waiting line to leave USSR. 
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Although the majority of jokes about immigration were also explicitly about Jews, the 
desire to leave the Soviet Union was not something limited to this social group. 
Instead we see a considerable envy articulated in these narratives. The anekdot below 
specifically illustrates how discriminated against Jews were in Soviet Russia, and yet 
how they were still a source of envy: 
On a cold winter day, a rumor spreads through the city that meat will be 
available the next day at the butcher's shop. Thousands go directly to the store 
and wait in line. 
After some time, the butcher comes out and says, "Comrades, I've just had a 
call from the Party Central Committee: it turns out there won't be enough 
meat for everyone, so all the Jews in line should go home." The Jews leave 
and the rest wait. 
After a few more hours, the butcher comes out again: "Comrades, the Central 
Committee called again. It turns out there still won’t be enough meat for 
everyone, if you are not a member of the Communist party, you should go 
home.” All the non-communists go home.  
After a few more hours the butcher comes out again and says, “Comrades, the 
Central Committee called again. It turns out there won’t be any meat.” The 
crowd disperses, grumbling how “Those Jews always get all the luck!” 
The irony of this anekdot is stark.  It reflects the perspective of the Jew, who is a 
constant target of discrimination and hatred, but who cannot complain or receive pity 
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since they are the “lucky ones.” Even in these cases of overt discrimination (as most 
forms were since Anti-Semitism was institutionalized and supported by the Soviet 
state), Jews were constructed as having an advantage over Russians. 
 The popularity of anekdoty about the Jews above all else may be in part a 
reflection of how targeted this group was in Party propaganda. Although some argue 
that these politics of defending identities makes it difficult for the creation of cross-
group coalitions needed to build a movement for progressive change (Epstein 2000; 
Gitlin 1993), others argue that a group is only able to achieve the recognition 
necessary for social action once it has established a firm identity, even if it is 
essentialist or exclusionary in nature (Carroll and Ratner 1996: 618). The “we” that 
these movements construct is adversarial, in that it defines a “we” and an “other.” 
This other includes other social groups who are not included in the collective identity, 
but it also includes the State and other political entities with whom the “we” is 
negotiating for power over resources and self-definition.  
 
Americans 
Anekdoty about Americans accounted for 26% of anekdoty about national groups; this 
was the second most popular group in the sample. What is distinctive about jokes 
about Americans is that they are not as negative compared to other outgroups. 
Although Soviet propaganda constructed the US at the major adversary of the USSR 
(as did the US about the USSR), according to these discourses, it is not clear that this 
negative sentiment was internalized by Russians. Instead, we see quite a bit of envy 
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and respect for Americans and for capitalism as a more successful political ideology 
than communism. The anekdot below captures the contrast between perceived 
impending doom for Russians living under communism and the security of 
Americans living under capitalism: 
Rabinovich works at the Kremlin. He sits on Spasskaya bashne to see into the 
distance and signal the approach of communism.  
The Americans try to win him over and have him sit on the Empire State 
building and warn/anticipate of the approach of an economic crisis. 
No, responded Rabinovich, I need steady work. 
The butt of the anekdot is the greedy Jew, but the narrative also casts the Soviet 
project as stalled and unproductive, in contrast to the successful endeavors of 
American capitalism.  Not only were Russians wary of their own political regime, but 
they were also cognizant of the warped, inaccurate portrayal of reality that was 
disseminated by the state in textbooks, films or newspapers. This made it difficult for 
Russians to be able to accurately compare the merits or weaknesses of two political 
systems since they had little-to-no information about how the two systems actually 
operated. The absence of reliable sources of information resulted in cynicism about 
the communist vision, but also suspicion toward Soviet authorities. The anekdot 
below articulates this sentiment.  
There is a track competition between the USSR and the USA. There are two 
runners. The American wins. The Russian newspaper reports: “In the 100 
meter dash, the representative from our country was one of the first to cross 
the finish line. The American was second to last.” 
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Although Soviet propaganda sought to promote Americans as greedy, exploitive and 
power-hungry, Russians continued to understand Americans as wealthy, powerful and 
secure, in a position worthy of envy. The narrative makes it clear that Russians are 
not duped by the newspaper’s false presentation of reality. Everything must be read 
with a critical eye and a grain of salt.  
Yuri Andropov was visiting a collective farm to check on the progress of his 
announced reforms. 
“Do you have a house?” he asked the farmer. 
“Yes.” 
“Do you have a car?” 
“Yes, oh yes.” 
“Do you have money?” 
“Yes, of course.” 
“Do you know who I am?” the Premier inquired. 
“You’re an American spy!” the farmer declared. 
“How dare you say that?” the former KGB chief huffed as he reeled back in 
shocked amazement. 
“Because any real Soviet would know we don’t have shit!” 
 
After the lecture on the topic of “Overtake and surpass America,” a Jew asks 
the presenter: 
“Could you, please, tell me - when we catch up with America, can we stay 
there?” 
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An unemployed American wanted to dramatize his plight a handful of hay, sat 
at the gates of the White House and began eating it. 
Soon the president came out and inquired about the strange demonstration. 
“I’m hungry. I have no work. And I have no money to buy food,” the man 
declared. 
The President was embarrassed and instructed his strange demonstration. 
“I’m hungry. I have no work. And I have no money to buy food,” the man 
declared. 
The President was embarrassed and instructed his aides to feed the man and 
help him find a decent job. 
Word of this immediately spread to the Soviet Union and an enterprising 
Muscovite thought he would try the same at the Kremlin. 
He took a handful of hay and started munching on it. 
Soon Cherenkov came out and demanded to know what the Muscovite was 
doing. 
“I’m hungry. I have no work. And I have no money to buy food,” the 
Muscovite declared. 
“Idiot!” replied Cherenkov. “It’s summer now! You should be eating grass! 
Save the hay for winter!” 
 
Russians laughed about how dire their situation was in comparison to even the most 
unfortunate in the rest of the world. In contrast to those anekdoty that characterized 
Chukchi, Georgians, and Jews as “other,” anekdoty do not construct Americans as 
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intrinsically different. Rather Americans are fashioned as more fortunate than 
Russians as a result of living under a more equitable and prosperous political regime. 
In many ways, anekdoty express envy and aspiration of Americans as opposed to 
distrust or bitterness. This is an important finding, in that we see how these narratives 
enabled Russians to challenge and/or counterbalance propagandistic depictions of the 
United States with their own perceptions. Russians did not perceive Americans to be 
the enemy as the Soviet power tried to construct them as, but rather as a group of 
people living under a freer and more prosperous political system. 
This is Armenian Radio! Our listeners asked us: What is the difference 
between the constitutions of the USA and the USSR? Both guarantee the 
freedom of speech. 
Our answer: Yes, but the USA’s constitution guarantees freedom after speech. 
This characterization of Americans and life in the US has a resistant quality in nature. 
It rejects the state-disseminated discourse and presents a different interpretation of the 
situation. This presentation of self-definition and popular construction of knowledge 
and “truth” is a demonstration of everyday resistance and collective empowerment. 
 
Women 
 
Women were considered to be central to the communist mission, yet in practice, 
neither the professed equality nor respect was provided for Russian women. In both 
Marx’s and Lenin’s writings, the role of women in bringing about and sustaining the 
revolution is emphasized. Their equality was also a central goal of the movement.  In 
1919, a year after the October Revolution, Lenin proudly wrote: 
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Take the position of women. In this field, not a single democratic party in the 
world, not even in the most advanced bourgeois republic, has done in decades 
so much as a hundredth part of what [the Soviet Union] did in [its] very first 
year in power. [The Soviet Union] really razed to the ground the infamous 
laws placing women in a position of inequality, restricting divorce and 
surrounding it with disgusting formalities, denying recognition to children 
born out of wedlock, enforcing a search for their fathers, etc., laws numerous 
survivals of which, to the shame of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism, are to be 
found in all civilized countries (Lenin 1977: 65). 
These accomplishments went into effect soon after the revolution. Less than two 
months after the revolution, civil marriage replaced the rule of the church, in less than 
a year a marriage code was written that ensured complete equality of rights between 
husband and wife. Divorce was made very simple: if the two parties both agreed, 
dissolution took place on the spot.  If only one of them wanted the divorce, there was 
a brief court hearing.  When a couple decided to marry, they could choose to take 
either the male or female’s surname. Abortion was legalized and women were given 
equality in education. Without gender equality, the communist mission could not be 
achieved (Cliff 1984). 
 Despite official ideology and initial laws that sought to ensure and protect 
women’s rights, in practice, most Soviet women did not enjoy the same position as 
men in society, or within the family. Women earned less than men across the board, 
and while women were numerous in fields such as health care, medicine, education, 
and economics, very few occupied the most prestigious or highest-paying positions. 
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Women were also conspicuously underrepresented in the leadership in the communist 
party (Buckley 1981). 
 The status of women in the Soviet Union was very similar to the status of food 
or freedom: propaganda painted one picture, whereas lived reality diverged sharply. 
In propaganda that was shown domestically and abroad, women were depicted as 
upstanding communists and soldiers in the war of communism, yet motherhood 
became a central theme of propaganda. Gender equality in education, the workplace, 
and in the home was revoked after Stalin came to power. Abortion was outlawed, 
girls were forced to study home economics and other domestic work as part of their 
schooling, families were paid to have more children, and women received prizes for 
bearing greater quantities of them (Schlesinger 1949).  As one slogan read: “A 
woman without children merits our pity, for she does not know the full joy of life. 
Our Soviet women, full-blooded citizens of the freest country in the world, have been 
given the bliss of motherhood” (Schlesinger 1949). Women could be equal in the 
workplace, but only if they fulfilled all of their duties at home.  
 Tensions between men and women are expressed in a number of anekdoty, 
which cast women as sex-crazed, money hungry and dumb, yet somehow manages to 
turn situations to her advantage: controlling her husband, her lover, and her children. 
She is simultaneously weak and powerful—a reflection of the contradictions between 
ideology, law and practice in Soviet society more generally. 
 The disparagement of women is common to anekdoty. Unlike racial or class 
oppression that historically constructs concrete communities among racial and ethnic 
groups or divides classes by virtue of economic means, because gender cross-cuts 
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these structures, women lack such community recognition or support and they have 
fewer institutional opportunities for resistance. Patricia Hill Collins (1990) argues 
that, “gender oppression seems better able to annex the basic power of the erotic and 
intrude in personal relationships via family dynamics and within individual 
consciousness” (p. 226). This is in part because of gender crosscuts these structures of 
race and class as the existing community structures provide a primary line of 
resistance against racial and class oppression but not gender oppression. Collins 
argues that instead of focusing on these segmented forces of oppression, we would 
better understand power if we conceptualize it as a matrix of domination, in which 
different people and populations exist at the intersection of multiple forms of 
oppression.  
 Domination does not only operate by structuring power from the top down but 
through the simultaneous cooptation of the power of those on the bottom to subjugate 
subgroups of this population. Although Russian women were privileged as an ethnic 
group in Soviet culture, their financial situation was equally as dire as other groups 
and as women they denied a voice as they were reduced to sexual objects without 
capacity for creative or political expression. Many anekdoty that focus upon women 
involve sex, the narratives portray women as simple-minded, greedy, over-sexed, and 
as objects whose value comes from their bodies as opposed to their brains.  Every sort 
of immoral behavior or poor character trait that is cast upon other ethnic groups is 
also cast upon the women. Below are a few examples:  
A writer is complaining. 
“Out of all my books, the only thing my wife is interested in is my checkbook.” 
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A drunk man is on a bus filled with women. He starts to yell out:  
“Those in front of me are fools and those behind me are sluts.” 
Silence. At the next bus stop, he repeats,  
“Those in front of me are fools and those behind me are sluts.” 
Silence. Again, at the next bus stop he says, 
“Those in front of me are fools and those behind me are sluts.” 
Finally a woman replies to him, “How can you say that? I have been married 
for 20 years to the same man and never cheated on him!” 
“Well then, you’re a fool. Move to the front of the bus.” 
 
“People, I saved a woman from being raped last night.” 
“How’d you manage to do it?” 
“I managed to persuade her.” 
 
Two guys are talking: 
“What is the most important part of a woman’s face?” 
“Her mouth.” 
“What do you mean by that? Her lips or her teeth in a smile?” 
“None of that matters. The most important part is that it is closed.” 
Women are recurrently depicted as superficial, greedy, and horny in the narratives. 
This construction of gender serves to create and recreate stereotypes about Russian 
women and their role in society. The second anekdot presents the stereotype of 
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women as a catch-22: women are either a fool or a slut, it is impossible to be neither. 
According to the communist doctrine women should be treated as equals to men, yet 
in practice we see how this is not always the case. These narratives similarly reflect 
this push-pull dynamic of women who are portrayed as dumb and obedient or as 
smart, manipulative sluts. This dichotomous choice constructs the dumb and 
compliant women as morally superior, a value judgment that reveals the preferred 
position of women in society. The final anekdot is particularly elucidative of the role 
that women were expected to play in society—voiceless and under the direction of 
her male counterpart.  
 Although we have no idea of knowing exactly what proportion of women and 
men told anekdoty, in the descriptions often given—of three men drinking vodka and 
exchanging anekdoty—it is likely that more men exchanged these narratives than 
their female counterparts. What is noteworthy is that although women are portrayed 
as stupid, sex-crazed and immoral, they are also considered powerful enough to be 
blamed for male problems such as alcoholism and impotence. The sense of 
helplessness that emerged during Soviet times resulted in such anekdoty. Men were 
frustrated in that they were unable to fulfill the role of the breadwinner or sexual 
commander; therefore they were unable to feel fully masculine in the way that the 
culture pressured them to do so.  
“You! Do you love me?” a woman asks her husband 
And he replies, “Why do I have to do everything your way?”  
 
After the wedding, the groom admits to his bride: 
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“I’m sorry, dearest, but I am paying alimony for two children.” 
“There’s nothing to be afraid of, sweetheart, it just so happens that I am 
receiving alimony for two children!” 
 
A wife asks her husband to fix the faucet and toilet. Her husband snarls: 
“What do I look like to you, a mechanic or something?” 
The next day, the husband came home and saw that everything was fixed. The 
wife responded that the neighbor came over, fixed everything, and for his 
work asked her to sing for him or… 
“And you did what?” 
“What do I look like to you, a singer or something?” 
These non-traditional narratives portray the woman as in control. Her power comes 
from sex and the ability to manipulate men. Although she is cast as immoral, greedy 
and loose, she is able to control the situation and the men in her life with her body. 
She is given power, but only if she accepts the definition of her power as sex-based. 
This negates her ability to self-define and resist gender oppression. This construction 
of women also pits the genders against each other. Although they may be brushed off 
as “just a joke,” is evident that the traditional roles of men and women continue to 
permeate the Soviet discourse of gender and family politics and as a result women are 
caught in an intersecting logic of subjugation. 
 
 In this chapter, I have traced the way by which different ethnic, national, and 
gendered groups have been constructed by anekdoty and how Russians understood 
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their community in relationship to these different social groups and to the State. In 
these narratives there is the adoption and internalization of state discourse and state 
definition of “others,” but there is also a resistance and redefinition of some of these 
groups.  There are both supportive and resistant qualities to these narratives and 
divergent sentiments expressed in these stories: envy, disgust, respect, 
embarrassment, and contempt. This is significant in that the relationship between 
Russians and these other groups expressed in anekdoty is much more complex than it 
may have been deciphered or measured based upon policy, media depictions or 
accounts inter-ethnic violence. If we understand collective identity as relational in 
nature, the idea that we understand who we are in contrast with the “others” around 
us, then who these “others” are, is very important to the process of self-definition. 
Anekdoty reflect an alternative understanding of identity to the dominant one 
promulgated by the regime, they reflect the fluency in a cultural consciousness that 
engages in self-definition and power politics at a number of different levels. 
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Chapter 7 Where have all the Anekdoty Gone? 
 
The legacy of the Soviet State continues to affect the lives of contemporary 
Russians in a multitude of ways. As an example, Soviet law required that workers be 
able to march to work, therefore many mining labor camps were built directly over 
the mines. As a result, sinkholes (where the land caves into old holes/mines under the 
earth) have become common hazards in Russian mining regions where miners 
burrowed into layers of soluble minerals over the last century. In the town of 
Berezniki, south of the Ural Mountains, this problem has been exacerbated in recent 
years, where massive chasms hundreds of feet deep run the risk of opening at any 
moment. In an interview with the New York Times, one resident of Berezniki, 
Tatyana Shishkina, explained, “We are afraid but don’t know what to do. The mayor 
says one thing, people say another. We are confused.” Tatyana was interviewed in her 
living room where the ceiling is cracked and appears as though it were about to 
collapse. The situation in Berezniki can be understood as a metaphor for living 
conditions in both Soviet and contemporary Russia. People were aware shaky ground, 
cracks in the foundation, walls, and ceilings, yet how to escape the associated 
impending doom, remained unclear. The government said one thing, people said 
another, and the result was confusion. In such a situation, people are left to create 
their own community as both a system of support and a network of credible 
information. 
 There are many stories like this one about the situation in contemporary 
Russia. In a recent trend, official publications have constructed Vladimir Putin as a 
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superhero, wrestling sharks with his bare hands and excavating thousand-year-old 
artifacts in the ocean (Barry 2011).  In these stories, the work of animal trainers or 
archeologists is removed from the story, enabling the narrative of a single superhero 
politician to take stage—a narrative not that unlike Soviet propaganda about Lenin’s 
or Stalin’s accomplishments. In many of these stories, the lines between truth and 
reality are blurred if not erased entirely. When asked about whether they believe the 
presentation of Putin’s feats in State media, Russians will tell you that the 
contemporary situation is no different from during Soviet times when reading 
between the lines and reinterpreting the “truth” as the Party told it was a 
commonplace survival skill. In order to navigate through these accounts that often 
have little overlap with reality, Russians have had to develop their own networks and 
tactics for excavating truths and coping with the hardships of daily life. 
In this dissertation, I explored the multiple articulations of power and 
resistance in the Russo-Soviet anekdot. I accomplished this by tracing the contours of 
the collective identity that was expressed in anekdoty, as well as its constituent 
discourses that are both reifying of and resistant to Soviet power.  I demonstrated how 
these discourses articulated a political identity engaged in multiple power moves: 
directly challenging the state in some narratives, defining and centering a Russian 
nationhood that excluded particular racialized and gendered outgroups, as well as 
describing the various coping strategies of citizens who lived in a dysfunctional 
political and ideological system. The discourses expressed in anekdot narratives 
reflect a cultural consciousness, a self-awareness, self-definition, and a historical-
cultural situatedness within ongoing power struggles. 
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The boundaries of the Russian collective identity were maintained through 
those narratives that sought to mark and exclude. The Russian identity is constructed 
in opposition to racial, ethnic, national, or gendered “others,” as well as the Party, the 
Soviet State, and social problems more generally. Not all of these discursive moves 
were political with a capital P, but they all engaged in the re-negotiation of the socio-
political power structure through their involvement of institutions, ideologies, or 
social and political actors. Through the above analysis and discussion, I offer a new 
interpretation of this folklore that permeated Russian cities and villages under Soviet 
rule.  I illustrated how together the discourses of anekdoty expressed a cultural 
consciousness that reflected a collective identity, a collective memory, a coping 
mechanism, and expressions of everyday resistance against State power.  This 
systematic analysis was made possible by the large sample afforded by these 
published compilations, in that I was able to quantify themes and understand which 
subjects were particularly popular in Soviet anekdoty. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to this study that focuses upon 
published forms of this oral folklore. Although Soviet anekdoty were defined by their 
oral and unpublished structure—as forbidden gestures and expressions under severe 
censorship and admonishment—studying the folklore in written form afforded a 
systematic analysis that would not have been possible otherwise. If this study was 
conducted through interviews or ethnographic collection of anekdoty, such a macro 
analysis would not have been possible. This is true for several reasons. Firstly, 
memory tends to be fairly inaccurate measure of truth. For instance, the narratives we 
recall might be a product of our current situation—issues that are salient and 
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meaningful to us now may not be the same issues that were meaningful to us at a 
previous time, when we initially heard and told anekdoty. Not only may we 
misattribute importance to some narratives over others, but we also may entirely 
forget particular anekdoty in a present context in which those jokes are no longer 
meaningful, since its relevance is tied to its historical and cultural context.  
Secondly, studying anekdoty in written form reduces the likelihood that 
mistakes are made in the recording of these narratives. Across collections there were 
many repeated anekdoty, narratives with similar meaning, but with slight variations. 
If the anekdoty were collected entirely from recollection, such differences may have 
been erased due to memory or the process of recording.  
Finally, as previously discussed, anekdoty are shared among insiders, they are 
only shared among trusted friends and family. Although the legal repercussions for 
telling anekdoty have declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, informal 
policing of “appropriate” humor continues today. As such, it would be unlikely as an 
American female that I would have been privy to the same narratives that I found in 
these published works. People often tell anekdoty that they believe their audience will 
find amusing, therefore the nationality, ethnicity, religion, or gender of a person often 
determines the type of anekdoty s/he would be told. For a researcher, this might 
translate into over- or under-sampling of particular subjects. Since this research 
project focused upon the relationships between different types of anekdoty and their 
subjects of ridicule, studying them in compilations proved more fruitful, than doing 
so through interviews 
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Although studying anekdoty compilations was beneficial in this study, there 
were also some disadvantages and challenges that should be addressed. To begin, 
how people used anekdoty, in what contexts, and with whom they were shared, are 
issues that could only be speculated upon based upon previous scholarship. The 
height of anekdoty exchange occurred at a time when the activity was forbidden and 
when it would have been impossible to conduct a formalized ethnographic or 
interview study in Russia. In order to understand these relationships, it was necessary 
to supplement my research with testimonies of Soviet citizens who engaged in 
anekdot exchange. The relationship between selected anekdoty and context in which 
they told, in regards to audience and precipitating event, is something that cannot be 
ascertained by this study and therefore serves as a limitation. The limitations of this 
study could not been resolved through interviews or ethnographic work because we 
are dealing with a historical phenomenon.  
Future work might make more extensive use of diaries or other archival 
material to supplement the arguments with individual voices and perspectives on the 
matter. These personal accounts may make it possible to measure change over time 
and explore how opinions of Soviet leadership and power changed over the years. 
This study utilized historical textbooks or official Soviet publications to contextualize 
the narratives, but the perspectives of the people who actually engaged in anekdot are 
underrepresented. As such, the conclusions we can draw about how these narratives 
affected one’s experienced collective identity are limited. 
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The incongruity between official and unofficial discourses is a key component 
of this Russian identity, particularly as expressed in anekdoty. Although Soviet 
discourse described Russians as a powerful and successful people, anekdoty offered 
an alternative insider perspective of life behind the curtain, a description that often 
revealed intimate social problems, embarrassment and insecurity. These narratives 
capture something that no official narrative can do: they show how Russian political 
identity was enmeshed with the incongruences and lived realities of live under Soviet 
rule, irrespective of the outward political ideology. They also illustrate how national 
sentiments remained strong among Russian men, through a process of outgrouping 
and scapegoating other ethnic and national groups. Women were also constructed as 
“outsiders” who were not centered in the Russian national collective. Together, these 
anekdoty reveal rhetorical negotiations with Soviet power, social problems, as well as 
ethnic, national, and gendered “others,” that were necessary in order to produce the 
contours of a Russian political identity. This work contributes to research about 
gendered nationalism: how national identities rely upon modern logic of 
identification, subjugation and exclusion of particular subgroups. 
Anekdoty also articulate a type of everyday resistance, not unlike the types 
explored by James Scott, Javier Auyero, and Patricia Hill Collins. This form of social 
action is under-theorized most likely because it often goes entirely unrecognized. 
Social movements seek political recognition in a very public and visible way, while 
everyday resistance frequently operates through culture and informal institutions of 
the family and social networks as opposed to organized political structures.  Despite 
this, such resistance engages in meaningful agency and as a result contributes to the 
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self-definition of oppressed groups who are otherwise entangled in a matrix of 
domination (bell hooks 1988; Collins 1990). 
Some have argued that anekdoty disappeared after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union due to the greater opportunities for freedom of expression or diminished 
censorship.  Although anekdoty do not wield the same power and influence today as 
they once did, the idea that their disappearance is a result of a renewed freedom of 
speech seems particularly misinformed. This explanation seems particularly inapt, 
considering the stuffed ballots of Vladimir Putin’s elections, the trials and mysterious 
deaths of outspoken journalists, and 2012 incarceration of the punk rock band Pussy 
Riot for an anti-Kremlin musical performance in an Orthodox Church. After Vladimir 
Putin’s first election in 2000, there was a resurgence of anekdoty, especially online, 
challenging the legitimacy of his position. Protests have been more common in post-
Soviet space, but participation in these public and organized acts of resistance can 
have very dire consequences—social exile, prison or death. As a result, it seems as 
though the need for such underground expressions of dissent and coping with 
continuing hardships still exists as evident in the following contemporary anekdot:   
The Chairman of the Election Commission comes to Putin after the election: 
“I have good news and bad news. Which do you want to hear first?” 
“The bad news,” replied Putin. 
“ The Communist Party candidate got 75% of the votes.” 
“Holy crap!” – cried Putin. “What is the good news?” 
“You got 76%.” 
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It is true the popularity of anekdoty has declined in contemporary Russia, yet 
what is interesting is how they continue to be exchanged online among Russians 
living abroad.  How contemporary Russians use anekdoty was out of the scope of this 
project, since the focus of the study was upon the Soviet Russians. Because there was 
not enough space to interrogate the post-Soviet variety of anekdoty and the type of 
people who exchange them, future research might explore how this community and 
collectivity abroad continues to engage in anekdot exchange in online forums. 
Russian expats living abroad maintain the collective memory and identity articulated 
by the anekdot in a way that may be different from those who remained in Russia.  
An argument I make in this dissertation is that anekdoty are intimately tied to 
a collectivity that is defined by their narratives, therefore the decline of their 
exchange in contemporary Russia may not be related to freedom of speech, but 
instead a reflection of a fractured collectivity, of people who no longer identify at this 
national level. Instead, people may identify along class lines or party lines, or perhaps 
the sense of a collective identity and memory is something that has declined entirely 
in post-Soviet rhetoric. Out of the scope of this dissertation were also the anekdoty of 
non-Russian Soviet nationalities since the emphasis was upon those narratives 
exchanged by Russians in their native or primary language. However, it would be 
interesting to compare Russian anekdoty with the jokelore of other Soviet populations 
in order to see how the relationships between these national and ethnic groups are 
constructed differently from other vantage points. Further, the perception of the Party, 
Soviet State or other institutions may differ by group, opinions and perceptions that 
may be captured in other cultural jokelores as they are in Russian anekdoty. Future 
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research might also engage in an ethnographic exploration of contemporary Russians 
to better understand where the creative energies and resistance have been directed.  
In her ethnography of post-Soviet Moscow, Olga Shevchenko (2009) explores 
the new identities that have emerged among Muscovites in the late 1990s, divided 
along class lines and coping with an uncertain landscape of politics, health care, and 
underground economies of knowledge and goods.  The expression of such new 
identities and social issues presents possibilities for future research that might explore 
the presence and absence of anekdoty among contemporary Russians or other non-
Russian, ex-Soviet collectivities and how such discourses engage with contemporary 
social and economic politics of Russians in the world today. I plan to explore these 
new forms of everyday resistance and cultural forms of protest in future work through 
intensive interviews and ethnographic exploration. 
At the end of Domination and the art of Resistance, James Scott writes, 
“When the first declaration of the hidden transcript succeeds, its mobilizing 
capacity as a symbolic act is potentially awesome… if the results seem like 
moments of madness, if the politics they engender is tumultuous, frenetic, 
delirious, and occasionally violent, that is perhaps because the powerless are 
so rarely on the public stage and have so much to say and do when they finally 
arrive” (1990: 227). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was not necessarily one of these “moments of 
madness,” yet recent protests in contemporary Russia that challenge the legitimacy of 
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elections, publically deride corrupt government officials and other dishonest 
businesses may be an indication of such “tumultuous, frenetic, delirious, and 
occasionally violent” politics. The argument that anekdoty have disappeared because 
censorship has been lifted or that people feel safe to speak out is a laughable 
conjecture—especially in light of those dissidents that have been indefinitely 
imprisoned
21
 or mysteriously “disappear”
22
 after speaking out against the 
government.  
The disappearance of anekdoty in contemporary Russia may indicate how 
hidden transcripts are becoming public—journalists and protesters speaking out and 
voicing dissent in public spaces. Unlike the social movement model that would 
expect these hidden transcripts to develop into an organized, systematic revolution 
against the state power, in contemporary Russia, we see bursts of protests and vocal, 
visible resistance to the State. The resistance against the state is not uniform in its 
interests or intentions and seems to be anything but organized. Despite this frenetic 
formation, this resistance may still be incredibly powerful in affecting social and 
political change. Just as anekdoty originated in small villages that told different local 
stories, we see how these isolated, but visible expressions of protest might begin to 
create cultures across people and places.  
                                                 
21
 On February 17, 201,2 five members of the group staged an illegal performance in 
Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. Their actions were stopped by church security officials. 
Three of the members were charged and found guilty of “hooliganism” and eventually given a prison 
sentence of two years. 
22
 A report and database published by the International Federation of Journalists in 340 deaths and 
disappearances of Russian journalists since 1993 (journalists-in-russia.org accessed October 19 2012). 
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 This research has developed the concept of cultural consciousness, an 
awareness and worldview that enables people who are atomized by repressive forces 
to connect and find a sense of meaning and belonging.  This consciousness may be 
resistant to power in some situations, while reifying of it in others.  As a coping 
mechanism and means of collective identification, it offers the collectivity a social, 
cultural and historical location within a repertoire of emplotted stories.  In this 
dissertation, I have demonstrated the importance of paying attention to and analyzing 
cultural expressions such as the anekdot, in order to understand the sentiments and 
national identities of the people who participate in their consumption and exchange.  
Political motivations, identities, or actions are not easily discernible from outward or 
public behaviors.  Opinions are not always directly expressed due to censorship or the 
respondent’s own ambivalence.  Studying popular culture discourses, voices from 
below, can provide the researcher with an intimate view into tight-knit communities 
that do not regularly open up to outsiders.  It also enables us to understand the 
political nature of even the seemingly most benign—it’s just a joke after all, right? 
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Appendix A: The Compilations 
 
1. Andreevich, Evgenii. 1951 Kreml’ I Narod: Politicheskie anekdoty. 
Munich: Glolos naroda. 
This compilation was found in the Russian State Library in Moscow, Russia.  This 
volume was published in Germany in 1951, making it the earliest of all the 
compilations in this study. Although the height of anekdot exchange occurred only 
after Stalin’s death (1953-onward), the anekdoty in this volume dealt with many 
similar themes as those in other volumes. The anekdoty in this volume tended to be 
more morbid or gruesome, referencing famine and death camps, though many of the 
sentiments were very similar to later anthologies. Nothing is known about the author, 
the last name is Russian, though it might be presumed that it is a pseudonym in that 
the author risked her/his life in publishing such anti-Soviet sentiments at the height of 
its power and control. 
2. Verner, Artur. 1980. Rossia smeetsia nad SSSR. Chitaite anekdoty! 
Smotrite! Smeites’! Paris: Ritm, 1980. 
This collection was found in the Russian State Library in Moscow. Artur Verner was 
a Russian Jew, born in Tula, Russia.  In Soviet Russia, he was a distributor of anti-
Soviet samizdat; abroad he worked for Russian broadcast radio that was aired on the 
BBC and Radio Canada International.  He was originally trained as a doctor and 
served in the Soviet military before immigrating to Israel in 1971 and then to 
Germany in 1974.  The anthology of anekdoty was assembled from Verner’s personal 
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anekdoty exchanges as well as the various samizdat and radio pieces he had read and 
heard over the years. 
3. Zand, Arie. 1982. Political Jokes of Leningrad. Austin, TX: Silvergirl, Inc.  
This volume was found in the St. Petersburg book store, House of Books. Based upon 
the last name, we would assume that the author is Jewish, and the publication location 
indicates that the author may be a Jewish émigré. The anekdoty in this anthology had 
considerable overlap with other anthologies and seemed worth including in that it was 
published before the dissolution of the USSR and it reflects another perspective upon 
the Soviet State and the Party as well as daily living conditions in Leningrad. The title 
and the forward indicate that the anekdoty included in the volume were heard by the 
author when living in Leningrad-now-St. Petersburg.  As such, the volume offers a 
rich source of firsthand experiences with these narratives. 
 
4. Telesin, Iulius. 1986. 101 izbranni sovetskii politicheskii anekdot. Tenfly, 
NJ: Ermitazh. 
This volume was found in National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg. The anekdoty 
in this compilation were collected by the author over 10 years leading up to its 
publication. Telesin explains that many of them were written down on napkins before 
the 1970s when it would have been impossible to write them elsewhere. He says that 
most of the anekdoty were heard or told in the last few years before he emigrated. 
Telesin says that the book has “many authors,” in that many of the jokes have been 
published by others, but also that he was told these anekdoty by such a wide variety 
of people and it would be impossible to properly credit each person for each 
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contribution.  Instead he explains that these narratives are the creation of a nation and 
a network of connected people.  Telesin explains that the jokes included do not reflect 
his taste, but rather that he felt that it was inappropriate to censor the anekdoty of 
others.  Specifically he preemptively says that before you get mad at him about 
offensive anekdoty, remember, “I DID NOT COME UP WITH THEM!”  Telesin has 
organized these 1001 anekdoty in a chronological and topographical system, but even 
this, he explains, is his own tailoring and does not necessarily reflect how others 
would classify or organize.  Each section is prefaced by a short historical blurb about 
the significance of the particular category of anekdoty. 
 
5. Shatzkii, R. 1990. Anekdot: Ul’ibk zhiznii. Tula: Prioksko knizhno 
izdatel’stovo. 
This compilation was found in the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg. The 
collection includes over 1000 anekdoty that were derived from many different 
sources, including published and unpublished books, magazines and diaries as well as 
personal conversations. Although the compilation did include some works that were 
published (and therefore state-sanctioned), the book is published in 1990 before full 
censorship had been lifted, and the anekdoty in this volume were very similar in tone 
to the other collections, therefore the narratives were considered part of the target 
population. 
6. Roblesh. 1991. Anekdotii. Maikop, Russia: Ad’geyskoe Knijnoy. 
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This publication was found in the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg. The 
author explains that the compilation is a selection of those anekdoty that he heard 
during the Soviet years. He encourages the readers to use the anekdoty when spending 
free time with friends, when bored waiting in a long line, or when driving with 
friends. These recommendations imply that this is the way he collected these 
narratives over the years before it was safe to publish them in written form. After the 
Revolution, published forms of anekdoty disappeared, but he explains that this was 
not because people were laughing, but rather because they were doing so in private. 
Unlike some of the other authors, this author does claim that he selectively included 
only those that he found to be funny or representative of this particular era of time. 
 
7. (no author). 1991. Sovetskii Anekdot. Moscow: Datastrom. 
This compilation was found in the Russian State Library in Moscow. Although the 
forward does not explain how the anekdoty were compiled, it does note to the reader 
that s/he will encounter jokes about politics and everyday life, students and army 
officers, as well as the classic Soviet characters of Shtirlitz, Vovochka, Lenin, and the 
other Soviet leaders. The compilation is intended to provide the reader with a wide 
breadth of topics and characters. 
 
8. Posvezhinov, Igor.  1991.  Anekdoty.  Voronezh, Russia: Literaturno-
chudozhestvennoe izdanii. 
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This compilation was found in the Russian State Library in Moscow.  The author 
argues that jokes reflect the health of a nation.  For this reason, he includes both those 
anekdoty that he finds humorous and tasteful, and those that he finds sorrowful and 
crude.  He argues that it is important to see all of the varieties in order to understand 
the sentiments and realities of a people.  The anekdoty are from the author’s own 
recollection, as well as the recollection of others with whom he consulted in the 
creation of this volume.  The author explains that he has intentionally included both 
crass humor that ought to make the reader cringe as well as intellectual anekdoty that 
require careful thought and reflection.  The authors says that he has not distorted or 
censored these narratives and voices, therefore the anekdoty in the collection are 
representative those that were exchanged by Russian people. 
 
9. Kluckinoe-Vituk, M. U. 1992 Sovetskii Anekdot. Moscow: Russian 
Encyclopedia. 
This publication was found in the National Library of Russia in St. Petersburg. The 
anthology was compiled right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, therefore the 
anekdoty are still fresh in the editor’s memory and he is able to distinguish new or 
“fresh” anekdoty from old ones that “have a beard.”  Kluckinoe-Vituk says that he 
has included Soviet anekdoty from as far back as he remembers in the middle of the 
century until 1991.  He does not explain how he collected the anekdoty, but argues 
that anekdoty do not exist in isolation but are told in succession, which implies that 
this was the context in which he heard them.  He explains how anekdoty are always 
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engaging with other anekdoty or cultural phenomena, creating a historical, social, and 
cultural landscape that surround the people who tell them.  He encourages the reader 
to understand these relationships as s/he reads through the collection, which he says is 
reflective of a “national consciousness”. 
 
10. Borev, Iurii Borisovich. 1995. Istoriia gosudarstva sovetskogo v 
predaniiakh I anekdotakh. Moscow: Ripol. 
Iurii Borev is a writer and scholar with a doctorate in linguistics.  In his preface, 
Borev explains that he has been collecting anekdoty for over half a century from a 
variety of personal and literary sources.  Borev argues that anekdoty are intellectual 
folklore, a conceptual combination that was oxymoronic before the Soviet Union. In 
nineteenth century Russia, intellectuals directed creative energies toward written 
texts, in the form of letters or published literary works.  Oral folklore was the text of 
commoners and farm workers who were often illiterate or lacked the spare time to 
read. Yet the censorship of the Soviet Union forced the creative impulses of 
intellectuals into the commoner’s tradition of folklore, since satire or documentation 
of other anti-Soviet sentiments were a punishable capital offense.  Oral folklore was 
more difficult to confiscate or punish.   As a result, anekdoty managed to transcend 
class and geographical boundaries, uniting both intellectuals and commoners in 
laughter.  He argues that this genre brings together these two groups most frequently 
around historical anekdoty that bring together literary references to the high culture of 
Pushkin as well as the lived experiences of intellectuals and commoners alike.  
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Shared history and shared experiences are the common denominators that he found 
most popular in his anthology of anekdoty.   
 
11. Trachtenberg, Roman. 2006. Tonna anekdotov sovetskikh. St. Petersburg: 
Astrell, SPB. 
This volume was found in the St. Petersburg bookstore, House of Books. Roman 
Lvovich Trachtenberg was a Russian radio host and actor. He compiled the anekdoty 
in this volume from personal recollections as well as those jokes that were submitted 
to him online. As a comedian and Soviet citizen, it is likely that many of the anekdoty 
included in this volume were told or heard by the author before and after it was legal 
to tell them. 
 
12. Koshelev, Pavel.  2010.  Anekdotii o Politikach ot SSSR do Yeltsina. St. 
Petersburg: Vedi. 
This volume was found in the St. Petersburg bookstore, House of Books.  This 
anthology of anekdoty was assembled by Pavel Koshelev, who served as the deputy 
of the Department of Culture for the Leningrad Town Party Committee during the 
Soviet Union. Although the anekdoty are not referenced, the author says that he often 
remembers the particular circumstances in which he first heard them or who initially 
told each narrative to him, though he does not include these details in the collection.  
The anekdoty in the collection come from the author’s parents, close relatives, 
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teachers and friends in high school and college. Some of the jokes come from his 
friends who served in the Politburo of the Party Committee or those who served in the 
KGB!  Although there were many who did suffer for telling or hearing anekdoty, the 
author believes that none of his friends or family who told or laughed along to these 
jokes suffered any legal repercussions.  
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